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Business Angels  (BAs) are wealthy individuals whose investments in entrepreneurial 
ventures enable them to increase the likelihood of both attracting subsequent Venture Capital 
(VC) and achieving long-term venture success. Unfortunately more than 95% of 
entrepreneurs seeking funds from BAs are unable to do so, raising questions about whether 
this high failure rate might be reduced. Scholars suggest the answer lies in gaining a better 
understanding of the investment decision process itself and identifying why opportunities are 
rejected at each stage of the decision process. However, the private nature of the interaction 
between BA and fund-seeking entrepreneur constrains our ability to observe the multistage 
nature of the interaction and how rejection reasons change at each stage. As a consequence, 
much research relies on BA’s biased post-decision recollections, which limits our ability to 
understand the decision process and identify opportunities for improvement. 
In this research we overcome these constraints by observing interactions from the 
reality TV show Dragons’ Den, where fund-seeking entrepreneurs pitch their early stage 
businesses to five BAs. During the interaction, each BA must either make an offer to invest 
or provide a reason for rejection. We develop hypotheses about why this complex decision 
evolves over several stages, and why rejection reasons change at each stage, which we then 
test by coding observations and decision outcomes.    
We draw on research in behavioral economics and decision making to propose that 
BAs use heuristics to reduce their decision making effort at each stage and initially examine 
the criteria that are easiest to retrieve. They then assesses each opportunity based on the most 
easily retrieved criteria and reject those they believe unlikely to achieve their aspiration level 
for required return, or because the risk of failure exceeds the BA’s own risk aspiration level. 
 
iv 
We propose that during subsequent stages of the interaction, each BA audits the 
entrepreneur’s behaviors to assess performance and relationship risk, rejecting those where 
the risk level exceeds their aspiration level.  
We use trained observers to code the information exchanges and behavioral cues 
provided by the entrepreneur to find support for our hypotheses. We observe that, during the 
venture assessment stage, BAs do reject opportunities that fail to reach aspiration levels for 
investment return or investment risk, however, contrary to normative assumptions we find 
BAs do not trade off investment risk for investment return. For opportunities not rejected, we 
observe BAs assess how the entrepreneur’s behaviors and decisions inform their assessment 
of managerial risk and increase the likelihood of venture failure. We note BAs are more 
likely to reject entrepreneurs whose behaviors indicate low level of capabilities, experiences 
or traits, while excess traits can also increase this likelihood. For opportunities not rejected at 
this stage, we observe BAs audit the entrepreneur’s trust behaviors to inform their assessment 
of the relationship risk. We find BAs more likely to reject entrepreneurs who damage or violate 
trust in comparison to those who build trust. We also observe that BAs invest in entrepreneurs 
who damage trust, but only if they can introduce appropriate behavioral controls. 
Our observations help explain the multistage nature of the decision process and why 
opportunities are rejected at each stage. We suggest that better prepared entrepreneurs who 
display appropriate behaviors are less likely to be rejected.  Increased understanding of the 
decision process enables BAs to improve their decision-making, while knowledgeable policy 
makers will be better able to cost-effectively deploy appropriate resources to enhance funding 
activities. Our observations should encourage academics to further explore entrepreneurial 
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1 Angel Decision Making 
1.1 Introduction – why the interest in financing high growth ventures  
The long-term success of high growth ventures, often called Gazelles1, is important for 
regional economic wealth creation, they stimulate local infrastructure, develop secondary 
businesses, launch new technologies, and create high paying jobs (Carree & Thurik, 2010). 
Their success is not only of interest to entrepreneurs and their stakeholders, but also to 
governments and economic development agencies (Kelly, 2007: Mason & Harrison, 2000; 
Mason, 2006). Yet many of these ventures fail to achieve their growth potential because they 
are unable to find external funding at the early stage of their development (Van Osnabrugge, 
2000). 
External funding is often required to finance product development and/or infrastructure 
investment in advance of revenues. While initial funding is often from the entrepreneur and 
his or her family and friends, equity funding can also be raised from third party investors 
(Van Osnabrugge, 2000). Equity investors are specifically interested in high potential 
ventures that offer the opportunity for a high return on investment to compensate for the 
inherent risk in the business (Riding, 2008). The most frequent investors in early stage 
ventures are individual Business Angels2 (BAs) who Sohl (2011) notes invest in twenty 
times as many ventures than the more frequently researched institutional Venture Capitalists 
(VCs) (Wong, Bhatia & Freeman, 2009).  
Not only do BAs invest more often than VCs, and more money (PWC, 2010; Sohl, 
2011), they invest at earlier stages in the venture creation process, in contrast to VCs who 
                                                      
1	  High-­‐growth	  firms	  experiencing	  growth	  rates	  of	  >	  20	  percent	  over	  at	  least	  a	  3	  year	  period	  (NACO,	  2011).	  
2	  The	  term	  Angel	  investor	  originated	  early	  in	  the	  20th	  century,	  and	  referred	  to	  individuals	  who	  invested	  
in	  Broadway	  shows	  (Benjamin	  &	  Margulis,	  1996).	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prefer to invest larger amounts at later stages in the venture creation process that offer shorter 
exit cycles and lower perceived risk (Sapienza, Manigart, & Vermeir, 1996). BA funding can 
also be a pre-requisite for VC investment, by demonstrating a track record of performance to a 
potential future investor (Madill, Haines, & Riding, 2005). BA funding, often accompanied by 
direct assistance from the BA, also increases the likelihood of achieving a successful exit event 
(Landström, 1993; Mason & Harrison, 2002b).  As Foremski (2008) notes: “venture capitalists 
… have outsourced much of the seed investing to angels. The angel investors are now a more 
important generator of the next wave of start-ups than ever before”.  
Given the potential economic impact of high growth ventures, it is concerning to find 
that more that 95% of entrepreneurs in Canada who seek BA equity investment fail to attract 
funding (Riding, Duxbury & Haines, 1997). Similar low rates are observed in the U.S. and 
the U.K..  While this high failure rate might be due to a lack of investable companies, Frear, 
Sohl, and Wetzel (2002) suggest that the low success rate may be due to inefficiencies in the 
process and suggest we focus on understanding the decision process itself. Focusing on the  
reasons that opportunities fail to attract funding will allow us to identify opportunities to 
improve the process and increase the number of ventures able to attract funding. While this is 
the primary motivation for our research we are conscious that government policymakers who 
wish to stimulate increased levels of BA activity need to better understand the investment 
process.  As Riding, Madill & Haines (2007, p332) note “the design of any such incentives 
should be grounded in a thorough understanding of Business Angels’ motivations, decision-
making processes and criteria”.  
1.2 The Business Angel Investment Decision 
Much research on the BA investment decision process assumes that BAs make their 
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investment decisions in a similar manner to the more frequently observed VCs. As a 
consequence, they use evidence from VC decisions to propose how BAs make decisions. 
However this assumption is flawed, as there are differences between BA and VC motivations 
that influence their decision processes.  Further, this incorrect assumption can misinform fund-
seeking entrepreneurs pitching to BAs and cause them to interact with and make presentations to 
BAs that reduce rather than increase their likelihood of attracting investment.  
Van Osnabrugge (2000) suggests that the most important difference between BAs and 
VCs that influences the investment decision is the fundamental agency difference between 
them. VCs are professional fund managers who must justify their selection and rejection 
decisions to their investors, while BAs invest their own money and do not need to justify their 
decisions to anyone. Further, VCs are financially motivated professional fund managers, 
compensated by a management fee and a share of any increase in equity value (Schwarzkopf, 
Lévesque, & Maxwell, 2010). In contrast, BAs have both financial and psychic motivations 
(Wetzel, 1981) and only achieve a financial gain when their shares are sold (Mason, 2006). 
BAs and VCs also have different views of their portfolio of investments. VCs tend to invest in 
a number of companies over a set time frame specializing within a certain domain. BAs not 
constrained by portfolio requirements tend to invest in a more limited number of opportunities 
but over a broader range of industries (Mason & Harrison, 2002a).    
These differences encourage the two types of equity investor to make different 
decisions, VCs are more likely to look for ‘home runs’ (Mason & Harrison, 2002b), while 
BAs look are more interested in making a reasonable return on investment in a venture 
where they are able to directly contribute to venture growth (Mason & Harrisonb, 2002; 
Wetzel, 1981). Importantly, VCs view the entrepreneur as replaceable if things don’t work 
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out (Bruton, Fried & Hisrich, 2000), while the BA assumes that making an investment in an 
early stage venture is the start of a long-term relationship with the entrepreneur.  As a result 
BAs pay closer attention to the entrepreneur and their relationship with them than do VCs.  
This research attempts to improve understanding of the BA investment decision by 
developing hypotheses based on on behavioral economics and decision-making research and 
evidence from previous BA investment decision research to address the research gap identified 
by Landström (1998) who notes “[t]here are few studies which have attempted to bring out the 
nuances in informal investors' decision making criteria” and suggests the development of studies 
that consider “investment as a process in which decision  making criteria may vary in the course 
of time” (p. 322). 
We start by reviewing evidence from previous investigations into how BAs make 
decisions that identify the multistage nature of the decision process, and the significant 
number of criteria that influence the decision at each stage. We also provide an overview of 
decision-making research that enables us to develop specific hypotheses about the different 
decision techniques used and the decision criteria considered at each process stage.  Each 
chapter of the thesis examines one stage of the process, and combines a theoretical view of 
how investors make decisions with evidence from previous BA research. This allows us to 
develop hypotheses that propose how and why opportunities are rejected at each stage. We 
continue each chapter by explaining the coding schema we develop to find support for each 
of our hypotheses, and then present our results and analyses, as well as the implications for 
reducing failure rates at that stage of the process.  
Maxwell, Jeffrey & Lévesque (2011) review existing literature to identify 27 criteria 
that BAs consider when making their investment decision, although they observe that only 
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eight critical venture factors are considered during the selection stage of the process where 
the majority of opportunities are rejected.  They also observe that at subsequent stages of the 
interaction other criteria influence the investment decision. Mason and Harrison (2002b) also 
observe that BAs consider different criteria to reject opportunities at each stage. The 
observation that the nature of the rejection decision changes at each stage of the process 
encourages us to break down the decision process into based on the identification of different 
rejection reasons to help us understand which specific factors impact the rejection decision at 
each stage. Examining the relationship between factors at each stage will also help us 
identify which factors are compensatory and which are not (Mason & Harrison, 1996a). 
The phase of the investment decision in which we are interested is the evaluation phase 
when entrepreneur and investor first meet. This phase is part of the overall process as shown 
in Figure 1.1 that includes: origination, interaction and due diligence, as well as two post-
funding activities: management and exit (Duxbury, Haines & Riding, 1997; Paul, Whittam & 
Wyper, 2007; Riding, Madill & Haines, 2007). Origination is the phase before the 
entrepreneur and BA first meet when trusted advisors filter opportunities and only refer to 
the BA those that are appropriate (Paul, Whittam, & Wyper 2007).  During the evaluation 
phase the entrepreneur and investor first meet and various criteria are sequentially retrieved 
and assessed. During this phase the BA observes the informational and behavioral cues 
provided by the entrepreneur and make the decision to reject an opportunity or make an 
investment offer. The subsequent due diligence phase takes place once an investment offer 
has been made. During this phase the BA looks to confirm the veracity of information 
provided during the interaction (Haines, Madill & Riding, 2003).  Management of the 
venture occurs once the venture is funded and if successful leads to the point where the BA 
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Figure 1-1 Stages of the BA investment process 
Despite recognition that the evaluation phase is a complex multistage decision process, 
there has been limited effort to theoretically explain the nature of the multistage process,  
how the decision process and reason for rejection changes at each stage. In part this 
limitation stems from the fact that it is difficult to gather data from real BA interactions due 
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observing such interactions, and particularly of identifying the different reasons for rejection 
at each stage make it challenging to understand how theories from behavioral decision-
making might be supported with evidence from the BA investment decision. Yet the ability 
to understand each stage of the process is critical to an appreciation of the investment 
decision process as a whole.    
In this research, we build on the observations of Maxwell, Jeffrey and Lévesque (2011) 
who note that time constrained BAs use a multistage decision process based on a desire to 
minimize the cognitive decision effort required. Mason and Harrison (2003) comment that 
BAs enter the interaction with a negative mindset and look to reject opportunities at each 
stage. During the selection stage when BA and entrepreneur first meet, Maxwell et al., 
(2011) find that BAs use a non-compensatory Eliminations-By-Aspect heuristic (Tversky, 
1972) to rapidly eliminate opportunities that are determined by the BAs to have a fatal flaw 
in any one of eight critical venture criteria3. BAs use of heuristics at this stage reduces the 
retrieval and assessment effort required and allows the BA to allocate his or her limited time 
to spend on those opportunities that are more promising (Mason & Rogers (1997). 
We build on the observations that experienced BAs use heuristics and suggest that at 
each stage BAs make the most cognitively efficient decision, adapting and deploying 
rejection techniques to minimize the overall assessment effort required (Payne, Bettman, & 
Johnson, 1988). Based on a heuristics framework (which we discuss in detail in chapter 4 – 
Table 4.2) we suggest that BAs use decision techniques that require greater cognitive effort 
later in the process when fewer opportunities are still being considered. This approach 
                                                      
3 Rejection reasons may be personal, for example: poor fit or lack of market expertise (Smith, Harrison & 
Mason, 2010), however in our research we observe five BAs simultaneously making decisions, reducing the 




enables us to develop a four-stage model of the investment decision process as shown in 
Figure 1.2, with different criteria being retrieved and assessed at each stage. In this model, 
we characterize each stage by the final rejection reason given by the last BA to lose interest 
in an opportunity. This can be based on the assessment of: critical venture criteria where 
rejection is due to the presence of a fatal flaw; venture criteria where rejection is due to 
insufficient investment return or excess performance risk; manifestations of the 
entrepreneur’s behaviors where rejection is due to excess managerial risk; and, the 
identification of trust behaviors where rejection is due to excess relationship risk. Breaking 
down the overall process into these four stages allows us to ask our research question: How 
do BA’s use their assessments of specific venture criteria and observations of entrepreneur 
behaviors to reject opportunities at each stage of the multistage investment process?  
In this thesis we look to identify reasons why opportunities are rejected after the 
selection stage. During the previous selection stage, BAs are found to use non-compensatory 
rejection techniques where the identification of a fatal flaw is sufficient reason for rejection 
(Maxwell, Jeffrey & Lévesque, 2011). We hope that focusing on the subsequent stages will 
enable us to address previous research questions about the relationship between the horse 
(venture) and the jockey (entrepreneur) (Harrison & Mason, 2002; MacMillan, Siegel & Subba 
Narasimha, 1985). In the thesis we present three core chapters with each focusing on a specific 
stage of the process, with a conclusion in chapter 5 that includes insights from each aspect of 
our research. In each chapter we combine insights from behavioral economics and decision 
making with entrepreneurship research to develop hypotheses about why and how BAs will 
reject opportunities at each stage of the process, and develop and deploy coding schema to 







Figure 1-2 Stages of BA and fund-seeking entrepreneur interaction and rejection reason 
 
Our initial observations of the interaction persuaded us to undertake our research in 
reverse order to the posited interaction sequence. This was because we observed and 
collected data based on the final rejection reason - excess relationship risk, first and were 
intrigued to understand why an otherwise promising opportunity was rejected at the end of 
an extended4 interaction.  Observations of the final stage of the interaction encouraged us to 
examine information exchanges and behavioral cues at each stage of the process, code 
interactions based on the reactions of the BA, and record to dichotomous decision outcomes: 
investment offer, and moving to the next stage of the interaction. In this section we introduce 
the chapters in reverse order to the way they are written in the thesis, as this helps to explain 
the interaction context, and specifically how criteria observed at one stage inform the 
assessment of other criteria at subsequent stages. However, in the thesis, we present the 
chapters in the order in which they were written as the theory development from one chapter 
to the next follows that sequence. 
                                                      
4	   During	   the	   process	   of	   developing	   the	   coding	   schema	   we	   coded	   interaction	   length,	   	   controlling	   for	  
demonstration	  time.	  While	  we	   found	  a	  strong	  relationship	  between	  the	  two,	   this	  simply	  confirmed	  our	  























































	  	  	  
	  	  	  






















































































In Chapter 4 we explore how the BA’s examination of the venture criteria informs his 
or her assessment of the two investment decision criteria: investment return and investment 
risk and how this influences the rejection decision at the venture assessment stage (Feeney, 
Haines & Riding, 1999; Modigliani, & Pogue, 1974).  The BA’s assessment of the 
investment return is calculated based on the amount the BA will receive back when he or she 
is able to exit from the investment (usually by selling the equity to an acquirer), divided by 
the initial amount invested, controlling for time.  The amount the BA will receive is a 
function of the future venture value and percentage equity at the time of sale. Venture value 
is determined by the marketplace, but increases with higher levels of revenues, profitability 
and revenue growth. Venture criteria assessed by the BA at this stage are those directly 
linked to increases in future venture value.  The BA’s assessment of the investment risk is 
the assessment of the likelihood of venture failure as this is the most likely alternate outcome 
to success. At this stage the BA considers the inherent technology, financial, operational and 
people risks in the venture. As a result, the venture criteria assessed by the BA at this stage 
are those linked to factors that likely increase the risk of venture failure.   
We propose that BAs will minimize the cognitive effort required at the venture 
assessment stage of the decision process in two ways, first by using the priority heuristic 
which avoids the need to make complex decisions that trade off risk and return. Second we 
suggest that BAs will use satisficing techniques rather than the assessment of absolute value 
when determining whether targets for investment return or risk can be achieved. We propose 
that the BA will reject an opportunity if they think that there is little likelihood of achieving 
the required level of investment return, or if they determine that the investment risk is 
excessive.   
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In investigating criteria are compensatory and those that are non-compensatory we 
propose that the four venture sub-criteria that inform the assessment of the investment return 
are compensatory, as are the four venture sub-criteria that inform the assessment of the 
investment risk. However we also posit that, contrary to normative assumptions, the 
relationship between investment return sub-criteria and investment risk sub-criteria is non-
compensatory, such that a higher level of investment return cannot compensate for a higher 
level of investment risk. 
In Chapter 3 we propose that BAs reject opportunities due to the assessment of 
excessive managerial risk. They determine this risk by auditing the entrepreneur’s behaviors 
to assess the entrepreneurs underlying characteristics: capabilities, experiences and traits. 
Observations of current behaviors are found to be the most accurate predictors of future 
behaviors (Ouellete & Wood, 1998). We propose that the assessment of managerial risk 
moderates the initial assessment of the investment risk (in combination the performance risk) 
such that the BA will reject an opportunity where the combination of the inherent risk in the 
venture and the managerial risk due to the entrepreneur’s anticipated future behaviors, 
increases the likelihood of venture failure above an acceptable level.  
We propose that fewer displays of behaviors seen as manifestations of capabilities, 
experiences and traits, increase the BA’s perception of managerial risk and reduce the likelihood 
of a obtaining an investment offer, or moving to the next interaction stage.  We also suggest that 
excess displays of these traits will reduce this likelihood (for example excessive confidence). 
Manifestations of excessive traits cause concerns about the quality of the entrepreneur’s future 
decisions and increase the likelihood of the entrepreneur making an ill-advised decision, which 
increases the managerial risk and reduces the likelihood of an investment offer. 
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In Chapter 2, we propose that BAs reject opportunities due to their assessment of 
excessive relationship risk due to concerns that the entrepreneur will put their own interests 
ahead of the BA.  BAs assess this risk by looking for the entrepreneur’s displays of trust 
damaging or violating behaviors that reduce confidence in the relationship and increase the 
perception of relationship risk.  Confidence in the relationship can also be reduced by the 
absence of trust building behaviors. Higher levels of trust damaging behaviors and lower 
levels of trust building behaviors increase the likelihood of the BA rejecting an opportunity 
at this stage of the process. However, in the case of certain types of trust damaging 
behaviors, relationship confidence can be restored through the introduction of behavioral 
controls. However while entrepreneurs who damage trust can still receive an investment 
offer, trust violation virtually precludes that possibility. The difference between trust damage 
and violation is one of intent; trust can be damaged through omission or accidentally, trust 
violation involves intent to deceive (Marsh & Dibben, 2005).   
Due to our inability to directly observe due diligence, we exclude from our research the 
subsequent stage of the interaction.  During this stage opportunities that receive an 
investment offer are subject to due-diligence when previously provided information is 
verified and a detailed shareholder agreement is drawn up that can include behavioral and 
other controls. Failures at this stage of the process are usually due to the provision of 
incorrect information, or the making of inappropriate assumptions during the interaction. 
Other reasons for failure are related to current venture valuation, or the unwillingness of the 
entrepreneur to accept control clauses in the shareholder agreement. 
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1.3 Overcoming the constraints of prior research  
Much BA investment decision research has been constrained by the confidential nature 
of the interaction, which usually takes place in private and evolves over a series of meetings 
(Harrison, Mason & Robson, 2003).  The ability to observe traditional interactions in real 
time is therefore limited, as a consequence of which, researchers have been forced to gather 
insights about the investment from the BA once the decision has been made. Yet utilizing 
investor recollections is unreliable as it can introduce hindsight and confirmation biases that 
rationalize previous decisions rather than report what actually happened (Mynatt, Doherty, & 
Tweney 1977). It is also difficult to recount cognitive processes in retrospect (Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977) or to gather insights into why opportunities are rejected at each stage of the 
process.   
An alternate approach to understanding the BA investment decision is to use surveys to 
investigate how BAs think they made previous decisions (i.e. Cressy, & Olofsson, 1997) or 
to use conjoint analysis to gather data on how investors think they will rank the relative 
importance of various criteria in a future investment decision (i.e. Landström, 1998). 
However both of these research techniques cause generalizability concerns because most 
investors suggest that they consider more decision criteria than they actually use (Zacharakis 
& Meyer, 1998) and there is limited evidence that investors use the decision techniques they 
espouse (Shepherd, 1999). 
An alternate approach is through the use of verbal protocol analysis (Ericsson & 
Simon, 1984), where BAs explain their thought processes while they are in the process of 
making a decision (i.e. Mason & Stark, 2004). While this improves understanding of the 
overall process, for example by helping to identify the stages of the process, it is often 
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undertaken as a hypothetical exercise as gathering insights from the BAs while he or she is 
making an actual decision tends to interfere with the decision process itself.  To avoid this,  
verbal protocol analysis is often used with videotapes of previous interactions, however this 
creates other validity issues due to the absence of any direct interaction between the 
entrepreneur and the BA (Mason & Harrison, 2003). In addition, any research method that 
involves hypothetical rather than actual decisions is likely to record decisions that don’t 
reflect real decisions as Rabin (2000) notes, behaviors and decisions of individuals under 
conditions actual risk deviate from how individuals predict they will behave under those 
conditions. The above discussion highlights a concern that insights gathered into the BA 
decision in previous research may not reflect the actual decision processes used (Mason & 
Rogers, 1997; Mason & Stark, 2004), which makes it challenging to identify opportunities 
for process improvement (Wiltbank, Read, Dew, & Saravathy, 2009). As Riding et al. (2007) 
point out in a review of BA investment research “there remains considerable room for 
research on the nature of the investment process itself” and “how the various decision criteria 
are weighted at different points in the process” (p. 336).   
A promising approach to overcome some these issues involves recording interactions 
and using trained observers to code and analyze the results of the interaction (Hall & Hofer, 
1993). We extend this approach by recording and coding a series of investment interactions 
between fund-seeking entrepreneurs and five BAs, where we code for venture criteria, 
entrepreneur behavior and the reactions of the BA. In Appendix A we explain in more detail 
the context and population of the 602 entrepreneur/BA interactions that form our data set and 
were taped for a reality TV show, CBC Dragons’ Den. During the show, in which we were 
directly involved, BAs made real investments at the end of a multistage interaction between 
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five BAs “The Dragons” and a fund-seeking entrepreneur. The interaction started with the 
first meeting between the entrepreneur and the BA and ended when one or more of the BAs 
made an investment offer, or all the BAs reject the opportunity. Coding of this interaction 
was enhanced by two factors: the requirement that each BA was required to provide a 
rejection reason; and, because the BAs were experiences and able to rapidly focus on critical 
issues, asking follow up questions where needed.  
Our coding was done in two phases, during the first of which we coded every 
interaction based on the last rejection reason provided by a BA. This enabled us to break up 
the data set into three groups based on the three rejection stages shown in Figure 1.2 (venture 
assessment, entrepreneur assessment or relationship assessment). We then coded each group 
of opportunities looking to link criteria assessed and retrieved with the rejection reason. The 
opportunities coded in Chapter 2 were the group that made it through the entrepreneur 
assessment stage.  Our theory development suggested that opportunities were rejected at this 
stage if the BA lacked confidence in the relationship, which we link to the display of trust 
behaviors. We developed a trust behavioral coding schema that allowed observers to code for 
displays of trust building, trust damaging and trust violating behaviors.  
The opportunities coded in Chapter 3 were the group that made it through the venture 
assessment stage.  Our theory development suggested that opportunities were rejected at this 
stage if the BA became concerned about the entrepreneur’s capability to achieve the 
venture’s potential or if the BA determines certain characteristics of the entrepreneur would 
increase the likelihood that the venture will fail. We propose that BAs audit the 
entrepreneur’s behaviors as manifestations of their underlying characteristics: capabilities, 
experiences and traits, and develop a coding schema to allow the observers to code for each. 
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The opportunities coded in Chapter 4 were the group that made it through the selection 
stage, where opportunities were rejected due to the presence of a fatal flaw. Our theory 
development suggested that opportunities were rejected at this stage if the BA assessed that 
the likely investment return would fall below their return aspiration level, or that the 
investment risk exceeded their risk aspiration level. We propose that BAs consider eight 
venture criteria that inform the assessment of each and deploy an existing coding schema to 
allow the observers to code for each of eight critical venture criteria. 
Through our direct involvement in the show’s production we were fortunate to have 
access to both the live interactions and recorded line tapes of the entrepreneur/BA 
interactions. This enabled us to adopt a research approach based on Observational Interaction 
(Bakeman & Gottman, 1997), a technique more frequently used in social psychology to 
explore interpersonal relationships. This facilitated our research approach and allowed us to 
look at how presented information exchanges and behavioral cues linked to the rejection 
decision at each stage.  
We are conscious that the use of a reality TV show for academic research raises a 
number of validity concerns, especially: the reality of the observed behavior, whether show 
participation influences entrepreneur behaviors and BA decisions outcomes, and selection 
bias. Given our direct involvement in the show we were able to confirm the reality of the 
interaction, and are aware of how both BAs and entrepreneurs were chosen. We do not 
propose that either the BAs or entrepreneurs are representative of their respective 
populations as a whole, but suggest that this research is exploratory and designed to help us 
understand why each opportunity was rejected. As Shanteau (1992) points out, using 
observing how experienced decision makers make real decisions facilitates understanding of 
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the decision process. In the case of this research, we are able to observe experienced BAs, 
with a track record of investing, provide reasons to reject specific opportunities which 
provides important insights into “how individuals arrive at decisions” (Riding, Madill & 
Haines, 2007: 336). We explain the context of the interaction and address validity concerns 
in more detail in Appendix A, where we also provide information as to how the observed 
Dragons’ Den interaction differs from more traditional investment interactions.   
1.4 Contributions  
A limitation of previous research in BA decision-making has been the lack of 
theoretical underpinning to explain the investment decision process and how decisions are 
made. Rather most research is descriptive - identifying specific criteria linked to success or 
failure (Riding, et al., 2007). We address this shortcoming in prior research using a heuristic 
theoretical framework (detailed in Table 4.2) based on the assumption that experienced BAs 
adopt decision processes that minimize the cognitive effort required. This allows us to 
propose the sequence in which BAs examine each criterion and how the assessment of each 
will inform the rejection decision. Observations that BAs use heuristics that sacrifice 
decision quality for expediency means that decision outcomes can deviations from normative 
assumption (Gigerenzer, 2008). A comprehensive understanding of the investment decision 
process also requires an understanding of these deviations, which we explain in the relevant 
chapter and restate in chapter 5. 
We link the rejection decision at each stage to the assessment of investment return and 
three components of investment risk, and highlight the fact that the relationship between 
investment return and investment risk is non-compensatory. We identify how four venture 
criteria influence the assessment of investment return, and how four venture criteria 
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influence the resident risk that is inherent in the venture (Yazdipour, 2010). We also link 
entrepreneur behaviors to the assessment of managerial risk, based on manifestations of the 
entrepreneur’s characteristics; and, relationship risk, based on the entrepreneur’s 
manifestations of trust behaviors. Breaking down the investment risk into three components 
helps explain how the assessment of each risk component can only occur in a certain 
sequence based on the retrieval and assessment effort required.  
In looking at the investment return and resident risk component of the investment risk, 
we observe that BAs use satisficing and priority heuristics when assessing risk and return. 
We find evidence that increased levels of capabilities and experiences reduce the likelihood 
of rejection due to concerns about managerial risk, but that manifestations of behaviors that 
indicate traits follow an inverted U shape relationship with the assessment of managerial risk 
such that insufficient or excessive levels of certain traits can increase the likelihood of 
rejection. We link the development of relationship confidence to specific trust behaviors 
(McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998) in contrast to the assumption of swift trust that 
develops based on the social environment (Meyerson, Weick & Kramer, 1996). Although we 
recognize that deep trust does take an extended time to develop, our focus on reasons for 
rejection allows us to identify how trust damage or violation can lead to the rapid termination 
of a promising relationship.  
Our development of a multistage model of the investment process allows us to identify 
how specific venture criteria and entrepreneur behaviors inform the BA’s assessment of 
investment return and each component of investment risk. Our focus on identifying the 
rejection reasons at each stage reinforces the lessons entrepreneurial researchers can learn by 
understanding the reasons for failure (Shepherd, 2003), and the importance of observing each 
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stage of a multistage process rather than just the final decision outcome (Svenson, 1979).    
Our research highlights the importance of observing how entrepreneurs behave and 
make context specific decisions using a novel research technique. Our adaptation of 
Observational Interaction research techniques to the entrepreneurial setting enables us to 
develop coding schema and a research approach that can be used to investigate “relational 
exchanges and interpersonal negotiations” in order to provide “ a deeper understanding of 
stakeholder relationships in entrepreneurship” (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011, p127).  
Based on the conclusions from each chapter, in Chapter 5 we provide practical 
guidance, for fund-seeking entrepreneurs, BAs and government policy makers. 
Entrepreneurs, cognizant of our recommendations can increase their likelihood of receiving 
an investment offer through a more open information exchange that directly addresses 
shortcomings in the venture criteria identified.  Entrepreneurs will also be better able to 
understand how BAs are likely to interpret their behaviors when assessing managerial and 
relationship risk and thereby avoid displaying the types of behavior that can lead the BA to 
reject an opportunity. They will also be more willing to accept an investment offer based on 
increased understanding of how the BA assesses the existing company valuation and why the 
BA needs to introduce controls in the shareholder agreement. 
An improved understanding of the investment decision process will enable BAs to 
increase their decision-making efficiency and our explanation provides a useful framework 
that enables them to better explain how specific criteria influence their rejection decisions. 
This will be useful when communicating with individuals referring opportunities and when 
meeting fund-seeking entrepreneurs. Conscious of how specific criteria and behaviors inform 
the assessment of each component of investment risk, BAs will focus more attention on 
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critical factors early in the process, become more confident in their early rejection decisions, 
and be better equipped to compensate for identified shortcomings. 
Government policy makers armed with a better understanding of the causes of process 
inefficiency can develop appropriate policies that target resources where they are most likely 
to have a positive impact on the number of ventures able to attract investment. This will 
enable more fund-seeking entrepreneurs to attract funding and enable BAs to improve the 
quality of their investment decisions. In turn, higher efficiencies in the investment decision 




2 Trustworthiness5: A critical ingredient for entrepreneurs 
seeking investors 
2.1 Introduction 
Most business ventures with high growth potential require significant amounts of 
external funding for working capital, fixed asset acquisition, and technology development 
(van Osnabrugge, 2000). This cash is often obtained through risk capital investments from 
business angel investors (BAs)―private individuals who invest their own money, on a 
risk/reward sharing basis, in companies in which they have no direct connection (Kelly & 
Hay, 2003). Unfortunately, entrepreneurs’ success rate in receiving BA funding is less than 
5% of all applications submitted, for instance, in Canada (Riding, Duxbury & Haines, 1997). 
Mason and Harrison (2003) characterize the interaction between BAs and entrepreneurs as a 
multistage decision-making process, where initial evaluations lead to the rejection of most 
business opportunities. 
This paper examines why BAs reject business opportunities that have passed earlier 
stages of the investment decision-making process. Mason and Harrison (2003) further 
observe that the criteria BAs use to accept or reject an opportunity change as the decision-
making process evolves, as later in the process the BA focuses on assessing the risk in 
his/her anticipated relationship with the entrepreneur. That risk rises if the BA perceives that 
the entrepreneur might spend the BA’s money differently than would the BA (van 
Osnabrugge, 2000), which creates uncertainty on the BA’s part about the wisdom of the 
entrepreneur’s future decisions and behaviors. How, then, does a BA interpret an 
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entrepreneur’s behaviors during an initial interaction to decide whether or not to make an 
investment offer? 
Research on BA decision-making has been limited and frequently constrained by 
reliance on data collected at the end of the decision-making process rather than during that 
process (Wiltbank, Read, Dew & Sarasvathy, 2009). Furthermore, much research has relied 
on investors’ recollections of the decision-making process, despite findings that they are 
often unaware of their own decision-making process (e.g., Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998). 
Although laboratory-based experiments where external observers record actual decision-
making behaviors can explore some of these issues, experiments also suffer from 
generalizability concerns because they cannot create the actual, essential components of the 
anticipated relationship between a BA and entrepreneur. Such components include the 
emotional ownership of the idea (Cardon, Zietsma, Saparito, Matherne & Davis, 2005), 
actual risk due to the substantive amount of money at stake in the decision-making process 
(Rabin, 2000), and the potential for long-term relationship development (Kelly & Hay, 
2003), which are key in the BA-entrepreneur relationships. 
We therefore adopt a research method referred to as observational interaction 
(Bakeman & Gottman, 1997) to record, code and analyze behaviors during actual BA-
entrepreneur interactions. We were inspired by the work of Kelly and Hay (2003) who posit 
that to achieve confidence in the entrepreneur’s anticipated behaviors, the BA must develop 
a relational contract characterized by an informal relationship with the entrepreneur where 
trust developed in that relationship can ostensibly replace formal contract clauses. A trust-
based relationship is one where “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party [is] based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action 
 
23 
important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” 
(Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995: 712). We observe how the entrepreneur’s trust-based 
behaviors affect the BA’s assessment of the risk in his/her anticipated relationship with the 
entrepreneur, and hence affect the decision whether to make an investment offer. We 
develop a behavioral schema (explained in section 2.3) for coding each display of the 
entrepreneur’s trust-building, trust-damaging and trust-violating behaviors and compare such 
displays with the interaction outcomes (i.e., to make an offer or not).  
We contribute to the entrepreneurship literature in three major ways. First, viewing the 
hard-to-define concept of trust as a “decision variable” provides unique insights into how 
cooperative, trusting relationships are formed (i.e., the BA in this study assesses whether 
his/her trust level is high enough to continue the relationship with the entrepreneur). Second, 
a focus on the effect of entrepreneurial behaviors reinforces Gartner’s (1988) suggestion that 
research should concentrate on “what the entrepreneur does, and not who the entrepreneur 
is” (p. 57, italics added). Third, the use of an innovative research method for studying 
interpersonal relationships, and the resulting development of a coding system that 
dynamically measures multiple facets of trust-based behaviors, provide useful tools for 
studying the influence of an entrepreneur’s trustworthy behaviors as cues that inform 
investment decisions. 
In the next section, we draw from research on BA investment decisions and investment 
risk to explore how the development of relational contracts, based on displays of trust-based 
behaviors or cues, can be key factors in whether a BA decides to continue building the 
relationship. We then use existing research on trust to develop four categories of trust 
dimensions that characterize how certain behaviors can build, damage or violate trust. From 
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this, we offer four hypotheses on how trust-based behaviors can influence the investment 
decision, including one that entails the BA’s introduction of a control mechanism. We then 
present our research method and results, and conclude with theoretical, methodological and 
practical implications.  
2.2 Staged investment, relationship risk and trust 
Maxwell, Jeffrey and Lévesque (2011) summarize a body of research that identifies the 
multistage nature of the BA’s decision-making process, and the stages at which the BA 
considers key decision factors. They find that during this multistage process, the BA often 
initially rejects a business opportunity due to a single “fatal flaw” (as perceived by the BA) 
during the initial interaction with the entrepreneur. Subsequently, the BA’s assessment of the 
proposed venture allows him/her to predict anticipated investment return and investment risk 
based on specific factors―market, technology and financial―as well as entrepreneurial 
skills and characteristics. This prediction thus enables the BA to reject opportunities that do 
not meet his/her predetermined investment aspiration level or exceed a maximum level of 
investment risk (i.e., the likelihood of a complete loss).  
In the case of BA investing, Fiet (1995) identifies two components in investment risk: 
market risk and agency (or relationship) risk. Das and Teng (1998) expand on this by 
extending market risk to performance risk, which also includes technological and 
implementation risk. Performance risk reflects the likelihood that the venture’s objectives 
will not be achieved due to operational or external problems (such as unexpected competitor 
activities). Relationship risk is primarily the risk that the entrepreneur, while managing the 
venture, may not make the same decisions when spending the BA’s money as would the BA 
himself/herself. In the context of this dyadic relationship, we focus on concerns the BA 
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might have about the entrepreneur’s future decisions and behaviors, although we note that 
relationship risk is reciprocal and the BA may not always act in the entrepreneur’s best 
interests (Arthurs & Busenitz, 2003).  
Relationship risk is thus due to moral hazard, where the entrepreneur makes decisions 
that create a divergence of interests between the parties (e.g., using the company’s money to 
pay for personal expenses). This can cause outcomes that deviate from the BA’s prior 
expectations, not because of performance issues, but because the entrepreneur has made 
decisions that are not in the interests of the BA. Relationship risk is also due to adverse 
selection, where the entrepreneur has different perceptions and familiarity with information 
to the BA, known as perceptual asymmetry (Yazdipour, 2010). These perceived differences 
in business risks and opportunities or a lack of competence in the entrepreneur can result in 
the BA making suboptimal decisions during the investment decision or subsequently (van 
Osnabrugge, 2000). Because the BA does not need to assess relationship risk in the 
investment decision-making process until anticipated return and performance risk have been 
determined, he/she assesses relationship risk later on in the process. Also, since relationship 
risk comes from the BA’s uncertainty about the entrepreneur’s future decisions and 
behaviors while running the business, its assessment requires significant cognitive effort as 
well as information about the entrepreneur’s previous performance (Ouellete & Wood, 
1998). However, such information emerges later in the BA-entrepreneur interaction (Boon & 
Holmes, 1991).  
To reduce relationship risk, the BA strives to increase his/her confidence in the future 
behavior of the entrepreneur via tools such as behavioral and output controls. Behavioral 
controls specify and monitor acceptable boundaries of conduct and behavior that comply 
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with stated rules (e.g., BA signature is required on all checks) rather than the venture’s 
performance (Eisenhardt, 1985). Behavioral controls thus reduce the likelihood of adverse 
selection caused because the entrepreneur misrepresents his or her abilities or other business 
information that the BA cannot completely observe or verify during the investment decision 
process, or during subsequent management of the venture (Van Osnabrugge 2000). 
Behavioral controls allow the BA to require and be able to verify certain information before 
critical business decisions are made.  
Output controls, on the other hand, are designed to reduce the risk of moral hazard 
through the alignment of the BA’s and entrepreneur’s goals and incentives. They thus 
specify how the BA will measure the entrepreneur’s and venture’s performance, and how to 
penalize the entrepreneur if agreed-upon performance milestones (e.g., revenue targets) are 
not achieved (Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard & Werner, 1998). Both types of controls incur 
transaction costs, which can reduce anticipated returns or limit the speed at which the 
venture can react to opportunities (Dyer & Chu, 2003).  
The use of such controls, common in venture capital investing, is less common among 
BAs, partly because venture capitalists (VCs) need to explain their investment decisions to 
funders and controls are easier to explain to a third party; in contrast, BAs do not need such 
explanations since they invest their own money (van Osnabrugge, 2000). In addition, VCs 
often view the replacement of the entrepreneur as a viable option and must insert language to 
this effect in the control clauses, an option that BAs rarely consider (Bruton, Fried & Hisrich, 
2000). As a result, a more suitable (and often less costly) approach to reduce relationship risk 
is for the BA to develop interpersonal trust with the entrepreneur.  
Research on the dyadic development of trust in close personal relationships (Boon & 
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Holmes, 1991) and actions/reactions in game-theoretic reasoning (Boyle & Bonachich, 1970) 
enables us to articulate how trust-based behaviors affect the relationship to the point where 
the decision to make an investment offer, or not, can be made. The BA’s initial level of trust 
is based on his/her innate trust temperament (Strickland, 1958) or predisposition to trust 
(Lewicki, Tomlinson & Gillespie, 2006; Colquitt, Scott & LePine, 2007), which is related to 
his/her own trustworthiness under the assumption that others will behave similarly to oneself 
(Serva, Fuller & Mayer, 1995). The BA’s initial trust assessment is further shaped by referral 
sources (Paul, Whitham & Wyper, 2007), the entrepreneur’s reputation and institutional 
affiliations, and the context of the proposed transaction (McKnight, Cummings & Chervany, 
1998). The entrepreneur’s physical appearance (Grégoire, de Koning & Oviatt, 2008) and the 
nature of the anticipated relationship (Butler, 1991) also influence initial levels of trust.  
Unlike traditional models of trust development that focus on intent (i.e., Mayer et al., 
1995), we rely on evidence from behavioral experiments that demonstrate how trust in a 
relationship develops based on a sequence of behaviors/actions and responses/reactions. The 
framework of Serva et al. (1995) inspired the development of Figure 2.1, which illustrates a 
cycle of behaviors where each party builds trust in the relationship by first trusting the other 
party, and then waiting for the decision to be confirmed by the other’s display of 
trustworthiness (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996).6 In this circular phenomenon, the BA first trusts 
the entrepreneur. Subsequently, trust in the relationship builds if the entrepreneur displays 
trustworthy behaviors that confirm the BA’s expectations. The entrepreneur then trusts the 
BA, who responds by showing that he/she too is trustworthy (Rempel, Holmes & Zanna, 
1985). This reciprocal sequence continues with modifications to trust levels in the 
                                                      
6 Trust develops when trustworthiness is confirmed. For instance, it is the demonstration that an entrepreneur 
has expected relevant ability to complete a specific task that builds trust in the relationship, not having the 
ability per se.  
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relationship (Shapiro, Sheppard & Cheraskin, 1992) based on the BA “auditing” limited 
samples of the entrepreneur’s behavior for examples of positive and negative trust displays 
(Kramer, 1996). 
While trust develops in the BA-entrepreneur relationship due to displays of behaviors 
that engender trust, negative trust-based behaviors reduce the trust level in the relationship. 
Specifically, if the trustee’s behavior confirms untrustworthiness, then trust is violated while 
distrust develops (Lewicki, Tomlinson, & Gillespie, 2006). However, if the trustee’s 
behavior fails to confirm trustworthiness, then trust is damaged and mistrust develops. Marsh 
and Dibben (2005) suggest that the fundamental difference between the two is that the 
former is deliberate whereas the latter is unintentional, and they are both a function of the 
reasons the trustor attributes to the trustee’s negative behavior (Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). 
Deutsch (1973) identifies an alternative negative outcome that also damages trust, namely 
suspicion, which occurs if the trustee’s behavior fails to confirm untrustworthiness. The type 
of negative behavior that causes distrust, mistrust or suspicion impacts the likelihood that the 
relationship will continue (Whitener et al., 1998). Trust violations often cause immediate 
termination of a relationship (McKnight et al., 1998), and how trust is damaged influences 
whether it can be “repaired” (Kim, Dirks & Cooper, 2009). We focus attention on how 
entrepreneurs’ negative trust displays impact the interaction outcomes between BAs and 
entrepreneurs (i.e., whether the BA decides to make an investment offer or not). 
Although several researchers have identified the role of trust in the investment decision 
(e.g., Harrison, Dibben & Mason, 1997; Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2001), they have faced a 
number of challenges in gathering data to test their theories. Attempts to operationalize trust 
have met with limited success (Currall & Judge, 1995) partly because, as Kramer (1999) 
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notes, some scholars view trust as a psychological state and that individuals’ dispositions 
affect intentions (e.g., Mayer et al., 1995) while others view trust from a behavioral 
perspective (e.g., Whitener et al., 1998). We adopt the behavioral perspective view because 
behaviors are better predictors of future behaviors than are intentions (Ouellette & Wood, 
1998), and because behaviors are easier to observe and code than psychological states.  
 
Figure 2-1 Reciprocal trusting and trustworthy behaviors 
2.3 Behavioral trust schema and hypotheses development 
The level of trust in the dyadic relationship between investor and entrepreneur changes 
over time as different trust-based behaviors are displayed and the interaction evolves 
(Rempel et al., 1985). As the BA interprets the entrepreneur’s trust-based behaviors, the BA 
gains confidence in the predictability of the entrepreneur’s future behaviors. The BA then 
uses these insights to assess the relationship risk that emerges due to adverse selection or 
moral hazard, and to determine if that risk can be sufficiently reduced to prompt the BA to 
make an investment offer. We chose to develop our own behavioral trust schema to observe, 
Entrepreneur 
perceives 





















Investor takes a 






code and analyze positive and negative trust-based behaviors displayed during an investment 
interaction since no known schema exists. Empirical research on trust has been hampered 
because researchers have used numerous definitions of trust, and have applied them 
inconsistently (Lewicki et al., 2006). In developing our behavioral trust schema, we draw 
extensively on Gillespie’s (2003) behavioral trust inventory and Butler’s (1991) conditions 
of trust inventory. We start with the definition of four general categories of trust 
dimensions―trustworthy, capable, trusting and communicative―and provide examples of 
behaviors for each. 
Mayer et al.’s (1995) classic definition of trustworthiness includes integrity, 
benevolence, and ability. Integrity is defined as “the extent to which the party’s actions are 
congruent with his or her words” and “the trustee[’s] adher[ence] to a set of principles that 
the trustor finds acceptable” (p. 719). Simons (2002) emphasizes that behaviors associated 
with each are different. Hence, to avoid confusion, we use “consistency” (Whitener et al., 
1998) and “alignment” (Lewicki et al., 2006), respectively. These two components of 
integrity, rather than integrity itself, are easier to code and, along with benevolence, they 
form our three behavioral trust dimensions for the trustworthy category. Each dimension is 
exemplified in Table 2.1. 
The concept of ability in Meyer et al.’s (1995) classic definition of trustworthiness is 
based on a group of skills, competencies and characteristics that are all context dependent 
(e.g., a software engineer might show that he/she is competent to program a computer, but 
not to build one). In contrast, trustworthy behaviors can be displayed across a variety of 
contexts (an individual who is benevolent in his/her social life is likely to be benevolent at 
work). Hence, we create a separate category called capable, which we divide into three 
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dimensions—competence, experience and judgment—in order to again reduce definitional 
and coding confusion.  
Trustors see displays of trusting behaviors, also exemplified in Table 2.1, as an 
indication that the individual is trustworthy (Serva et al., 2005). Trusting behaviors involve 
the trustee taking a risk by demonstrating vulnerability to the actions of others (Mayer et al., 
1995). Trusting behaviors include: self-disclosing information that, if used inappropriately, 
could cause the entrepreneur harm (Gillespie, 2003); reliance on delegation (Clark & Payne, 
1997); and receptiveness through a willingness to accept others’ influence (e.g., by being 
‘coachable’; Levie & Gimmon, 2008).  
As for the last category of trust dimensions, communicative, we rely on Whitener et al. 
(1998) who highlight how reliable communications affect the speed and quality of 
relationship development. Behaviors that demonstrate reliable communication confirm the 
accuracy of information exchanges between the trustor and trustee (Rotter, 1980), 
willingness to explain information content (Sapienza & Korsgaard, 1996), and reveal a sense 
of openness, especially with respect to receiving feedback (Clark & Payne, 1997). An 
entrepreneur rapidly informing the BA on both positive and negative outcomes of a meeting 
with stakeholders is a good example of communication that builds trust. The four categories 
and twelve behavioral trust dimensions (three per category) discussed are summarized in 
Table 2.1, which also offers relevant scholarly references to support our use of each 















Consistency Displays of behavior that confirm previous promises 
Shows inconsistencies between 
words and actions 
Fails to keep promises and 
agreements 
Butler, 1991; Gabarro, 1978 
Lewicki & Bunker, 1996 
Benevolence Exhibits concern about well-being of others 
Shows self-interest ahead of 
others’ well being 
Takes advantage of others when 
they are vulnerable 
Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 
1995; Rempel et al., 1985 
Alignment Actions confirms shared values and/or objectives 
Exhibits behaviors sometimes 
inconsistent with declared values 
Demonstrates lack of shared 
values and willingness to 
compromise 
Arthurs & Busenitz, 2003; 







Competence Displays relevant technical and/or business ability 
Shows lack of context specific 
ability 
Misrepresents ability by claiming 
to have non-existent competence 
Butler, 1991 
Gabarro, 1978 
Experience Demonstrates relevant work and/or training experience 
Relies on inappropriate 
experience to make decision Misrepresents experience Amit et al., 1990 
Judgment 
Confirms ability to make 
accurate and objective 
decisions 
Relies inappropriately on third 
parties 
Judges others without giving 
them the opportunity to explain 








Shows vulnerability by 
sharing confidential 
information 
Shares confidential information 
without thinking of 
consequences  
Shares confidential information 
likely to cause damage 
Currall & Judge, 1995; 
McAllister, 1995; Rempel et al., 
1985 
Reliance 
Shows willingness to be 
vulnerable through delegation 
of tasks 
Reluctant to delegate, or 
introduces controls on 
subordinates’ performances 
Is unwilling to rely on 
representation by others, or 
dismisses participation 
Clark & Payne, 1997; Gabarro, 
1978; Gillepsie, 2003 
Receptiveness Demonstrates ‘coachability’ and willingness to change 
Postpones implementation of new 
ideas or makes excuses for 
failures 
Refutes feedback or blames 
others 
Butler, 1991 









Accuracy Provides truthful and timely 
information 
Unintentionally misrepresents or 
delays information transmission 
Deliberately misrepresents or 
conceals critical information 
Rotter, 1980; Whitener et al., 
1998 
Explanation 
Explains details and 
consequence of information 
provided 
Ignores request for explanations Dismisses request for explanations 
Sapienza & Korsgaard, 1996 
Whitener et al., 1998 
  Openness Open to new ideas or new 
ways of doing things 
Does not listen or refutes 
feedback 
Shuts down or undermines new 
ideas 
Butler, 1991; Gabarro, 1978 
Sapienza & Korsgaard, 1996 
Table 2-1 Behavioral trust schema and manifestations
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In line with these behavioral displays, which are trust building, trust damaging or trust 
violating, we develop a series of hypotheses as to their impacts on the BA’s willingness to 
make an investment offer. Initial evidence of the entrepreneur’s trustworthiness is his/her 
display of trusting behaviors, which are followed by reciprocal displays of trusting and 
trustworthy behaviors that reinforce the trustor’s original decision to trust (Rempel et al., 
1985). As per our behavioral trust schema shown in Table 2.1, trusting behaviors involve 
self-disclosure, reliance and/or receptiveness, whereas trustworthy behaviors involve 
consistency, benevolence and/or alignment (e.g., of goals). BAs will also look for behaviors 
that confirm that the entrepreneur is capable (displays competence, experience and good 
judgment) and communicative (displays accuracy, explanation and openness when 
communicating). Hence, we expect that the entrepreneur’s displays of trust-building 
behaviors (as exemplified in Table 2.1) increase the BA’s confidence in how the entrepreneur 
will behave in the future, which reduces the relationship risk and as such increases the BA’s 
interest in making an offer to invest. Therefore, 
H1. An entrepreneur who receives a BA’s investment offer has displayed a greater 
number of trust-building behaviors than an entrepreneur who does not receive such an offer. 
 
While behaviors that confirm the BA’s expectations function to build trust, behaviors 
that reduce the predictability of the entrepreneur’s future behaviors damage trust (Rotter, 
1980). We note that trust-damaging behaviors are not necessarily the absence of trust-
building behaviors (Marsh & Dibben, 2005). As articulated in the previous section, a 
trustee’s failure to confirm trustworthiness damages trust and mistrust develops, as does 
failure to confirm untrustworthiness, which creates suspicion. Behaviors that damage trust, or 
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the absence of behaviors that build trust, increase the relationship risk and reduce the 
willingness of the BA to make an offer. Therefore, 
H2. An entrepreneur who receives a BA’s investment offer has displayed a smaller 
number of trust-damaging behaviors than an entrepreneur who does not receive such an 
offer.  
 
We also argue that the motivation that the trustor attributes to the trustee’s behavior 
creates the fundamental difference between behaviors that damage and those that violate 
trust. While trust damage can be inadvertent and unintended, trust violations are intended to 
deceive. Trust-violating behaviors create distrust in the relationship by confirming that the 
trustee is untrustworthy. For instance, an entrepreneur damages trust if, because of 
inexperience, he/she ‘over-trusts’ and relies on an inappropriate partner (e.g., the 
entrepreneur allows an accountant to decide on potential distribution partners) (Goel & Karri, 
2006). However, if the BA discovers that the entrepreneur deliberately chose a friend as a 
partner for reasons other than a good skill set and experience, then the BA’s trust in the 
entrepreneur is violated. Distrust created by a trust-violating behavior often generates anger 
in the trustor (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). It can also trigger a reappraisal of the relationship 
and be so catastrophic that it prompts the termination of that relationship (Burt & Knez, 
1996). Opportunities where the entrepreneur has displayed even a single trust violation (as 
those exemplified in Table 2.1) are thus expected to be less likely to receive an offer. 
Therefore,  
H3. The percentage of entrepreneurs who receive a BA’s investment offer after 
displaying trust-violating behaviors will be smaller than the percentage of entrepreneurs 




For opportunities where trust in the relationship has been reduced due to trust-
damaging or trust-violating behaviors, Currall and Judge (1995) suggest that relationship risk 
can be reduced to an acceptable level only through the investor’s introduction of controls. 
These include direct controls that allow the BA to participate in the venture’s management 
and indirect controls that specify output or behavioral controls, where behavioral controls 
define boundaries of conduct and behaviors that comply with stated rules, and output controls 
articulate measures for the entrepreneur’s and venture’s performance.  
A BA’s direct participation in the venture’s management can control the entrepreneur’s 
behavior by requiring the BA’s permission before the entrepreneur can make certain 
decisions (e.g., the BA’s approval of all strategic partnerships) (Kelly & Hay, 2003). Indirect 
controls can be introduced through contract clauses in the shareholder agreement (Kaplan & 
Strömberg, 2004). The ability to introduce controls in a relationship depends on its progress 
(Lewicki & Bunker, 1996), the nature and dimension of the trust-damaging or trust-violating 
behavior (Kim et al., 2009; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009), and the willingness of the trust 
damager or violator (in our case the entrepreneur) to accept the proposed control (Korsgaard, 
Brodt & Whitener, 2002). A BA interested in a specific opportunity is more likely to propose 
a control once the relationship has developed and if the behavioral trust dimension that is 
damaged or violated can actually be addressed via the control (e.g., unattainable for reasons 
such as goal alignment or benevolence). To propose a control, the BA will likely attribute the 
damage or violation to incompetence rather than a negative intent, and be confident that the 
entrepreneur will accept it. As a result, the introduction of a control in instances of trust 




H4. For the group of entrepreneurs whose behaviors has damaged or violated trust, the 
percentage who receives a BA’s investment offer will be greater for those to whom the BA 
presented a control than for those to whom he/she did not.  
2.4 Research methodology 
We use a real-time technique to collect behavioral data from actual interactions to test 
these four hypotheses. Researchers have extensively used our chosen technique, 
observational interaction (Bakeman & Gottman, 1997), in observing the development and 
status of romantic relationships. While similar to surveys or conjoint studies on the questions 
addressed (e.g., to make an investment offer), observational interaction has multiple added 
benefits. It allows independent observers to extract certain data, and thus remove the 
likelihood of self-reporting bias by individuals who may not be aware of the decision-making 
process they use (Petty & Gruber, 2011). This real-time data-gathering technique uses 
behaviors as the key unit of analysis, removing the judgment components inherent in 
assessing intentions and predispositions. It also allows the researcher to gather data over time 
and not need to know the outcomes of interactions (offer/no offer), which eliminates 
hindsight bias. Our use of this technique enables us to explore the stages of the investment 
decision under actual risk (i.e., actual money to be invested) and in the context of long-term 
relationship development.  
The interactions that we use to code and analyze are extracted from a population of 
entrepreneurs interacting with BAs via guest participation in the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation’s (CBC) reality TV show, Dragons’ Den (http://www.cbc.ca/dragonsden/). In 
this globally syndicated (20 countries) show, actual or ‘hopeful’ entrepreneurs, selected 
through an open audition process, pitch their business opportunities to a team of five 
experienced BAs, the “Dragons,” in hopes of persuading them to invest between $10,000 and 
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$500,000 of their own money in return for equity in the business.7 The BAs have no 
knowledge of the opportunity or the entrepreneur prior to their meeting in the “Den,” where 
the entrepreneur must request (and be offered) a specific investment amount (after describing 
his/her business opportunity) or go home with nothing. During the show, the investor must 
make a risky investment decision in 15 to 75 minutes. The interaction concludes when either 
all the Dragons provide a specific reason for being ‘out’ or one or more of them decide to 
make an investment offer. If an offer is made and accepted, then there is a subsequent due 
diligence process, which if successful leads to an investment and the start of a long-term 
relationship between the BA and the entrepreneur.  
For the four seasons (2006 to 2009)8 of the Canadian show we study, 602 entrepreneurs 
pitched to the BAs (although only about 60% of these recorded pitches aired, we reviewed all 
of the unaired versions as well). These 602 entrepreneurial pitches (opportunities) are 
investigated in Maxwell & Lévesque (2011), who find that the BAs eliminated most (436) 
opportunities quickly due to the presence of a “fatal flaw” in the entrepreneur’s pitch. A 
further 112 opportunities were then rejected by the BAs due to concerns about performance 
risk, including ‘high likelihood of failure’ and ‘insufficient investment return.’ We focus on 
the remaining 54 pitches that made it through this attrition process; because they are the 
entrepreneurs whose trust-based behaviors influenced the BAs’ assessment of relationship 
risk (and the investment offer decision). Figure 2.2, inspired by Petty and Gruber (2011), 
summarizes the number of opportunities that the BAs considered at each of three identified 
                                                      
7 CBC producers worked with industry experts, including one of the authors, to design and promote the 
selection (audition) process to replicate real-life situations. Each year, open auditions were held at 12 locations 
across Canada. In addition, entrepreneurs could apply on line or by mail.  




stages of the interaction, the attrition process and the reasons that the BAs gave for rejection 
at each stage. 
We employed two trained observers to independently code each interaction using the 
behavioral trust schema (see Table 2.1). Based on a video recording of the TV interactions, 
the observers coded the frequency of each individual entrepreneur’s behavior that built, 
damaged or violated trust, without knowing our underlying theory or the interaction’s 
outcome (i.e., making an offer, or not). The observers also recorded whether or not (1/0) the 
BA introduced a control (i.e., BA’s request for direct participation in managing the venture, 
request for output controls or behavioral controls), whether or not (1/0) the BA made an 
investment offer, and whether or not (1/0) the entrepreneur accepted it. Examples of actual 
coding sheets are included in Appendix C although the names and dates of the recordings 
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Fatal flaws:  
Technology, Market, 
Financial, Entrepreneur 
Poor investment:  
High risk of failure 












To rule out potential alternate explanations that could account for the observed 
outcomes, the observers also coded for whether or not (1/0) similarities (e.g., cultural 
background) existed between an entrepreneur and any one BA, and for the entrepreneur’s 
presentation skill (1–5 Likert scale, 5 being the highest). Franke, Gruber, Harhoff & Henkel 
(2006) suggest that investor-entrepreneur similarities can increase the likelihood of receiving 
an investment offer, while Baron and Markman (2003) and Clark (2008) note that high levels 
of presentation skill also increase this likelihood. The observers coded each interaction for 
the presence of a similarity between the entrepreneur and an interested BA if it seemed to be 
important to the BA. While several of the similarities were anticipated—sex, cultural 
background, and business experience—a number of personal similarities (e.g., hobbies, 
social networks) also emerged. Presentation skill was based on the observer’s evaluation of 
the entrepreneur’s perceptive ability and persuasiveness. 
2.5 Results 
Of the 54 interactions we analyzed, 32 led to an investment offer, of which 26 were 
accepted, as summarized in Table 2.2.9 In these 54 interactions, 571 trust-building behaviors 
were identified, along with 45 trust-damaging behaviors and 12 trust-violating behaviors. We 
note that a single instance of trust violation was enough to stop the interaction, while the display 
of more than one trust-damaging behavior did not preclude an investment offer. Figure 2.3 also 
offers the frequencies of trust-damaging and trust-violating behaviors per behavioral trust 
dimension, highlighting the importance of competence since it is the dimension most frequently 
damaged during those interactions. Trust-damaging behaviors via competence might have 
been easier to observe and more likely to occur early in the relationship development.  
                                                      
9 Although less than half of the offers made and accepted in the “Den” were subsequently consumated, funds 
were advanced to entrepreneurs with and without trust-damaging behaviors.  
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Opportunity A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z AA AB AC AD AE AF 
Trust 
building 11 7 8 6 9 12 14 15 17 16 8 9 8 7 11 14 16 12 7 9 11 14 15 16 17 11 9 8 11 12 14 10 
Trust 
damaging                   1 1 1 2 1 2   1  2  1  
Trust 
violating                         1        
Control                   1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1  1  1  
(a) 32 opportunities that received an investment offer, with AA – AF rejecting it (blank =0)  
Opportunity a b c d e f g h I j k l m n o p q r s t u v 
Trust building 8 7 11 14 12 8 9 12 6 8 9 12 13 11 10 7 6 8 9 10 11 6 
Trust 
damaging  2 2 2 2 3 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 
Trust 
violating  1     1 1 1   1 1 1 1  1   1 1  
Control (none)                       
(b) 22 opportunities that did not receive an investment offer (blank =0) 
Table 2-2 Frequencies of trust –based behaviors and controls 
2.5.1 Validity checks 
Our research method raises validity concerns about the accuracy of coding behaviors. 
The coding schema was refined over several iterations and with the benefit of feedback from 
trust scholars. It also builds on other scholarly works that have developed behavioral trust 
schemas and validates the use of the dimensions identified based on testing on real 
interactions. The most reliable way to address coding validity concerns is via inter-rater 
reliabilities that compare the results and differences between our trained observers when 
coding each type of trust-based behavior (building, damaging and violating) (Landis & Koch, 
1977). Inter-rater reliability (Cohen’s kappa) for trust-building and trust-damaging behaviors 
were 0.84 and 0.87, respectively, supporting the usefulness of our coding schema and 
method. Both observers identified all 12 trust-violating behaviors (Cohen’s kappa of 1.0), 
confirming the fundamental difference between displays of trust damage and trust violation. We 
also measured the coding reliability for the introduced control, the degree of BA-entrepreneur 

















Behavioral trust dimension 
Damage 
Violation 
0.78, respectively (the lower rating for presentation skill likely results from its measurement on a 













Figure 2-3 Frequencies of trust damaging/violating behaviors per dimension 
Internal and external validity concerns also emerge due to the context of the 
interactions. In Table 2.3, we adopt a framework developed by Meyer (1995) to address these 
context-based concerns. A team of professionals—including one of the authors—with legal, 
accounting, marketing and technical expertise was formed to ensure the realism of the 
interactions and to subsequently assist the entrepreneurs whether or not they received an 
investment offer. The TV-set interactions mirrored real-life interactions on two key 
dimensions: the BAs invested their own money, and they decided whether or not to enter 
long term relationships with the entrepreneurs. Even the short timescale of the interaction 
may reflect real-life BA-entrepreneur interactions, in which BA investment decisions are 
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often made within ten minutes of the start of the first interaction, according to Mason and 
Rogers (1997). Post, van den Assem, Baltussen and Thaler (2008) also identify a number of 
studies that use data from TV shows to investigate how individuals make decisions under 
uncertainty, although rarely was one of the authors involved in the show’s development and 
production, as is the case here. Such involvement can help reduce several other internal validity 
concerns, including changing the context of the interaction (e.g., removing a BA because he/she 
was too “nice”) by someone external to the interaction (e.g., the shows producers). 
Table 2-3 Validity concerns on data from a reality TV show  












Other	  factors	  than	  hypothesized	  
may	  affect	  outcomes 
Entrepreneur-­‐investor	  similarities	  and	  
entrepreneur’s	  presentation	  skill	  were	  not	  
found	  to	  predict	  the	  investment	  decision	   
Outcome	  trends	   External	  (e.g.	  economic)	  factors	  may	  change	  outcomes	  over	  time	   
4	  year	  dataset	  were	  compared	  where	  
investment	  rates	  increased,	  but	  rejection	  rates	  
at	  the	  relationship-­‐risk	  stage	  did	  not 
Mis-­‐specified	  
variances 
Possible	  correlation	  of	  
independent	  variables	   
Correlation	  tests	  were	  run	  prior	  to	  the	  
regression,	  statistical	  tests	  separated	  the	  effect	  




Accuracy	  errors	  caused	  by	  data	  
collection	  method	   High	  degrees	  of	  inter-­‐rater	  reliability 
Externalities	   Context	  changes	  based	  on	  prior	  interactions	   
While	  changes	  in	  the	  interactions	  were	  noticed,	  
one	  of	  the	  authors’	  participation	  limited	  the	  
effects	  on	  displayed	  behaviors 
Simultaneity Independent	  interactions	  
variables	  jointly	  affect	  outcomes 
Interaction	  effects	  between	  trust-­‐building	  and	  
trust-­‐damaging	  behaviors	  were	  found	  to	  be	  
insignificant	  	   
Selection Participant	  selection	  criteria	  linked	  to	  outcomes 
Sel ction	  proces 	  was	  independent	  of	  
interaction,	  and	  the	  effect	  on	  the	  decisions	  made	  
	  the	  “De ”	  were	  limited	   
Attrition Participant	  may	  decide	  not	  to	  continue	  with	  interaction	   
All	  entrepreneurs	  left	  the	  interaction	  with	  an	  




Sample	  chosen	  for	  investigation	  
linked	  to	  outcomes 
A	  fundamental	  part	  of	  the	  research	  method	  was	  









y	   Previous	  out-­‐
comes	  affect	  
selection 
Individuals	  may	  not	  apply	  due	  
to	  low	  likelihood	  of	  success	   
An	  open	  audition	  encouraged	  all	  entrepreneurs	  
across	  Canada	  to	  participate 
Context	  deters	  
participation 
Concerns	  about	  treatment	  by	  
BAs	  or	  exposure	  on	  public	  TV 
Interaction	  setting	  was	  designed	  to	  replicate	  




Observed	  previous	  behaviors	  
may	  affect	  future	  behaviors	   
Participants	  learn	  from	  previous	  interactions,	  
but	  no	  change	  in	  the	  percentage	  receiving	  offers	  
during	  the	  relationship-­‐risk	  stage 
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Regarding external validity concerns, a crucial one in our context is that participants in 
subsequent seasons of the show could observe outcomes from previous seasons. This 
influenced who auditioned for the show and how participants in subsequent shows behaved 
in the “Den.” In turn, it also influenced whom the show producers selected. While we could 
not eliminate these concerns, we found no difference in success rates between participants in 
Seasons 1 and 4 who reached our sample (i.e., the relationship-risk stage of the interaction in 
Figure 2.2).   
2.5.2 Testing the hypotheses 
We use statistical hypothesis tests to verify whether our data support H1 to H4. We 
chose statistical testing because it provides insights on each incident of trust-based behavior 
and tells us whether or not the difference in mean values between subsets (those who receive 
an offer versus those who do not) is statistically significant. For H1 we apply a one-way t-test 
for the comparison of two averages (with unknown equal variances).10 Accepting the 
alternative hypothesis—the average number of trust-building behaviors is greater for the 
subset of entrepreneurs who receive an investment offer than for the subset who do not—
provides statistical support for H1. The average number of trust-building behaviors in the 
sample of 32 entrepreneurs who received an investment offer is 11.38, whereas in the sample 
of 22 entrepreneurs who did not receive an offer is 9.41. The t-statistic is 2.39 (a t-Student 
statistics with 52 degrees of freedom), which provides statistical support for accepting H1 
(with a one-tail p-value < .02). In other words, an entrepreneur who receives a BA 
investment offer is expected to display a greater number of trust-building behaviors than an 
entrepreneur who does not receive such an offer. 
                                                      
10 This test is appropriate given that the number of trust-building behaviors (per opportunity and for the 54 we 
analyze) appears to be approximately normally distributed. 
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For H2, given the much smaller number of trust-damaging behaviors recorded, we 
apply a Mann-Whitney test (which is a non-parametric version of the t-test). The alternative 
hypothesis states that the average number of trust-damaging behaviors will be smaller for the 
subset of entrepreneurs who receive an investment offer than for the subset who do not. The 
average number of trust-damaging behaviors in the received-investment-offer sample is 0.38, 
whereas it is 1.50 in the sample that did not. The Mann-Whitney U is 605.5 (where n1 = 32 
and n2 = 22), which provides statistical support for accepting H2 (with a p-value < .0001). In 
other words, an entrepreneur who receives a BA investment offer is expected to display a 
smaller number of trust-damaging behaviors than an entrepreneur who does not receive an 
offer. Figure 2.4 illustrates a tendency for entrepreneurs to receive offers if they display a 
rather large number (e.g., 14 or more) of trust-building behaviors and a low number of trust-

















(b) Trust damaging behaviors 















































































While for H1 and H2 we had to compare frequencies of trust-based behaviors, for H3 
and H4 we had to compare percentages of entrepreneurs receiving offers. The Fisher exact 
test is a more accurate statistical test than the usual Chi-squared test when comparing two 
percentages where one subset has a low count, which is the case for testing both H3 and H4 
as it allows differences from the null or alternate hypothesis to be calculated exactly, while 
Chi-squared is an approximation that makes assumptions about the distribution of outcomes. 
 The alternative hypothesis for H3 states that the percentage of entrepreneurs who 
receive an offer will be smaller for the sample in which each entrepreneur displays trust-
violating behaviors than for the sample in which they do not. As highlighted in Table 2.4, 
only one entrepreneur in the sample of 12  (8.3%) who displayed trust-violating behaviors 
received a BA investment offer, whereas 31 in the sample of 42 (73.8%) entrepreneurs who 
did not display trust-violating behaviors received an offer (as opposed to, respectively, 30.0% 
and 95.8% for trust-damaging behaviors). The Fisher exact test gave a P = 0.0134, which 
provides statistical support for accepting H3 (as this is an exact test, there is no calculation of 
significance). In other words, the percentage of entrepreneurs who receive a BA investment 
offer while displaying trust-violating behaviors is expected to be smaller than the percentage 
of entrepreneurs who receive such an offer but whose behaviors do not violate trust.   










Offer 9 23  Offer 1 31 
No offer 21 1  No offer 11 11 




% 95.8%  
% receiving 
an offer 8.3% 73.8% 
Table 2-4 Investment offer ratios for opportunities with trust damage/violation 
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For H4, the alternative hypothesis is that for entrepreneurs whose behavior has 
damaged or violated trust, the percentage who receives an investment offer will be greater for 
the sample in which the BA presents each entrepreneur with a control than for the sample in 
which they do not. Among the 31 entrepreneurs who damaged or violated trust, the 10 who 
received an investment offer were all presented with a control by the BA, whereas none of 
the 21 who received no investment offer was presented with a control. The Fisher exact test 
gave a P = 0.00046, which provides statistical support for accepting H4. In fact, in our 
sample the BA’s proposed control appears to have been a prerequisite to receiving an 
investment offer for all of the entrepreneurs who had damaged or violated trust.  
2.5.3 Predictive strength of trust-based behaviors 
While we found statistical support for each of our four hypotheses, we also wanted to 
rule out the possibilities that two independent variables, BA-entrepreneur similarities and the 
entrepreneur’s presentation skills, could better predict the observed outcomes. We therefore 
conducted regression analysis to explore the predictive significance of trust-based behaviors 
on the likelihood of receiving an investment offer, and the effect of each of these alternative 
independent variables on this relationship. Table 2.5 shows the correlation matrix, and 
identifies two significant correlations: (1) between the introduction of a control and trust-
building behaviors, and (2) between trust-damaging and trust-violating behaviors. Neither is 
surprising. We have already noted that the BA is more likely to introduce a control if he/she 
has already developed a relationship and somewhat trusts the entrepreneur, which would 
likely be linked to the entrepreneur’s display of trust-building behaviors. In addition, trust 




** significant at 0.01 and * at 0.05 
Table 2-5 Correlation matrix 
** significant at 0.01 and * at 0.05    a Dropped due to colinearity 
Table 2-6 Regression results (with Odds Ratio) 
We use logistic regression to examine three models of the relationship between the 
independent variables and the decision to make an investment offer (a dichotomous 













Trust building 1      
Trust damaging -0.137 1     
Trust violating -0.042 0.356
** 1    
Control 0.268
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Control NAa NAa NAa 




skills   
0.731  
(2.078) 
R2 (Cox and Snell) 0.580 0.599 0.605 
Model accuracy 88.9% 87.0% 87.0% 
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behaviors that build, damage, and violate trust), dropping the independent variable control 
because of colinearity. In Model 2 we add BA-entrepreneur similarity and in Model 3 we add 
the entrepreneur’s presentation skill. Table 2.6 summarizes the regression results. 
Model 1 shows statistical significance for each type of trust-based behavior, with all 
regression coefficients being significant (p-value < 0.05). This finding supports our earlier 
assertion that each type of behavior is a different construct. Also as expected, the coefficient 
is positive for trust-building behaviors and negative for both trust-damaging and trust-
violating behaviors. In other words, the more trust-building behaviors the entrepreneur 
displays, the higher the likelihood he/she will receive an investment offer, but the more trust-
damaging or trust- violating behaviors the entrepreneur displays the lower the likelihood 
he/she will receive an investment offer. From the odds ratios (OR), we also observe that each 
occurrence of a trust-building behavior is associated with almost double the chances of the 
entrepreneur receiving an offer (OR = 1.97) and each time an entrepreneur exhibits a trust-
damaging behavior, his/her chance of receiving an offer decreases by about 20 times (1/OR = 
1/0.049). Trust violation decreases the entrepreneur’s chance of receiving a BA investment 
offer by 500 times (1/0.002), virtually killing and entrepreneur’s chance of receiving an offer. 
In Models 2 and 3, the coefficient of neither added variable is statistically significant, 
and adding these two variables reduced rather than increased the predictive accuracy (i.e., the 
percentage of opportunities where the model predicted the outcome―offer/no 
offer―correctly). Yet, all coefficients for the three types of trust-based behavior are 
significant (p-value < 0.05) and retain relatively similar values and identical signs. Therefore, 
BA-entrepreneur similarities and the entrepreneur’s presentation skill cannot provide 
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alternate explanations for the investment offer decision. (We also verified that interaction 
effects were not significant). 
2.6 Discussion and conclusion 
Most of the empirical research on how BAs make decisions has focused on the 
characteristics of the venture (e.g., large potential market) and entrepreneur attributes (e.g., 
relevant experience), but not on the BA’s decision-making process to evaluate whether or not 
they can develop a long-term relationship with the entrepreneur, a major factor in the BA’s 
decision to offer funding. In fact, the context of BA-entrepreneur interactions―over 
extended periods and in a confidential environment―has made it challenging to gather data, 
especially on the role of trust development in the BA-entrepreneur relationship. This paper 
addresses this shortcoming. Further, the research on rapid trust development in informal 
cooperative relationships often confuses the use of social and institutional controls with the 
development of direct interpersonal trust (e.g., Meyerson, Weick & Kramer, 1996). 
Researchers have also ignored fundamental agency differences between venture capitalists 
(VCs) and BAs, based on the fact that VCs invest others’ money while BAs invest their own 
money, thereby overlooking the differences in trust development between investor types and 
entrepreneurs (van Osnabrugge, 2000). Our ability to access a unique (and contextually 
appropriate) data set, our utilization of an observational-interaction technique, and our 
development of a behavioral trust schema has enabled us to address each of these limitations.  
We found that in a short time span and under public exposure (a TV audience), BAs 
pay particular attention to key signals that entrepreneurs provide in their displays of positive 
or negative trust-based behaviors, which are often exaggerated under pressure (Mishra, 
1996). While it might seem incredible that so much information about individual ventures, 
 
50 
entrepreneurs and potential relationships can be gleaned in such short interactions (i.e., 
between 15 and 75 minutes), our findings reflect what scholars call rapid-judgment decision-
making (or thin slicing) (Ambady, Bernieri & Richeson, 2000). Maxwell et al. (2011) 
conjecture that experienced investors develop heuristics that enable them to rapidly eliminate 
opportunities early in the investment decision-making process, despite the fact that this 
practice may sacrifice accuracy for expediency (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). We argue 
that later in the process, BAs change their decision-making process and instead ‘intuitively 
audit’ positive and negative displays of trust-based behaviors to determine the level of 
relationship risk before making an investment offer.  
Overall, the statistically significant support that we found for our four hypotheses 
suggests that entrepreneurs displaying a comparatively large number of trust-building 
behaviors and a comparatively small number of trust-damaging ones are more likely to 
receive a BA investment offer. However, entrepreneurs who display trust-violating behaviors 
are unlikely to receive an offer. Once an entrepreneur violated trust it almost always led to 
the termination of the relationship. Furthermore, as illustrated in Table 2.3, while damaged 
trust can sometimes be addressed through the BA’s introduction of a control, violated trust 
rarely can be remedied. In the 10 cases (out of 30) where trust was damaged (as exemplified 
in Table 2.1) and a control offered, the damage was either due to a shortfall in the 
entrepreneur’s anticipated capability or the entrepreneur’s inappropriate reliance on another 
individual (over-trust). In these cases, the BA proposed his/her direct involvement in the 
venture or the introduction of behavioral controls on the entrepreneur (e.g., BA signature is 
required on all checks, arguably to reduce the chance of undesirable behaviors subsequently 
occurring). We note that the BA did not present a control or an investment offer when the 
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damage was due to a lack of benevolence, alignment or receptiveness. In the one case (out of 
12) where trust was violated and a control introduced, the violation was due to a 
misalignment of core values between the BA and the entrepreneur. That violation was 
addressed by the BA offering to invest in return for 100% ownership of the company. While 
this is technically a control mechanism, if accepted, the BA eliminates the relationship risk 
and is no longer vulnerable to the entrepreneur’s actions. We also note that six of the 
entrepreneurs who received an offer turned it down: half disagreeing with the new venture 
valuation, the other half rejecting the proposed control option.  
 While potential alternate explanations for the interaction outcomes were 
examined―BA-entrepreneur similarities and entrepreneur’s presentation skill―no support 
was found to suggest that either was a significant predictor of the investment offer decision, 
or moderated the effect of trust-based behavior displays. We did, however, observe that BA-
entrepreneur similarities often made the interaction less adversarial, at least initially, while 
most of the entrepreneurs had high presentation skill levels. Our ability to eliminate the BA-
entrepreneur similarities and the entrepreneur’s presentation skill as alternate explanations 
reinforces our proposition that trustworthiness is a critical ingredient for entrepreneurs 
seeking BA investment. 
On the theoretical side, our findings suggest that researchers pay closer attention to the 
connection between specific entrepreneurial behaviors and interaction outcomes. The 
characterization of behaviors that affect entrepreneurs’ ability to develop trust in their 
relationships highlights the competitive advantage enjoyed by entrepreneurs who can develop 
such relational contracts with partners. Also, investors’ reactions to entrepreneurs’ display of 
different types of negative trust-based behaviors (as exemplified in Table 2.1), either by 
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rejecting the opportunity or identifying an appropriate control mechanism, highlight the 
different dimensions of trust at play in the BA’s decision-making process. Further, in line 
with the work of Shanteau (1992) on using domain-specific experts to understand decision-
making processes, our research suggests that experts like BAs can be instrumental in 
improving our understanding of how complex investment decisions are made. Indeed, during 
the interactions we observed, the BAs were instrumental in focusing our attention on the 
most important behavioral trust dimensions and in providing specific reasons for rejection.  
On the methodological side, the use of an innovative research method to explore 
entrepreneurial behaviors in realistic environments responds to Bygrave’s (2007) suggestion 
that entrepreneurship scholars build a “new paradigm with imaginative research methods” (p. 
25). Our use of observational interactions and the development of an appropriate behavioral 
coding schema not only enabled us to explore behaviors and the BA-entrepreneur 
relationship development process, but helped demonstrate that analyzing short, but dynamic 
examples of entrepreneurial behaviors can explain how experienced investors (or other 
potential stakeholders) make rapid judgments about whether to enter a business relationship. 
Given the importance of first impressions, and the expected high correlation between initial 
and subsequent behaviors, the use of video-based techniques to explore other entrepreneurial 
phenomena and confirm insights from game-theoretic reasoning in dyadic relationships is 
likely to advance entrepreneurship research. 
On the practical side, an awareness of the multidimensional nature of trust and how it 
influences behaviors can help improve the behavior of entrepreneurs (e.g., when interacting 
with BAs), and encourage them to display more trust-building behaviors. Trust-damaging or 
trust-violating behaviors manifested, for instance, through a lack of benevolence or 
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misalignment of core values, are indicative of problems that can prevent the fund-seeking 
entrepreneur from receiving BA investment. Identifying the many dimensions of trust-based 
behaviors also enables BAs to better understand the reasons for negative outcomes (e.g., 
when the entrepreneur rejects a control) from their interactions with entrepreneurs. It also 
enables BAs to deploy control mechanisms that are acceptable to the entrepreneur, allowing 
more investments to occur (or allowing more leeway for mistaken or ill-conceived mistrust). 
In turn, more entrepreneurs may be encouraged to start new businesses and seek external 
investment for expansion. Likewise, by improving BAs’ decision-making processes, more 
investors will feel confident in their assessment and will be more likely to provide funding. 
While we are encouraged by the research potential associated with extracting data from 
unedited line tapes from a CBC reality show, we are aware that behaviors displayed on a TV 
show can be atypical of actual interactions. One could expect that the entrepreneurs taped for 
the reality show would be more likely to receive an investment offer than entrepreneurs in 
real-life (not taped TV shows), because the act of being willing to share an idea on national 
TV, and be chided by a “Dragon,” shows a willingness to be vulnerable (in addition, less 
trusting entrepreneurs may not be willing to expose themselves to vulnerability). 
Nevertheless, our analysis on identifying entrepreneur’s trust-based behaviors and their 
impact on receiving an offer of BA investment may have not been possible otherwise, 
because too few entrepreneurs would have received an offer (the context of the show - 
environment, advisory team support, public exposure - was designed to enhance the 
likelihood of receiving an offer). We are also conscious that the number of interactions (54) 
that progressed to the stage of potential relationship development was rather small. Yet, we 
had a set of occurrences (displays of behaviors) large enough to conduct a statistical test, and 
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in the case of small samples, we used a test that could accommodate small sample sizes. 
Further, our behavioral trust schema was developed with this small sample of interactions, 
which constrained our ability to identify the relative importance of each behavioral trust 
dimension or the possibility for other dimensions. We did, however, utilize the findings of 
extensive literature to minimize potential deficiencies in developing our schema. We leave 
these limitations as issues deserving further scrutiny by researchers in the realm of 





3 Investor auditing of entrepreneurs’ behaviors  
	  
3.1 Introduction 
The crucial role played by the entrepreneur in new venture performance is widely 
acknowledged (e.g., Gartner, Carter, & Reynolds, 2010) and frequently more important than 
the idea itself (Shepherd, 1999). While certain key characteristics (need for achievement, 
locus of control, action orientation, etc.) differentiate entrepreneurs from managers, linking 
them to future venture performance is problematic (Rauch  & Frese, 2007a). Shane et al. 
(2003) argue that the failure to find evidence for this link may be due to data often gathered 
from a broad cross-section of activities and at various stages in the venture creation process 
(despite the fact that the importance of certain characteristics depends on the nature of the 
activity and the stage of venture development; Baron, 2007a; Baum  & Locke, 2004). The 
coding of characteristics is also far from trivial, with conflicting views on what should be 
included and how it should be measured (Baron, 2007a). The difficulty of identifying a 
characteristic-performance relationship is further compounded by exogenous factors 
affecting venture performance over time (Baron, 2007a). Some scholars have therefore 
developed “a deep-rooted skepticism [...] about the presence and the strength of this 
relationship” (Rauch  & Frese, 2007b:354). 
Gartner et al. (2010) note that concerns about the measurement of characteristics and 
their linkages (or absence thereof) to venture performance have stimulated scholars to look 
instead at behaviors, although to date few studies of entrepreneurs’ behaviors exist (Baum  & 
Bird, 2010). Behaviors are seen as more reliable predictors of future behaviors and future 
performance than characteristics (Ouellette  & Wood, 1998). Exploring behaviors enables us 
to “focus on what the entrepreneur does and not who the entrepreneur is” (Gartner, 1988:21), 
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since the study of entrepreneurship is fundamentally about how entrepreneurs behave (Frese, 
2007; Gartner, 1990). Investigating behaviors has its own challenges, however. Observing 
behaviors in a realistic environment can be difficult, and much research has tended to rely on 
self-reports that introduce confirmation and hindsight biases (Bird  & Schjoedt, 2009). Furr, 
Wagerman, and Funder (2010) contend that the cost of setting up a realistic environment in 
which to make “direct behavioral observations” can be prohibitive, while Baumeister, Vohs, 
& Funder (2007) note the difficulties of developing behavioral-coding schema based on 
meaningful personality dimensions. 
Yet, studies of investors’ decision making (e.g., van Osnabrugge, 2000) have shown 
that an investor’s awareness of the presence (or absence) of key entrepreneurial 
characteristics can affect the likelihood of making an investment offer. Investors assess 
inventories of characteristics, such as expertise (van Osnabrugge, 2000), commitment 
(Feeney, Haines, & Riding, 1999) or passion (Cardon, Sudek, & Mitteness, 2009), based on 
the entrepreneur’s behaviors (and information provided) during the investment interaction. 
This article attempts to reconcile these research streams by observing and coding how 
entrepreneurs’ behaviors in a specific context (the investment interaction) impact short-term 
outcomes (investment decision). Specifically, how an entrepreneur’s behaviors during the 
investor-entrepreneur interaction influence the likelihood of receiving, or not, an investment 
offer.  
We consider how entrepreneurs behave during their initial interaction with 
investors―specifically business angels (BAs) who invest their own money in promising 
opportunities―as a predictor of these entrepreneurs’ future behaviors. We then theorize that 
experienced investors audit behavioral manifestations to enable them to modify their initial 
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assessment of the risk surrounding the future performance of the venture or, in other words, 
the performance risk, which they take into account in their investment decision along with 
return-on-investment. Perceptions of acceptable levels of performance risk directly influence 
the investor’s decision to make an investment offer: the higher the perceived risk, the less 
likely the investor makes an offer. We formulate three hypotheses on how the entrepreneur’s 
inventories of behaviors as manifestations of capabilities, experiences and traits affect the 
likelihood of receiving an offer: (1) an increasing linear relationship for the capability 
inventory; (2) an increasing relationship with diminishing returns for the experience 
inventory; and (3) an inverted U-shaped relationship for the trait inventory. 
We select an approach that enables us to gather behavioral data while the interaction 
unfolds, to provide some answers to the often-repeated question of whether investment 
decisions are based on the attributes of the “horse” (venture) or the behaviors of the “jockey” 
(entrepreneur) (e.g., Harrison & Mason, 2002; Sudek, Mitteness, & Baucus, 2008). Scholars 
have shown the benefits of gathering such data with unscripted interactions taped for 
television that involve actual investment decisions. Closest to our context are the studies of 
Maxwell, Jeffrey and Lévesque (2011) and Maxwell, and Lévesque (in press) that consider, 
respectively, one and four seasons of the Canadian TV show Dragons’ Den. The former 
focuses on how investors trim their set of available investment opportunities by developing 
shortcut decision-making heuristics, while the latter looks at how an investor’s trust 
prompted by the entrepreneur’s behavior affects the investment decision. Although the set of 
unscripted interactions we use here intersects with these studies, the data we analyze does 
not, because our focal point is on entrepreneurs’ behaviors as manifestations of 
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characteristics that require their own unique coding. We develop an appropriate coding 
schema that we use on 99 interactions. 
As we attempt to reconcile streams of research on the relationship between key 
entrepreneurial characteristics and venture performance, we contribute to the 
entrepreneurship literature in three ways. First, we highlight the importance of the 
entrepreneur’s behaviors on the investor’s assessment of performance risk (and hence the 
investment decision). In doing so, we consider how investors audit inventories of behaviors 
as manifestations of the entrepreneur’s capabilities, experiences and traits during actual 
investment negotiations. Second, we use a tried-and-tested research method from psychology 
to study entrepreneurs’ behaviors in interpersonal relationships, observing these behaviors in 
a similar context to enlighten our understanding of investment decisions. Third, we reinforce 
the benefit of using expert feedback (i.e., serial investors) to generate insights on how 
entrepreneurs’ behaviors affect the investment decision-making process and moderate the 
performance risk. We thus overcome some limitations about the influence of key 
entrepreneurial characteristics on future venture performance by focusing instead on the 
impact of behaviors on investment decisions. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section we explain how 
expert investors (BAs) initially assess performance risk and how they audit the manifestation 
of certain entrepreneurial behaviors, which modifies their initial assessment. We then 
develop the coding schema for behaviors as manifestations of the entrepreneur’s capabilities, 
experiences and traits, broken down into several facets. We formulate the hypotheses, present 




3.2 Angel investment and performance risk 
The use of expert insights to help understand how decisions are made is common in 
cognitive science, where domain-specific experts forecast future outcomes based on the 
assessment of a limited number of factors. Shanteau (1992) suggests that expert decision-
makers become more accurate when they operate in a consistent context, can break down the 
decision process into pieces, and use their cognitive processes to learn from previous 
decisions. Extracting real-time data from actual investor-entrepreneur interactions enables us 
to move in this direction, since we can observe both the entrepreneur’s behaviors and the 
experienced (serial or expert) investors’ reactions while investment decisions are being made.  
Expert investors can be venture capitalists (VCs), who invest other people’s money, or 
business angels (BAs), who invest their own money, in exchange for equity. Due to a 
fundamental agency difference between these types of investor―a VC has to justify his/her 
investment decision to others, but a BA does not (van Osnabrugge, 2000)―the decision-
making process used, and the relative importance of the criteria considered when making the 
investment decision, differ. As BAs tend to invest smaller amounts of money in earlier 
rounds of financing than VCs do (Hall & Hoffer, 1993), they tend to invest earlier in the 
venture creation process where “the overall enterprise is not viable without the entrepreneur” 
(Gartner, 1990:18). BAs thus focus more attention on the entrepreneur, because removing 
him/her is often not an option. Further, BAs are likely to become directly involved with 
operating the venture, which obliges them to evaluate how their participation might address 
the entrepreneur’s potential shortcomings and associated likelihood of venture failure (Freear 




The likelihood of venture failure and insufficient return-on-investment both cause 
rejection of an investment opportunity (Lopes & Oden, 1999; Payne, Laughunn, & Crum, 
1980).11 When the BA’s initial assessment of the venture results in a potential financial 
return that is too low, or an assessment of the likelihood of failure that is too high, he/she will 
reject the opportunity. However, for the remaining opportunities that are not rejected, the BA 
can assess how the entrepreneur’s behaviors modify his/her original appraisal of the 
likelihood of failure. Assessment of behaviors, however, can only take place subsequent to 
the assessment of the venture, because the relative importance of the entrepreneur’s 
behaviors as manifestations of his/her capabilities, experiences or traits is context dependent 
(Sudek et al., 2008). If the revised assessment of the likelihood of failure is below the BA’s 
risk threshold, then the opportunity will be further considered (Freear et al., 2002). Lopes  & 
Oden (1999) also argue that, unlike the traditional view of investment decisions, no tradeoff 
is considered between risk and return since these two dimensions are non-compensatory. 
Instead, each dimension has an “aspiration level” that is personal to the investor and based on 
his/her risk propensity and the context of the investment decision being made.  
After initial screening, the likelihood of venture failure corresponds to the BA’s 
assessment (i.e., perception) of the investment risk. Das and Teng (1998) identify two 
components of investment risk: performance risk and relationship risk. The performance risk 
is the risk that the venture will not achieve its full potential despite the best efforts of all 
stakeholders, while the relationship risk is the risk that the entrepreneur may not act in the 
best interests of the investor. McMullen and Shepherd (2006) propose that factors that are 
independent of the investor’s involvement, such as the technology and potential market (i.e., 
                                                      
11	  Other	  common	  reasons	  for	  rejection	  include	  lack	  of	  “fit,”	  insufficient	  interest	  in	  the	  product	  or	  service,	  
or	  inability	  to	  foresee	  how	  the	  BA	  can	  personally	  help	  the	  venture	  (Mason	  &	  Stark,	  2004).	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venture factors) or the entrepreneur’s behaviors, are assessed before those that affect the 
anticipated investor-entrepreneur relationship. We therefore focus attention here on how the 
entrepreneur’s behaviors moderate the performance risk, which is conditional on the 
assessment of venture factors, but before the impact of their behaviors on the relationship 
risk is considered (Maxwell & Lévesque, 2011). 
Categories Endogenous Exogenous 
Financial 
risk 
Higher development or overhead costs 
due to unanticipated expenses  
Customer insolvency creates bad debt 
expense 
Lower gross margins due to higher 
material costs 
Deteriorating economy reduces 
demand for product/service 
Unanticipated negative cash flows  Reduced credit availability limits debt 
or equity funding 
Technical 
risk 
Embedded technology does not 
perform as expected 
Competitor develops alternate solution 
Challenges in producing product / 
service 
Technology supplier unable to 
perform 
Product development issues cause 
launch delays 
External technology research 
obsoletes proposed product / service 
Physical 
risk 
Physical/environmental issues in plant Unable to access required material  
Operational and manufacturing 
challenges 
Poor performance by supply-chain 
partners 
Infrastructure failures or challenges Logistical challenges in fulfillment 
People risk 
 
Team becomes dysfunctional Unanticipated external changes in the 
market  
Team becomes unbalanced Recruitment issues 
Team lacks required ability Unable to develop strategic 
partnerships 
Table 3-1 Examples of endogneous and exogenous performance risk 
 
Das and Teng (1998) define four categories of performance risk: financial, technical, 
physical and people. Financial risks are due to lower than forecasted revenues or gross 
margins. Technical risks are inherent in product development and because of competitors’ 
technological advances. Physical risks are associated with internal operational and external 
supply chain issues, while people risks arise for individual or team performance reasons. 
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Table 3.1 exemplifies these risk categories, which can either be endogenous (i.e., arising 
within the control of the firm) or exogenous (i.e., beyond its control). Any of these 
categories, individually or in combination, can cause a promising business opportunity to be 
rejected. We now turn our attention to how and why behaviors as manifestations of the 
entrepreneur’s capabilities, experiences or traits can modify the BA’s perception of the 
performance risk. 
3.3 Types of behavioral manifestations  
We draw on research from psychology and entrepreneurship to identify distinct types 
of behavioral manifestations that can affect the investor’s perception of the entrepreneur’s 
characteristics and likely future behaviors. Simon (1990) suggests that behaviors are based 
on the individual’s underlying characteristics related to cognitive abilities, experiences and 
traits, a view echoed by Rauch and Frese (2007a), who link long-term venture success to the 
entrepreneur’s capabilities, education and traits. Guided by these studies and the work of 
Bakeman and Gottman (1997) on direct behavioral observations, we classify behavioral 
manifestations into three types - capabilities, experiences, and traits - and break down each 
type into a number of facets that make it easier to code.  
Manifestations of an entrepreneur’s capabilities are behaviors that demonstrate 
competence, critical thinking facility and new resource skills. More specifically, competence 
includes demonstrations of technical expertise (Sandberg, Schweiger, & Hoffer, 1988) and 
management ability (Reuber & Fischer, 1994), as well as social skills (Baron & Markman, 
2003). Behaviors linked to critical thinking facility include demonstrations of the ability to 
manage risk (Baron & Markman, 2003) as well as the ability to develop innovative solutions 
and make good decisions (Rauch & Frese, 2007a). New resource skills include the 
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confirmation of the facility to identify new business opportunities (Baron, 2007b), as well as 
build organizations, resource bases and teams (Bhide, 2000; Locke  & Baum, 2007).  
Experiences are manifested by behaviors that demonstrate prior activities, relevant 
knowledge and education. The entrepreneur’s prior activities can include involvement as a 
founder (Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, & Scharfstein, 2006) or in a leadership role in a related 
business activity (Franke, Gruber, Harhoff, & Henkel, 2008), where previous track record is 
also considered (Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, & Scharfstein, 2010). Behaviors that demonstrate 
relevant knowledge include technology, industry and/or domain (market) familiarity (van 
Osnabrugge, 2000). Formal and informal education, such as college or graduate programs 
(Shrader et al., 1997) and specialized or vocational instruction (Franke et al., 2008) can also 
influence an entrepreneur’s future performance and likely future behaviors. 
While some of the entrepreneur’s behaviors can be seen as manifestations of 
capabilities and experiences, others are manifestations of the entrepreneur’s personality traits 
(Furr et al., 2010). We use McCrae and Costa’s (1987) “Big 5” personality traits - emotional 
stability, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness and conscientiousness - to 
develop our behavioral-coding schema. Given the breadth of manifestations of behaviors that 
can be linked to each of these traits, we build on the approach of Ciavarella, Buchholtz, 
Riordan, Gatewood, and Stokes (2004) and the findings of Unger, Rauch, Frese, & 
Rosenbusch (2011) to identify proximate facets of each trait that are more closely linked to 
success and/or failure in entrepreneurial activities, which are discussed next. 
Emotionally stable entrepreneurs manifest behaviors that reflect optimism (Locke, 
2000) and high levels of confidence in the belief that they can control future events (Brush et 
al., 2010; Rauch  & Frese, 2007a). They also display behaviors that show a high desire for 
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autonomy (Rauch  & Frese, 2007b) and self-efficacy (Markman et al., 2002). Extraverted 
entrepreneurs’ behaviors demonstrate high levels of energy (Locke, 2000), enthusiasm 
(Sudek, 2006), passion (Cardon et al., 2009), and that they are action oriented and pro-active 
(Ciavarella et al., 2004). Entrepreneurs whose behaviors demonstrate openness to experience 
do so by showing that they like to explore novel ideas (Brandstätter, 2010), adapt to new 
circumstances (Khan, 1986), and take risks (Stewart et al., 1999). Agreeable entrepreneurs 
manifest behaviors linked to honesty and   trustworthiness  (Sudek,  2006),  and  that  they  
are  sympathetic   and willing  to  listen  to feedback  (Maxwell  &  Lévesque, in press).  
Conscientious entrepreneurs  show   high  levels   of  motivation  (Zhao   &  Siebert, 2006),  
and  that  they are  dependable  and  planful (Brandstätter, 2010). They also demonstrate that 
they are committed (Prasad et al., 2000), persistent and work hard (MacMillan et al., 1985). 
Table 3.2 summarizes all of these facets. 
During the investment interaction, the BA’s assessment of the moderating effect of the 
entrepreneur on the venture’s performance risk is informed by the entrepreneur’s disclosure 
of pertinent information along with the manifestations of these facets. Information exchange 
can provide some evidence of capabilities (e.g., ability to make good decisions) or 
experiences (e.g., formal programs), while the entrepreneur’s behaviors can further allow the 
BA to infer key capabilities and experiences. These, along with behaviors that are 
manifestations of personality traits, are all crucial in predicting the entrepreneur’s likely 
future behaviors and thus the investor’s assessment of performance risk. We now introduce 
our hypotheses, detailing the mechanisms by which behaviors that infer these entrepreneurial 




3.4 Hypotheses development 
For each characteristic type (capabilities, experiences and traits), an inventory is 
intuitively audited by the BA during the investor-entrepreneur interaction and is determined 
by aggregating (i.e., weighting based on a principal component analysis to be introduced) the 
rating of each dimension in Table 3.2 that belongs to a type. In turn, a dimension rating is 
determined by considering behaviors (and information exchanges) that are manifestations of 
any one facet of that dimension. For each hypothesis, Table 3.3 outlines the mechanisms by 
which behavioral manifestations of  various facets   of capabilities,  experiences or  traits  can  
reduce  endogenous and/or exogenous financial, technical, physical or managerial risk and, 
as a result, the BA’s perceived performance risk (to the point where an investment offer can 
be made). 
An entrepreneur who exhibits behaviors that infer capabilities will demonstrate that 
he/she likely possesses the competence, critical thinking facility and new resource skills to 
reduce the risks in Table 3.2. For instance, demonstrations of technical expertise can reduce 
the exogenous technical risk by tracking and responding to external technology 
developments (MacMillan et al., 1985), while displays of management ability can reduce 
endogenous financial risks by showing the knowledge necessary to constrain overhead costs 
(Frese, van Gelderen, & Ombach, 2000). An entrepreneur who demonstrates social skills will 
be able to reduce endogenous managerial risks should team performance become 
dysfunctional, and the ability to deploy these skills in future partnership development can 
limit exogenous managerial and financial risks (Baron, 2007b). Also, those who show that 
they can develop innovative solutions and make good decisions are likely able to overcome 
both endogenous technical (Amit et al., 1990) and physical (Stuart & Abetti, 1990) risks 
associated with startup activities. 
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) Competence (CD1) 
Technical expertise MacMillan et al., 1985; Sandberg et al., 1988;  
Management ability  Frese et al., 2000; Franke et al., 2008; MacMillan et al., 1985  
Social skills Baron  & Markman, 2003;  Baum  & Bird, 2010; Bird, 2002 
Critical thinking 
facility (CD2) 
Manage risk Baron  & Markman, 2003; Bird, 2002; MacMillan et al., 1985 
Develop innovative solutions Baum & Bird, 2010; Baum & Locke, 2004; Rauch & Frese, 2007a 
Solve problems / good decisions Baum  & Locke, 2004; Cooper et al., 1988; Rauch & Frese, 2007a 
New resource skills 
(CD3) 
Identify opportunities Amit et al., 1990; Baron 2007b 
Establish organization Amit et al., 1990; Bhide, 2000 











Startup familiarity Feeney et al., 1999; Gompers et al., 2006; Shrader et al., 1997 
Leadership familiarity Franke et al., 2008; Cooper et al., 1988 
Track record Gompers et al., 2010; Mason & Stark, 2004; MacMillan et al., 1985 
Relevant 
knowledge (ED2) 
Technology familiarity Bhide, 2000; Hall  & Hofer, 1993; van Osnabrugge, 2000 
Industry or domain familiarity Cooper et al., 1988; Franke et al., 2008; MacMillan et al., 1985 









Confident / high conviction Brush et al., 2010; Judge et al., 2002 
Optimistic / ext. control orientation  Locke 2000; Rauch & Frese, 2007b; Simon et al., 2000 
Autonomy / self-efficacy Baum &Bird, 2010; Markman et al., 2002; Rauch & Frese, 2007b 
Extraversion (TD2) 
Enthusiasm / passion Cardon et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2009; Sudek, 2006  
Energetic / outgoing Locke, 2000 
Action orientation / proactive Baum & Bird, 2010; Ciavarella et al.,  2004 
Openness to 
experience (TD3) 
Explore novel ideas Brandstätter, 2010; Zhao  & Siebert, 2006; Ciavarella et al., 2004 
Innovative / easily adaptable  Engle et al., 1997; Khan, 1986; Rauch  & Frese, 2007b 
Willing to take risk Stewart et al., 1999 
Agreeableness 
(TD4) 
Honest / trustworthy / integrity Maxwell & Lévesque, in press; Sapienza & Korsgaard, 1996; Sudek, 2006 
Listens to feedback / sympathetic Maxwell & Lévesque, in press; Sapienza & Amason, 1993  
Develops networks  Ciavarella et al., 2004 
Conscientiousness 
(TD5) 
Motivated / need for achievement  Khan, 1986; Baron & Markman, 2003; Mason & Stark, 2004; Zhao & Seibert, 2006 
Dependable / organized / planful Brandstätter, 2010; Khan, 1986; Zhao  & Seibert, 2006 
Committed / persistent / hardwork Brandstätter, 2010; Locke 2000; MacMillan et al., 1985; Prasad et al., 2000 
Table 3-2 Entrepreneurial characteristic type
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Table 3-3 Performance risk reduction from various facets of capabilities, experience and traits (Bolded text exemplified in hypothesis)











s Technical expertise reduces likelihood of 
development cost overruns (Sandberg et al., 1988)  
Management ability reduces likelihood of 
excess overhead costs (Frese et al., 2000) 
Startup familiarity increases alertness to new 
opportunities (Westhead et al., 2005) 
Higher levels of formal / informal education foster 
ability to manage cash flow (Frese et al., 2000) 
Confidence increases ability to manage financial 
challenges (Cardon et al., 2005) 
High levels of commitment persist despite 






 Problem solving limits effectsof weak economy / 
customer insolvency (Baron  & Markman, 2003)  
Social skills increase likelihood of attracting 
external finance (Baron, 2007b) 
Start up familiarity helps develops contingency 
plans for market changes (Westhead et al., 2005) 
Track records are important in attracting 
finance (debt and equity) (Gompers et al., 2010) 
Innovativeness enables survival in a 
deteriorating economy (Clegg et al., 2002) 
High levels of commitment required to 












s Facility to develop innovative solutions reduces 
development / production risk (Amit et al., 1990) 
Ability to establish organizations reduces 
implementation delays (Bhide, 2000) 
Track records in technology areas increase the 
quality of future decisions (Gompers et al., 2010) 
Technology familiarity can reduce product 
development risks (Engle et al., 1997) 
Confidence increase ability to overcome 
production setbacks (Cardon et al., 2005) 
Ability to explore novel ideas overcomes techn-






 Technical expertise helps track external 
technology advances (MacMillan et al., 1985) 
Opportunity identification reduces dependence on 
single technology/supplier (Wright et al., 1997) 
Domain familiarity helps selection of external 
technology partners (Sandberg et al., 1988) 
Technology familiarity reduces supplier 
performance risk (Hall  & Hofer, 1993) 
Enthusiasm increases ability to attract 
technology partners (Chen et al., 2009)  
Willingness to take relationship risks with new 











s Facility to develop innovative solutions reduces 
oper. constraints (Stuart  & Abetti, 1990) 
Skill in establishing new organizations reduces 
operational risks (Bhide, 2000) 
Start up experience enables cost-effective imple- 
mentation of operations (Westhead et al., 2005) 
Leadership experience provides knowledge that 
reduces operational risks (Franke et al., 2008) 
Exploring novel ideas help overcome 
operational challenges (Morrison, 1997) 
Trustworthiness encourages innovation to 






 Ability to gather resources reduces supply chain 
risks through partnerships (Ciavarella et al., 2004) 
Facility to manage risk encourages development 
of contingency plans (Rauch  & Frese, 2007a) 
Track records enable development of alliances to 
mitigate oper. risk (Mason  & Stark, 2004) 
Greater in/formal training create net-works to 
access resources (Stuart  & Abetti, 1990) 
Exploring novel ideas increases likelihood 
alternate suppliers can be found (Khan, 1986) 
Trustworthiness facilitates partnerships with 












s Social skills increase employee engagement 
reduce team dysfunction (Baron, 2007a)  
Management ability (business) increases 
employee performance level (Frese et al., 2000) 
Start up experience builds awareness of likely 
team performance issues (Gompers et al., 2006) 
Informal training provides skills that can optimize 
team performance (Frese et al., 2000) 
Dependability increase leadership & manage- 
ment suitability (Zhao  & Seibert, 2006)  
Confidence can enhance team performance 






 Social skills facilitate external relationships, 
attracts employees/partners (Baron, 2007b) 
Management ability gives potential partners 
relationship confidence (Frese et al., 2000) 
Leadership familiarity enables collaborations 
that reduce risks (Franke et al., 2008) 
Track records are key to attracting new 
employees/stakeholders (Gompers et al., 2010) 
Willingness to take risks increases ability to 
anticipate market changes (Stewart et al., 1999) 
Confidence increases the ability to attract 
talented individuals (Brush et al., 2010) 
 
68 
Entrepreneurs who demonstrate that they can identify promising opportunities can 
lower exogenous technical risks by creating alternative options to reduce dependence on a 
single technology or supplier (Wright et al., 1997). Similarly, entrepreneurs who show that 
they have built strategic networks in the past are likely able to reduce exogenous physical 
(supply chain) risks through the future development of such partnerships (Ciavarella et al., 
2004).   
Overall, entrepreneurs who display behaviors that infer higher inventories of 
competence, critical thinking facility and new resource skills - i.e., capabilities - can reduce 
the BA’s perception of the performance risk and increase his/her willingness to make an 
investment offer. 
Formally stated: 
H1: The likelihood of receiving a BA investment offer increases with the manifestation 
of behaviors that enhance the entrepreneur’s inventory of capabilities (competence, critical  
thinking facility and new resource skills) during the interaction. 
 
An entrepreneur who exhibits behaviors that show experiences through startup 
familiarity is able to reduce endogenous and exogenous financial risks by increasing 
opportunity alertness and by developing contingency plans (Westhead et al., 2005). 
Similarly, entrepreneurs who demonstrate leadership familiarity can foster a collaborative 
approach that reduces exogenous managerial risks (Franke et al., 2008). An entrepreneur, 
whose track record provides evidence of past satisfactory levels of performance, can reduce 
the BA’s assessment of exogenous financial risks (Gompers et al., 2010). Similarly, those 
who show technological or industry familiarity can mitigate exogenous technical (product 
development) risks (Sandberg et al., 1988). Endogenous financial (cash-flow) risks can be 
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reduced if the entrepreneur demonstrates that he/she has participated in formal or informal 
education programs (Frese et al., 2000), which participation can also reduce the exogenous 
physical risks by enabling access to critical resources (Stuart & Abetti, 1990).  
While this discussion suggests that entrepreneurs who display behaviors that infer 
higher inventories of experiences reduce performance risk, there are indications that, above a 
certain threshold, these higher inventories may have negligible effect on further reducing the 
risk (Westhead et al., 2005). For instance, when investigating the effect of startup familiarity 
on venture survival, Birley and Westhead (1993) found serial entrepreneurs equally likely to 
be successful as first timers. Also, individuals with higher levels of domain 
familiarity/knowledge (Dane, 2010) or training (Stuart  & Abetti, 1990) were found no more 
likely to be successful than those with lower levels. Shepherd, Zacharakis, and Baron (2003) 
argue that previous experience can breed a level of situation familiarity that reduces 
objectivity, or leads to set behaviors and cognitive entrenchment that constrains the 
entrepreneur’s ability to adapt or behave in an appropriate manner in a new environment 
(Dane, 2010).  
Combining these different perspectives, we posit that entrepreneurs who display 
behaviors that infer higher inventories of prior activities, relevant knowledge and education - 
i.e., experiences - can reduce the BA’s perceived performance risk. However, above a certain 
point, the effect of greater experiences on this risk exhibits diminishing returns. In other 
words, the relationship between the entrepreneur’s experience inventory and the BA’s 
willingness to make an offer is a concave increasing relationship. Formally stated: 
H2: The likelihood of receiving a BA investment offer increases with the manifestation 
of behaviors that enhance the entrepreneur’s inventory of experiences (prior activities, 
relevant knowledge and education) during the interaction but with diminishing returns. 
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We develop our last hypothesis by focusing on manifestations of behaviors that infer 
proximate facets of each of the five traits. Entrepreneurs whose behaviors demonstrate 
confidence can more easily overcome endogenous financial and technical risks due to 
challenges and unanticipated setbacks (Cardon et al., 2005). Entrepreneurs who demonstrate 
enthusiasm, evidenced by the display of passion and energy, find it easier to attract talented 
employees and partners (Chen et al., 2009; Locke, 2000), and can thus reduce exogenous 
technical risks. Entrepreneurs who demonstrate a willingness to explore novel ideas also 
show that they are innovative and thus able to address a range of endogenous and exogenous 
physical risks, such as operational challenges (Morrison, 1997) and supply chain issues 
(Khan, 1986). Those who display trustworthiness stimulate innovation within the firm (Clegg 
et al., 2002) that can reduce endogenous physical risks. Those who demonstrate 
dependability and good leadership can reduce endogenous managerial risks (Zhao  & Seibert, 
2006), while those who show commitment tend to persist despite a setback, reducing the 
exogenous financial risks (Prasad et al., 2000). 
This discussion suggests that entrepreneurs’ behaviors that infer a higher trait inventory 
reduce performance risk. However, scholars have also suggested that excessive 
manifestations of behaviors linked to these traits can increase the risk, because it can lead to 
a less objective decision maker (Shefrin, 2007), which raises concerns about the quality of 
the entrepreneur’s future decisions. An entrepreneur who demonstrates overconfidence by, 
for instance, disregarding an expert’s recommendation to cancel a project increases the 
investor’s perception of financial risk (Åstebro et al., 2007). One who displays over-
enthusiasm can become too attached to the venture, even refusing to delegate management 
and decision making (Cardon et al., 2005), which can increase managerial risk. Other 
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categories of performance risk can be increased if the entrepreneur demonstrates that he/she 
is too willing to explore new ideas, which can result in him/her losing focus on the challenges 
facing the venture (Ucbasaran et al., 2006). Those who demonstrate that they may be too 
trusting can end up relying too heavily on an inappropriate partner (Zahra et al., 2006), while 
those who demonstrate over-commitment will often overemphasize sunk costs, resulting in 
poor decision making (Chira et al., 2008).  
Combining these two perspectives, we posit that entrepreneurs who display behaviors 
that infer higher inventories of the five traits can reduce the BA’s perceived performance 
risk, but only up to a certain point. Beyond that point, manifestations of behaviors that show 
excessive traits are likely to reduce the quality of the entrepreneur’s decisions and increase 
the perceived performance risk. That is, the relationship between the entrepreneur’s trait 
inventory and the BA’s willingness to make an offer is an inverted U. Formally stated: 
H3: The likelihood of receiving a BA investment offer increases with the manifestation 
of behaviors that enhance the entrepreneur’s inventory of traits (emotional stability, 
extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness) during the 
interaction up to a critical threshold beyond which it begins declining. 
3.5 Data and methods 
Our expert investors, known as “Dragons,” were selected from the general population 
of BAs in Canada by the producers (assisted by industry insiders) of the CBC’s TV-show 
Dragons’ Den. In order to create a realistic investment interaction, five criteria were used to 
select the Dragons: previous entrepreneurial experience, existing angel investments, high net 
worth, willingness to invest, and willingness to make investment decisions in a TV-show 
environment. The producers also considered the Dragons’ domain of expertise (i.e., retail, 
software, education, marketing and food), as well as their personality and likely interactions 
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with each other and the entrepreneurs. BAs were chosen based on an initial referral from 
within the investment community and a live audition, where they interacted with several 
entrepreneurs.  
Our intent was not to find BAs who were representative of the Canadian BA 
population, but rather select a set of investors with entrepreneurial experiences - the Dragons 
are such experts. Also, the context of the show meant that for an opportunity to be rejected 
all five BAs had to reject it and provide a reason. This process reduced the likelihood that 
investor decisions were atypical. Moreover, while each Dragon had a different motive for 
participating, they were all interested in both encouraging entrepreneurial activity in Canada 
and learning from the process, which makes them (and the interactions we study) suitable for 
this exploratory work. 
We focus on the first four seasons of the show (2006-2009), during which our five BAs 
(4 men, 1 woman) remained fairly constant. One was replaced at the end of season 1 and 
another forced to leave the show at the end of season 3 for health reasons (full biographies of 
the Dragons are available on the show website). During the show, previously unknown fund-
seeking entrepreneurs pitch their business opportunities to the five Dragons and leave with 
either at least the amount requested or nothing. Details on these interactions and how validity 
concerns were addressed is provided in Appendix A, but we note here that the involvement 
of one of the authors in the taping of the show has built confidence in the veracity of the 
interactions. 
Our initial set of interactions comprises 602 BA-entrepreneur interactions (or 
opportunities). For the 570 opportunities that were rejected (95%), we used content analysis 
techniques to code the final rejection reasons, classifying them as being due to a “fatal flaw” 
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in the business, issues with the business opportunity’s potential, or issues with the 
entrepreneur’s ability to manage the venture and provide the required return.12 Figure 3.1 
illustrates the final rejection reasons, showing that most (436) were rejected due to the 
presence of a “fatal flaw,” similar to those reasons identified in Maxwell, Jeffrey and 
Lévesque (2011). These flaws included specific technology failings (103), such as a lack of 
protectability, excessive technology development required, or misalignment between 
technology features and customer needs, and market failings (217), which included the lack 
of evidence of demand, limited market size, and no channel to market. Lack of relevant 
entrepreneurial experience (37) and unrealistic financial projection (79) were also reasons for 
rapid rejection.  
Of the 166 remaining opportunities, 65 were rejected due to concerns regarding the 
venture (a combination of technology and market factors). Two (2) additional opportunities 
were rejected because none of the BAs could see how he/she would add value to the venture. 
The last 99 opportunities are those where the BAs became more interested and can be used to 
test our hypotheses, because the entrepreneur’s behavior mattered. They resulted in either an 
investment offer (32) or a rejection (67).13 For those rejected, we were able to code the 
rejections as primarily due to concerns raised about the performance risk due to the 
entrepreneur’s ability to manage the venture (45) or the relationship risk due to 
entrepreneur’s likelihood of managing the investment in the long-term interest of the BA 
(22). Data on these 99 investment interactions are extracted using our behavioral-coding 
                                                      
12	  While	  an	   investor	  might	  exit	  an	   interaction	  early	   for	  many	  reasons,	  our	  coding	  reflects	   the	  rejection	  
reason	  of	  the	  most	  interested	  investor	  who	  stayed	  in	  the	  interaction	  the	  longest	  and	  was	  therefore	  last	  to	  
exit.	  
13	   Of	   the	   32	   entrepreneurs	   who	   received	   an	   investment	   offer,	   only	   26	   were	   accepted	   on	   the	   show.	  
Entrepreneurs	  typically	  rejected	  an	  offer	  because	  of	  disagreements	  about	  valuation	  or	  the	  BA’s	  proposed	  
control	  of	  the	  venture.	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schema, in line with Bakeman and Gottman’s (1997) suggestions when implementing an 
observational interaction method. Examples of the data coding sheets used are included in 










Figure 3-1 Opportunity frequency per rejection 
This method allows us to use trained observers to code real-life interactions for 
information exchanges and behavioral cues, while the interaction is happening. It overcomes 
data collection limitations of previous research, where investors themselves might not 
understand how their assessment of certain behaviors influence their decision outcome 
(Zacharakis  & Meyer, 1998), or where data is gathered from the investor’s hazy 
recollections at the end of the decision-making process (Petty & Gruber, 2011). Rather than 
limiting the dataset to successful outcomes (which introduce selection bias), the use of these 
interactions enables us to develop insights on interactions that are normally protracted and 
take place in a confidential environment. Our ability to access the original line-tapes (with 
only a fraction in the public domain) of the interactions enables us to capture the behaviors 

























and decision process of entrepreneurs and BAs at a similar stage in the venture creation 
process within a consistent context, and view the recorded interactions repeatedly to explore 
and reevaluate different behavioral aspects in more detail. 
The two observers possess a great deal of experience in helping early-stage 
entrepreneurs. They reviewed the entire non-edited line-tapes of the 99 interactions and 
coded each without prior knowledge of the outcome (offer/no offer). They use our 
behavioral-coding schema that subdivides capabilities, experiences and traits into a total of 
11 dimensions, as shown in Table 3.2. The decision to subdivide was based on Bakeman and 
Gottman’s (1997) recommendation to develop a schema at a level of analysis that is slightly 
more molecular than the proposed hypothesis and where the dimensions can be aggregated. 
For each interaction, the corresponding lead entrepreneur was assigned a code (on a 1–5 
Likert scale) for every dimension of his/her capabilities and experiences based on the 
inventory of behaviors that manifested the entrepreneur’s underlying facets provided in Table 
3.2.14 An entrepreneur’s competence, for instance, was coded based on displays of technical 
expertise, management ability and social skills. To code for the five (dimensions of) traits, 
we developed simplified coding guides that focused on the more proximate facets of each 
dimension identified in our theory development. For instance, extraversion was coded based 
on behaviors that demonstrated enthusiasm and passion. If a dimension was not demonstrated 
during the interaction, then that dimension was considered irrelevant to the investment 
decision (because the opportunity was rejected before the dimension could be assessed or the 
BAs did not identify that dimension to be relevant).15  
                                                      
14	   In	   several	   cases,	   entrepreneurial	   teams	  presented.	   If	   there	  was	  not	  an	  obvious	   leader/founder,	   then	  
the	  assessment	  was	  based	  on	  the	  team’s	  behaviors	  during	  the	  interaction.	  
15	   Our	   observers	   were	   knowledgeable	   about	   the	   interaction,	   assessing	   the	   performance	   risk,	   and	  




3.6.1 Validity checks 
For construct validity, we performed a principal component analysis for the dimensions 
associated with each entrepreneurial characteristic type - capabilities (C), experiences (E) and 
traits (T) - as shown in Table 3.4. We used the calculated values as weights for the 
dimensions within a type to obtain that type’s aggregate rating. Table 3.4 also offers the 
correlations between all dimensions and types, where we would like each dimension to be 
highly correlated with its type (gray cells), which is the case for all except relevant 
knowledge (ED2). We also would like none of a type’s dimension to be significantly 
correlated to the aggregate ratings of the other two types. Out of the 22 relevant correlations 
bolded in Table 3.4, six are significant but again only ED2 is a real concern because its 
correlation with its type’s aggregate rating E (at 0.041) is below its correlation with the 
aggregate rating for capabilities C (at 0.269). We also carried out a rotated varimax principal 
component analysis for all 11 dimensions, which showed alignment between the five 
(dimensions of) traits, but some linkages between the dimensions for experiences and 
capabilities. This construct validity concern will be revisited in the conclusion.  
We address coding validity by calculating the inter-rater reliability between our trained 
observers for each of the 11 dimensions of the three characteristic types and for all the 
dimensions combined (Landis  & Koch, 1977). Inter-rater reliability (Cohen’s kappa) for the 
aggregate ratings of behaviors that manifest the various dimensions of capabilities, 
experiences and traits are 0.84, 0.89 and 0.79, respectively, while the overall reliability is 
0.83. These are sufficiently large to feel confident about the reliability of our coding schema 
and the appropriateness of our observational technique. We also observed few extreme 
differences in the coding between the two observers, with the maximum difference being 1 
 
77 
on any given dimension. Furthermore, repeated access to the line-tapes, which provided a 
complete record of the entire interaction between the entrepreneur and BAs, gave us the 
opportunity to develop and improve the behavioral-coding schema over time and to 
subsequently investigate additional displays of behaviors that were not foreseen at the start of 
the research. While this research method may raise a number of internal and external validity 
concerns that we discuss in Appendix A, the show provides us the opportunity to undertake 
an elaborate “field experiment,” where a variety of behaviors by each party can be observed 
(Bird  & Schjoedt, 2009). 
3.6.2 Hypothesis testing 
We test the hypotheses with logistic regression, where the investment offer is a 
dichotomous variable (1: offer; 0: no offer). Regression models identify the presence of a 
linear increasing (H1), concave increasing (H2), or inverted U-shaped (H3) relationship. 
Since two out of the three hypotheses propose nonlinear relationships, we initially chose to 
transform the aggregate rating E for experiences to its exponential form (e-E for a concave 
increasing shape) and to square the aggregate rating T for traits (T2 for an inverted U-shape). 
We find (in Table 3.416) significant correlations between the aggregate rating C for 
capabilities and E (0.360) and, as expected, between E and e-E (–0.861, which also explains 
the significant correlation between C and e-E at –0.372) and between T and T2 (0.992). Given 
these high correlations, we create separate models to test each hypothesis and alternate, in 
addition to two versions of a model that combines all ratings.17   
                                                      
16	  	  Unlike	  previous	  models	  we	  do	  not	  include	  the	  odds/ratio,	  because	  rather	  than	  looking	  at	  frequencies,	  
ratings	  are	  observer’s	  relative	  assessments	  on	  a	  Likert	  scale.	  	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  visualize	  what	  an	  increase	  in	  
that	  subjective	  value	  would	  look	  like.	  
17	   We	   also	   centered	   (i.e.,	   subtract	   the	   mean	   from)	   T	   &	   T2	   (Cohen	   et	   al,	   2003),	   which	   reduced	   the	  






** significant at 0.01 and * significant at 0.05 
Table 3-4 Principal component weights, (PCW), descriptive statistics and correlations  
  All Opportunities (99) 
Types/Dimensions PCA Mean S.D. C E e-E  T T2 CD1 CD2 CD3 ED1 ED2 ED3 TD1 TD2 TD3 TD4 TD5 
C      Capabilities  3.48 0.66 1                
E      Experiences  3.56 0.53 0.360** 1               
e-E    Experiences (Exp.)  0.28 0.02 -0.372** -0.861** 1              
T     Traits  3.44 0.47 0.079 -0.087 0.100 1             
T2    Traits (squared)  11.83 2.59 0.081 -0.084 0.097 0.992** 1            
CD1   Competence 0.435 3.26 0.79 0.690** -0.006 -0.083 0.091 0.094 1           
CD2   Critical thinking  
facility 0.517 3.57 0.84 0.838
** 0.434** -0.438** 0.083 0.081 0.386** 1 
         
CD3   New resource  
skills 0.410 3.59 0.79 0.651
** 0.327** -0.256* -0.008 -0.004 0.153 0.350** 1         
ED1   Prior activities 0.654 3.44 0.66 0.347** 0.719** -0.602** -0.127 -0.119 -0.010 0.291** 0.490** 1        
ED2   Relevant 
knowledge 0.035 3.46 0.68 0.269
** 0.041 -0.455** -0.003 -0.011 0.340** 0.229* 0.007 -0.023 1       
ED3   Education 0.660 3.70 0.76 0.199* 0.798** -0.682** -0.013 -0.016 -0.016 0.355** 0.040 0.156 0.031 1      
TD1   Emotional 
stability 0.388 3.38 0.80 0.012 -0.115 0.126 0.705
** 0.704** 0.020 -0.003 0.012 -0.148 0.015 -0.092 1     
TD2   Extraversion 0.452 3.57 0.73 0.036 -0.029 0.050 0.788** 0.786** 0.071 0.046 -0.046 -0.049 -0.020 0.002 0.449** 1    
TD3   Openness to 
experience 0.271 3.39 0.76 0.018 -0.029 0.016 0.473
** 0.461** 0.081 0.036 -0.090 -0.074 0.041 0.021 0.075 0.221 1   
TD4   Agreeableness 0.211 3.32 0.66 0.244* 0.120 -0.066 0.343** 0.330** 0.126 0.255* 0.136 0.114 0.018 0.070 -0.010 0.241* 0.184 1  
TD5   Conscientious-
ness 0.304 3.41 0.80 0.029 -0.078 0.108 0.556
** 0.553** 0.020 0.024  0.019 -0.145 -0.046 0.017 0.256* 0.206* 0.133 0.026 1 
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When assessing the significance of logistic regression models, we rely more on χ2 
“goodness of fit” and model accuracy than the R2 used widely in regression analysis, more 
importantly, the BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) provides a better statistical tool when 
comparing model accuracy between models because it also considers the impact of the number of 
different criteria considered (Menard, 2002; Schwartz, 1978).  In addition, significant values of 
χ2 can be used to determine the overall accuracy of the model, while the contribution of each 
variable can be measured by its magnitude, sign and significance. We use each of these three 
measures of model accuracy when looking for support for our hypotheses or comparing models.    
We follow the lead of Cohen et al. (2003) and first create a regression model for each 
hypothesis to test for the presence of the simplest relationship, which is the linear model. We 
call these Model 1a (capabilities), Model 2a (experiences) and Model 3a (traits). Finding 
high levels of χ2 significance in Model 1a alone is sufficient to test H1. To test H2, we look 
for significant χ2 in Model 2a and use BIC to compare this with Model 2b, which is created 
to only include e-E (to show a concave increasing relationship when the regression coefficient 
is negative and significant). To test H3, Model 3b is created to include both T and T2, where 
a significant χ2 and a significant positive regression coefficient for T as well as a significant 
negative coefficient for T2 supports the presence of an inverted U-shaped relationship. Table 
3.5 shows Model 1a through Model 3b that examine the relationship between each inventory 
of behaviors as manifestations of the entrepreneur’s capabilities, experiences or traits. In 
addition, we include the combination of all characteristic types in Model 4a (including 
experiences) and Model 4b (replacing experiences with its negative exponential), and the 
likelihood of receiving an investment offer, along with four measures of overall model 




Variable Model 1a Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b Model 4a Model 4b 
Constant -
7.902*** 
-4.001** -.155 -0.142 -42.418 -54.169* -53.316* 
Capabilities (C) 1.467***     1.614*** 1.525*** 
Experiences (E)  0.670*    0.048  
Traits (T)    -0.107 16.643* 18.383* 18.341* 
e–Experiences (e-E)   -61.412*    -20.236 
Traits2 (T2)     -1.626* -1.817* -1.809* 
R2 (Cox & Snell) 0.168 0.041 0.045 0.001 0.151 0.306 0.309 
Model accuracy 64.6% 70.7% 67.7% 67.7% 64.6% 70.7% 69.7% 
BIC† 108.40 122.42 121.99 126.45 112.38 96.41 95.95 
χ2  18.202*** 4.175** 4.604** 0.146 16.217*** 36.184*** 36.649*** 
*** significant at 0.01, ** significant at 0.05, * significant at 0.1 
† The Bayesian information (or Schwartz) criterion  (BIC) is -2×log-likelihood + k×log(n), (where k is the number of 
estimated parameters and n is the sample size. 
Table 3-5 Regression models: investment decision 
Model 1a is significant (χ2 = 18.202, p-value < 0.001), with a significant positive 
regression coefficient (p-value < 0.001) and a model accuracy of 64.6%.18 H1 is thus 
supported and a positive linear relationship exists between the inventory of behaviors as 
manifestations of the entrepreneur’s capabilities (competence, critical thinking facility and 
new resource skills) and the likelihood of receiving an offer. Model 2a is also significant (χ2 
= 4.175, p-value < 0.05), with a significant positive regression coefficient (p-value = 0.053) 
and a model accuracy of 70.7%. This suggests a positive linear relationship between the 
inventory of behaviors as manifestations of the entrepreneur’s experiences and the likelihood 
of receiving an offer. Model 2b, which instead uses the exponential of the negative aggregate 
rating for experiences to model diminishing returns, is also significant with χ2 improving to 
4.604 (p-value < 0.05), but model accuracy reducing to 67.7% when compared with Model 
2a and a regression coefficient that is equally significant. When comparing these two models, 
we note that Model 2a has a BIC equal to 122.42 while Model 2b has a BIC equal to 121.99, 
                                                      
18	  In	  logistic	  regression,	  model	  accuracy	  is	  a	  more	  reliable	  indicator	  than	  the	  R2	  used	  in	  linear	  regression.	  
In	  addition,	  higher	  χ2	  values	  show	  greater	  support	  for	  rejecting	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  (Menard,	  2002).	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showing both models have equal “goodness of fit”. We therefore find support for H2 that 
suggests increasing manifestations of behaviors that demonstrate experiences increase the 
likelihood of receiving an investment offer, but find no evidence that the hypothesized 
diminishing returns are no more significant than a simple linear relationship. In addition, as 
BIC for either Model is lower than for Model 1a, we suggest that capabilities are a more 
significant predictor of the investment offer than experiences.  
As anticipated, Model 3a suggests an insignificant (linear) positive relationship (χ2 = 
0.146, p-value = 0.702) between the inventory of behaviors that manifest the entrepreneur’s 
traits and the likelihood of receiving an offer. Model 3b, which combines T with T2 to model 
the inverted U-shaped relationship, has a χ2 = 16.217 and p-value < 0.01). The inverted U 
shape relationship is supported because both regression coefficients are significant (P<0.1) 
and of the appropriate sign for the hypothesized relationship.  This shows that H3 is 
supported such that manifestation of behaviors that infer lacks or excesses in the 
entrepreneur’s inventory of traits (emotional stability, extraversion, openness to experience, 
agreeableness, and conscientiousness) reduce the likelihood of receiving an investment offer.  
Overall, the best regressions exhibit reasonable levels of model accuracy (64.6% to 
70.7%) with significant goodness of fit. Figures 3.2 (a)-(c) offer graphical representations of 
the fit between the observed relationships and those prescribed by the regressions.19 We note 
that, while we find support for all three hypotheses (although a linear relationship is equally 
accurate for H2), we also eliminated the possibility that a more complex regression model, 
using higher orders of power transformations of the independent variables, may exhibit 
stronger significance. In each case, we calculated the difference in χ2 and observed that more 
                                                      

















complex (higher order) models did not produce greater accuracy; for space consideration we 
omitted these calculations.  
We also created two combined models, Model 4a and 4b and regressed simultaneously 
the aggregate ratings for the characteristic types and their transformations (in the case of 
Model 4a - C, E, T, e-E and T2, while for Model 4b - C, T, e-E and T2) on the likelihood of 
receiving an offer. Model 4a and Model 4b in Table 3.5 each show a better (χ2 = 36.184, p-
value < 0.001, BIC = 96.41, χ2 = 36.649, p-value < 0.001, BIC = 95.95, respectively) 
goodness of fit than the separate models. In each case all the coefficients excluding 
experiences are significant, however given correlations between the capabilities and 
experiences that may cause colinearity issues, this does not mean that experiences have no 
impact on goodness of fit. Insights from the combined model reaffirm our initial decision to 
model each of the characteristic types separately.  
 
3.6.3 Improving explanatory power 
The limited explanatory power on the investment decision of each aggregate rating 
encouraged us to revisit the dependent variable. We instead broke down the 99 opportunities 
into two groups: 45 that were rejected due manifestations of specific behaviors by the 
entrepreneur that affect the performance risk (shown in Figure 3.1); and 54 opportunities 
where 22 were rejected because of concerns about the future investor-entrepreneur 
relationship, and 32 that were not rejected. This division was inspired by the suggestion of 
Maxwell and Lévesque (2011) who suggest that different criteria are considered at each stage 
of the process, and that subsequent to the assessment of managerial risk during this stage of 
the interaction, relationship risk is considered.  
Based on this understanding, we repeated the logistic regressions with a new 
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dichotomous dependent variable: continue to the next stage of the interaction, or not, rather 
than coding for the investment decision. This dependent variable was coded 0 for the 45 
opportunities that were rejected based on concerns associated with the entrepreneur’s 
behaviors, and 1 for the remaining 54 that move to the next stage of the interaction, where 
the investor explores a longer-term relationship. This coding was undertaken as part of the 
original coding process, and is also included on the coding sheets in Appendix C. Table 3.6 
shows the corresponding models: Models 5a, 6a, 6b, 7a, 7b, 8a and 8b. 
 
Variable Model 5a Model 6a Model 6b Model 7a Model 7b Model 8a Model 8b 
Constant -13.363*** -6.657** 1.500*** -0.189 -46.147* -131.320** -120.059** 
Capabilities (C) 2.851***     4.920*** 4.662*** 
Experiences (E)  1.422**    1.989**  
Traits (T)    0.066 18.254* 39.991** 40.174** 
e–Experiences (e-E)   -138.281***      -176.010** 
Traits2 (T2)     -1.759* -3.929** -3.927** 
R2 (Cox & Snell) 0.376 0.165 0.165 0.001 0.224 0.627 0.624 
Model accuracy 80.8% 67.7% 67.7% 54.5% 70.7% 91.9% 91.9% 
BIC 91.66 120.54 120.59 138.36 115.31 46.87 47.47 
χ2  46.766*** 17.855** 17.838*** 0.062 25.116** 97.551*** 96.949*** 
*** significant at 0.01, ** significant at 0.05, * significant at 0.1 
Table 3-6  Regression models: continuing to next stage of interaction 
The explanatory power of the regressions considerably improved in most cases and the 
hypothesized regression coefficients now all become significant. To compare with figure 3.2, 
figures 3.3 (a)-(c) provides graphical representations comparing actual results to 
hypothesized model, where the dependent variable is now proceeding to next stage of 
interaction. Model 5a focuses on capabilities, and when compared to Model 1a, BIC 
improves from 108.40 to 91.66 (lower is better), and χ2 improves from 18.202 to 46.766. 
This finds stronger support for a hypothesis where the dependent variable is proceeding to the 
next interaction stage.  We therefore restate H1 such that a positive linear relationship exists 
between the inventory of behaviors as manifestations of the entrepreneur’s capabilities 
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(competence, critical thinking facility and new resource skills) and the likelihood of 
continuing to the next stage of the interaction.  
Model 6a’s goodness of fit (χ2 = 17.855, p-value < 0.05) is higher than Model 2a, χ2 = 
4.175, p-value < 0.05) with a similar BIC (120.54 compared to 122.42), however now the 
regression co-efficient (p < 0.05 rather than p< 0.1). Model 6b, which includes the negative 
exponential of experiences has a similar χ2 and BIC to Model 6a (17.838 and 120.59), 
although the goodness of fit and the regression co-efficient are both more significant (p < 
0.001). However, on balance, differences in accuracy between Models 6a and 6b are not 
significant, supporting either a linear or increasing concave relationship between the 
entrepreneur’s experience inventory and the likelihood of continuing to the next stage of the 
interaction. We therefore restate H2 such that an increasing linear relationship exists between 
the inventory of behaviors as manifestations of the entrepreneur’s experiences and the 
likelihood of continuing to the next stage of the interaction with limited evidence of 
diminishing returns. 
As expected, Model 7a (linear), which focuses on traits, is has a low goodness of fit (χ2 
= 0.062, p-value = 0.803) and an insignificant regression coefficient, however model 7b, 
which includes coefficients for both T and T2 has significant goodness of fit (χ2 = 25.116, p-
value < 0.05), with significant regression coefficients for each term (p<0.1). While model 
accuracy improves from 64.6% (in Model 3b) to 70.7%, and BIC deteriorates from 112.38 to 
115.31, the  goodness of fit, χ2, improves  from 16.2 to 25.1,  providing  stronger  support for  
the hypothesized inverted U-shaped relationship between the entrepreneur’s trait inventory  
and the likelihood of continuing to the next stage of the interaction.  This supports a 
restatement of  H3, such  that  manifestations of  behaviors that  infer a  lack or  excess In the  
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(a) Capabilities (C)    (b) Experiences (E)      (c) Traits (T) 
Figure 3-2  Observed vs. prescribed relationships between likelihood of receiving an offer and aggregate ratio 
	      	    
              (a) Capabilities (C)                 (b) Experiences (E)                (c) Traits (T)	  






































































entrepreneur’s inventory of traits (emotional stability, extraversion, openness to experience, 
agreeableness, and conscientiousness) reduce the likelihood of continuing to the next stage of 
the interaction.   
When regressing simultaneously the aggregate ratings and their transformations on the 
likelihood of continuing to the next stage of the interaction, Model 8a (which includes 
experiences) has a more significant goodness of fit (χ2 = 97.551, p-value < 0.001, compared 
to Model 4a  χ2 = 36.184) and model accuracy jumps from 70.7% to 91.9%, while BIC 
improves from 96.41 to 46.87. In the case of Model 8a, all the coefficients are significant. 
Model 8b (which includes the exponential of experiences) has a more significant goodness of 
fit (χ2 = 96.949, p-value < 0.001, compared to Model 4b χ2 = 36.649) and model accuracy 
jumps from 69.7% to 91.9%, while BIC improves from 95.95 to 47.47. More importantly, in 
the case of both Model 8a and 8b, all the coefficients are more significant than in Models 4a 
and 4b. However given the high correlation between the aggregate ratings for capabilities and 
experiences, one must be somewhat cautious with Model 8 to predict the relative impact of 
specific behaviors on the likelihood of progressing in the interaction. 
3.7 Concluding remarks  
What aspects of the entrepreneur contribute the most to future venture performance 
(including funding) has been unclear. In this article, we addressed this issue by examining 
behaviors. We consider a series of investment interactions as a “field experiment” to provide 
a consistent context, where the behaviors of entrepreneurs, who are at similar stages in the 
venture creation process, could be observed and appropriately coded. Our ability to not only 
observe entrepreneurs’ behaviors in actual interactions, but also to see the reactions of expert 
investors, enabled us to draw conclusions about the importance of the “jockey” 
 
87 
(entrepreneur) rather than the “horse” (venture): only when the characteristics and winning 
potential of the horse is known do the behaviors of the jockey matter. Existing works on 
entrepreneurial behaviors enabled us to put forward a theoretical framework to explain how 
the manifestations of specific behaviors, viewed through the lens of the entrepreneur’s 
capabilities, experiences and traits, might affect an investor’s assessment of the venture’s 
performance risk, and hence willingness to invest. In addition, our finding that the 
hypothesized relationships better predict continuing to the next stage of the interaction than 
of receiving an investment offer, provide support for the concept of of a multistage 
interaction, with factors other than performance risk considered at a subsequent stage in the 
process. 
We showed that higher inventories of behaviors as manifestations of the entrepreneur’s 
capabilities and experiences yield higher likelihoods of receiving a BA investment offer and 
an even higher likelihood of proceeding to the next stage of the interaction. In the 
composition of these inventories (as per Table 3.4), the entrepreneur’s demonstration of 
capabilities was an approximately equal combination of behaviors that showed competence, 
critical thinking ability and new resource skills and there seemed to be a level of correlation 
between the capability dimensions that justified us aggregating them into a single variable in 
our model. 
In a similar way, demonstrations of each of the five trait dimensions - emotional 
stability, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness, 
contributed to the rejection decision, however the very low correlation between these traits 
means that our aggregation of them into a single variable is an oversimplification of 
personality traits. The lack of a direct relationship between these traits reinforces their value 
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in assessing different dimensions of personality, but suggests that that more attention be paid 
to individual traits than their aggregate value. To investigate this, we repeated the regression 
for each trait separately, and found that emotional stability, openness to experience and 
conscientiousness all displayed significant inverted U-shaped relationships, however the low 
sample size caused concerns about model accuracy, and suggests an opportunity for further 
research with a large number of opportunities and entrepreneurs. 
In looking at the entrepreneur’s demonstration of experiences we noted that this was 
primarily inferred by behaviors that showed prior experience and education, with knowledge 
playing only a limited role. However we must be cautious when inferring about the role of 
knowledge, partly because of the selection bias in our dataset: the entrepreneurs were 
generally less sophisticated and experienced than those who might “pitch” to a BA group. 
This relative inexperience likely eliminated the possibility of excessive manifestations of 
experiences during the interaction. This might explain why support for our hypothesis 
associated with experiences (H2), where diminishing returns should have “kicked-in” above 
a certain inventory threshold, was weak (since we had an alternative linear relationship 
equally supported).  
The exploratory nature of this research led us to identify three types of characteristics 
that we broke down into dimensions for coding purposes. It is clear that additional 
dimensions may be added that might increase model accuracy. In addition, regressing at the 
dimension rather than the characteristic type level may provide additional insights into how 
specific behaviors influence the BA’s assessment of performance risk. Finally, it was 
difficult in a relatively short interaction to differentiate between manifestations of knowledge 
(a dimension of experiences) and competence (a dimension of capabilities). This reinforces 
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the observations of Unger et al. (2011) who explain the linkages between capabilities and 
experiences as capabilities can be viewed as an outcome from the effort made to acquire 
experiences. The richness of the experiences and the internalization of acquired knowledge 
can also be influenced by individual traits. 
Nevertheless, some theoretical implications have emerged from this work. The 
involvement of experts has helped us reconcile the apparent inconsistency between those 
studying the relationship between entrepreneurial characteristics and venture performance 
and those investigating the relationship between such characteristics and the investment 
decision. This reconciliation comes from focusing on entrepreneurs’ behaviors, specifically 
11 dimensions of behaviors in a context-specific interaction, proposing that expert investors 
view the manifestations of specific behaviors as a moderator for the performance risk in the 
investment opportunity. We inform current research by proposing that an entrepreneur’s 
capability inventory (as behavioral manifestations) or experience inventory can increase the 
likelihood of receiving an offer, because it reduces the BA’s perception of the performance 
risk. An entrepreneur’s trait inventory can also increase that likelihood, but only up to a 
certain point. After that point, the likelihood starts decreasing, because the entrepreneur’s 
decision-making can become compromised by excessive behavioral manifestations of these 
traits.  
On the methodological side, we applied an observational research method from 
psychology to gather data on what the entrepreneur does during the investor-entrepreneur 
investment interaction. Our direct involvement in this “field experiment” enabled us to 
develop a multi-criteria behavioral-coding schema and observe entrepreneurs’ behaviors to 
find support for our proposed decision mechanisms, all at a fraction of the cost we would 
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have incurred if we had designed our own experiment. In addition, our ability to reexamine 
the unedited line-tapes increases their utility in that more data can be generated by altering 
the focus of what one chooses to study and thus code. Conscious of the fact that 
entrepreneurial success is a complex phenomenon, focusing on behavioral manifestations and 
the reactions of experts in a specific context can be fruitful in a variety of entrepreneurial 
phenomena.  
On the practical side, acknowledging the importance of various behavioral 
manifestations of entrepreneurial characteristics, as listed in Table 3.2, might help 
entrepreneurs understand how the perception of their behaviors by investors affects these 
investors’ assessment of the performance risk in the investment opportunity. Entrepreneurs 
can thus adjust their behavior by, for instance, more thoroughly demonstrating their 
capabilities or experiences. When the entrepreneur’s behaviors create concerns about the 
performance risk, either party can engage other team members who can complement or 
supplement the entrepreneur’s shortcomings. Furthermore, a less experienced investor’s 
awareness of the behavioral manifestations we code can increase the quality of decision 
making and provide guidance as to when performance risk might be too high to justify an 
investment. Moreover, a focus on the four categories of performance risk exemplified in 
Table 3.3 can help entrepreneurs and investors identify alternate tactics to moderate 
undesirable behaviors.  
This research is of course not without limitations. We found the identification of 
behaviors that indicated excess levels of certain traits somewhat subjective, as was the coding 
for experiences (e.g., starting three ventures that each failed after one year is greater or lesser 
experience than starting one successful venture). We must also acknowledge the context 
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limitations, in that decisions were made under severe time constraints and the population of 
entrepreneurs was not representative of the population of all fund-seeking entrepreneurs. 
These issues call for further research, by observing more investor-entrepreneur interactions 
and developing a more elaborate behavioral-coding schema that can enable more accurate 
inventory assessment. Furthermore, while we assert that entrepreneurs’ behaviors are 
important during the investment decision due to their impact on performance risk, 
extrapolating these results to their impact on long-term venture performance from brief 
interactions early in the venture creation process may be premature. However, given the 
importance of third-party financing early in the venture creation process, understanding the 
factors that can influence success rates at this early stage is crucial. This might be 
complemented by a more detailed investigation of how behaviors might change over a longer 
timeframe or later in that process. 
Inventories of behaviors as manifestations of an entrepreneur’s capabilities, 
experiences and traits do matter for the making and receiving of an investment offer. Such 
behaviors are also crucial when negotiating and developing relationships essential to business 
success. There is still much to be learned about how the behaviors of entrepreneurs can act as 




4 Aspiration levels and tradeoffs in business angel 
investment decisions                                                                                                   
4.1 Introduction 
Business angels (BAs) are recognized as an important source of finance for high 
potential ventures (Kelly, 2007), yet more than 95% of the interactions between fund-seeking 
entrepreneurs and BAs end in failure (Haines, Madill & Riding, 2003; Riding, Duxbury & 
Haines, 1997). Mason and Harrison (2003) suggest that this high failure rate is due to a 
combination of a lack of ‘investment ready’ ventures, a paucity of available BA investment 
funds, and a lack of understanding of the investment decision process. Riding, Madill and 
Haines (2007) highlight the need to address this lack of understanding, suggesting the use of 
tools from social sciences to scrutinize how BAs make investment decisions and “the kinds 
of information that business angels seek” in order “to present the relevant information and to 
negotiate from a better informed perspective” (p332). 
In part, this lack of understanding stems from the assumption that experienced BAs 
invest in a similar manner to portfolio investors, who are thought to make tradeoffs between 
investment return and investment risk when deciding in which opportunities to invest 
(Markowitz, 1959). However, such a normative approach assumes that investors have 
unlimited time to make their decisions and can fully evaluate all available information before 
making a decision. Simon (1955) suggests instead that, depending on the context, individuals 
make boundedly rational decisions that consider only a limited number of criteria. 
Gigerenzer (1997) identifies that time constrained decision-makers can deploy fast and frugal 
decision shortcuts or heuristics to reduce the effort required by reviewing a limited number 
of criteria and limiting the analysis of tradeoffs among them. However, the resulting decision 
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outcomes can deviate from previous normative assumptions (Gigerenzer, 2008). We 
therefore ask: Rather than using normative decision-making techniques that consider all 
relevant information, do BAs use heuristics that trade off decision accuracy for decision 
efficiency?  
We address this research question by developing three hypotheses that describe how 
BAs assess opportunities and use heuristics to reject them at one stage of the multistage 
investment decision process – the post-selection stage. Specifically, we hypothesize that BAs 
make tradeoffs between four critical sub-criteria to assess the investment return and between 
four additional sub-criteria to assess the investment risk. However, we posit that BAs do not 
trade off between these two investment-decision criteria (i.e., investment return and 
investment risk) when rejecting an investment opportunity. In fact, we hypothesize that rather 
than assessing the absolute value of each criterion, BAs look for the investment opportunity 
to fall short of an aspiration level for investment return, or exceed an aspiration level for 
investment risk, to reject it.  
We test these three hypotheses with coded data originating from videotapes of the 
complete interactions (including what did not air) between fund-seeking entrepreneurs and 
five BAs recorded for the reality-TV show CBC Dragons’ Den. Our analysis of such 
interactions enables us to overcome some of the methodological constraints identified in 
prior research, including the private nature of the interaction (Harrison, Mason & Robson, 
2003) and reliance on investors’ recollections (Wiltbank, Read, Drew & Sarasvathy, 2009), 
which would make it challenging to “identify whether there are non-compensatory or 
essential criteria” (Mason & Harrison, 1996a, p37). During the show recording, 
entrepreneurs pitch their opportunities to BAs they have not met previously, while the BAs 
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are required to provide a specific reason for the rejection of an opportunity, or make an 
investment offer. The context of the show makes available a unique dataset and our ability to 
use trained observers to code the entire investment process, and identify the reasons for 
rejection, enables us to gather data at specific stages of this multistage process. Observing 
real investment interactions provides a “fertile untapped resource(s) for future 
entrepreneurship research” (Sarasvathy & Venkataraman, 2011, p127).  
Our research findings enable us to make two key contributions to the field of 
entrepreneurship. First, by paying attention to critical sub-criteria associated with the venture 
that inform a BA’s assessment of the two investment-decision criteria, we unearth a 
compensatory relationship between the four sub-criteria that inform investment return and 
those that inform investment risk. This finding can in turn be used to explain how 
shortcomings in a sub-criterion can be addressed. Second, we challenge the normative 
assumptions of how BAs assess and trade off between these criteria by proposing instead that 
BAs use heuristics that limit their cognitive effort to reject opportunities that fail to meet an 
aspiration level for investment return or exceed an aspiration level for investment risk. 
4.2 Investment-decision (sub-) criteria 
BAs assess a large number of criteria (e.g., those associated with the venture, the 
entrepreneur, the investment fit) to inform their investment decision (van Osnabrugge, 2000). 
Some are personal to the BA and based on his/her own involvement, such as interest, ability 
to contribute and chemistry (Mason & Stark, 2004). Others are linked to the more traditional 
portfolio measures, investment return and investment risk (Feeney, Haines & Riding, 1999), 
or what we call here the investment-decision criteria. McMullen and Shepherd (2006) 
suggest that investors investigate these criteria in stages, assessing those seen as more 
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objective, such as those associated with the venture offering, before deciding whether to 
investigate those seen as more subjective, such as those associated with the entrepreneur. 
Sudek, Mitteness and Baucus (2008) explain this multistage sequence by pointing out that the 
assessment of how entrepreneurial factors influence the investment decision can only be 
undertaken once the venture offering is understood.  
Maxwell, Jeffrey and Lévesque (2011) investigate the initial selection stage of the 
multistage investment-decision process, and observe how the presence of a fatal flaw in any 
one of eight venture sub-criteria (i.e., those directly associated with the venture) cause a 
business opportunity to be rejected. In this paper, we focus on the subsequent stage in the 
process, the post-selection stage, when opportunities that have made it through the initial 
selection stage are further considered. We propose that during the post-selection stage, 
investors reassess the same sub-criteria as at the selection stage, but rather than looking for a 
fatal flaw on any one of them, they assess the impact of each sub-criterion on the investment 
return or the investment risk. The BA’s assessment of these sub-criteria influences the 
decision to reject an opportunity at the post-selection stage, or to allow it to proceed with the 
process where the entrepreneurs’ characteristics are then considered (Lévesque & Maxwell, 
2011). We next explain the relationship between the eight critical venture sub-criteria and the 
BA’s assessment of investment return and investment risk. Table 4.1 summarizes these sub-
criteria. 
4.2.1 Investment return 
Investment return is based on the assessment of the financial return that the BA 
anticipates receiving at the time of exit. It is calculated by the BA in the form of a 
percentage, dividing the amount he/she expects to receive (at the time of exiting the  
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Sub-criteria  Key question  Rating and Explanation 
V1 – Market potential  
(market size) 
Is there a large market 
for this product? 
A Large market potential (i.e. over $20 million) 
B Medium market potential (i.e. over $5 million) 
C Unable to predict — likely less than $5 million. 
V2 – Product adoption  
(market share) 
Will customers in target 
market easily adopt this 
product?  
A Customers will easily adopt product or service 
B Benefits harder to identify, some adoption issues 
C No clear benefits, or major adoption issues 
V3 – Protectability 
(profitability) 
How easy will it be for 
other people to copy 
the product or service? 
A Product patented or significant other barrier 
B It will not be easy to replicate. 
C Anyone could copy it easily. 
V4 – Entrepreneur 
experience (reputation)  
Does management have 
direct and relevant 
experience? 
A Significant relevant experience 
B Limited experience, but appropriate knowledge 
C No evidence of required experience 
V5 – Product status  
(for technology risk) 
 
Product ready for market, 
or major work required 
before it ships? 
A Finished product 
B Design complete all technical issues addressed 
C Needs more research and development 
V6 – Route to market 
(for operational risk) 
Is there a realistic 
marketing plan and 
route to market? 
A Realistic marketing plan / distribution partner 
B Options identified — no agreements in place 
C Limited thought given to distribution issues 
V7 – Customer engagement 
(for market risk) 
Is a first customer 
identified? Does 
product meet need? 
A Customers in place, or committed to purchasing 
B Customers engaged in development project 
C No first customers identified. 
V8 – Financial projections 
(for financial risk)  
Profitable and 
sustainable cash flow?   
A Sound business model and cash management 
B Unclear profitability, limited cash management 
C No evidence of profit or cash management 
Table 4-1 Venture sub-criteria in the investment decision  
 
investment) by the initial investment amount. The amount invested in return for a specific 
level of equity in the venture is negotiated by the BA and fund-seeking entrepreneur, and 
included as part of the initial investment contract. The financial return is a function of the 
BA’s percentage of venture ownership at the time of exit, and the venture’s value at this time. 
The venture value at the time of exit is more difficult to forecast, but Ge, Mahoney and 
Mahoney (2005) suggest that it is influenced by the size and growth rate of the market, the 
potential for creating product differentiation, the barriers to entry for competitors, and the 
quality of the management team. Of the eight venture sub-criteria itemized in Table 4.1 (and 
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also used in Maxwell, Jeffrey & Lévesque, 2011), four can be linked to the forecasted 
venture value and hence investment return. 
The forecasted venture value increases with higher forecasted revenues, which result 
from a higher assessment of V1 – market potential (Mason & Rogers, 1997) and V2 – 
customer ease of product adoption (Bachher & Guild, 1996). The forecasted venture value 
also increases with greater gross margins, which are due to V3 – a level of protectability that 
creates an entry barrier for potential competitors (Mason & Harrison, 1996a). In addition, V4 
– evidence of the entrepreneur experience enhances venture credibility and increases the 
venture’s ability to attract resources and build strategic relationships (Burton, Sorensen & 
Beckman, 2001), in turn augmenting the forecasted venture value and hence investment 
return.   
4.2.2 Investment risk 
Regarding the investment risk, its assessment by an investor (such as a BA) depends on 
sub-criteria that influence his/her estimation of the likelihood of the venture failing (Libby & 
Fishburn, 1977; Payne, Laughunn & Crum, 1980). We first recognize that to fully assess the 
investment risk the BA must assess sub-criteria not only associated with the venture, but also 
with the entrepreneur in order to anticipate the entrepreneur’s behavior for future 
performances (i.e., managerial risk as in Lévesque & Maxwell, 2011), as well as for future 
relationships (i.e., relationship risk as in Maxwell & Lévesque, in press). By focusing on the 
venture sub-criteria, we can inform more specifically the BA’s estimation of the resident-risk 
component of the investment risk. Resident risk is inherent to the venture and without which 
the venture would be riskless (Yazdipour, 2010). Since they are context specific, the 
managerial-risk and relationship-risk components can only be assessed once the venture sub-
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criteria have been assessed. For instance, managerial risk depends on how the entrepreneur’s 
technological expertise can influence the technology risk associated with product 
development, but this can only be assessed once the venture offering is understood.  
We thus keep the scope of this research within reasonable reach by focusing on the four 
venture sub-criteria that affect the resident-risk component of the investment risk. Resident risk 
includes technology, operational, market, and financial risks, and a greater level in any results in 
the BA perceiving a higher level of investment risk (Das & Teng, 2001). The BA considers the 
technology risk based on the assessment of manufacturing and product development (Vara, 
2010) that can be reduced when V5 – product status includes evidence of manufacturability or a 
working prototype (MacMillan, Siegel & Subba Narasimha, 1985). Operational risk is associated 
with establishing a viable supply chain. The identification of an established V6 – route to market 
can either directly (Mason & Stark, 2004), or indirectly through a strategic partnership (Zsidisin 
& Smith, 2005), reduce this risk. Market risk is lower if there is evidence of V7 – customer 
engagement in the design process, so that new products are more likely to achieve market success 
(Mason & Harrison, 1996a). Financial risk is assessed based on the venture’s V8 – financial 
projections and is lower when they indicate that the venture is unlikely to run out of cash before 
being able to earn money, or it can attract additional funding (Mason & Stark, 2004).  
4.3 Investor heuristics 
The identification of the above sub-criteria, V1 to V8, that influence the BA’s 
assessment of investment return and investment risk has been a manageable task given the 
state of existing literature on the topic. However, the prediction of “how to tradeoff one 
attribute [sub-criteria] against another” (Shafir, 1993 p546) or the anticipation of how a sub-
criteria might change as the investment-decision process evolves (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992) 
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is a more challenging task. Normative decision-making assumes that decision-makers have 
unlimited time to assess and make tradeoffs between all relevant (sub-) criteria. In reality, 
BAs operate under time constraints and need to manage their time between investing in new 
opportunities, negotiating investment agreements, and managing existing portfolio firms 
(Shepherd, Armstrong & Lévesque, 2005). In addition, many engage in other personal or 
professional activities (Haines, Madill & Riding, 2003). BAs are also constrained by the 
amount of money they can invest based on their personal wealth and by the percentage of this 
wealth they are willing to invest in risky endeavors.  
Consequently, BAs are expected to be boundedly rational (Simon, 1978). Payne (1976) 
observes that, faced with making complex decisions under time constraints, experienced 
decision-makers take shortcuts or use heuristics to minimize their cognitive effort. Cognitive 
capacity (Simon, 1978), expertise (Gigerenzer, 1997) and decision-making experience 
(Shanteau, 1992) are all individual factors that can influence the choice of heuristics (Simon, 
1955). That choice also depends on the decision context, including the nature of the decision 
outcome (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), the interaction format, frequency and timescale 
(Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Jurkovich, 1974; Tversky & Sattath, 1979), and whether the 
interaction is externally observed (Stasavage, 2006). However, the use of heuristics 
challenges the assumptions of normative decision-making, because decision-makers may not 
consider all factors that link to the outcome, and instead take decision shortcuts that cause 
suboptimal outcomes (Brandstätter, Gigerenzer & Hertwig, 2006). Gigerenzer (1997) 
highlights that while this approach likely improves decision-making expediency by reducing 
cognitive effort, decision accuracy can be sacrificed and outcomes that deviate from 
expectations encountered.  
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Payne, Bettman, Coupey and Johnson (1992) contend that, when faced with complex 
decisions, individuals break down the decision process into stages and use different heuristics 
at each stage. Tversky (1972) also suggests that, when individuals have to select preferred 
options from a large set, they might use a covert sequential elimination process. The use of 
heuristics is thus challenging to predict (Marewski, Schooler & Gigerenzer, 2010). 
Nevertheless, we overcome this challenge by drawing on Shah and Oppenheimer’s (2008) 
heuristics framework, illustrated in Table 4.2, which helps us identify different heuristics 
based on qualitative differences each heuristic has on reducing either the acquisition or the 
assessment effort required. We illustrate these heuristics with examples observed in BA 
decision-making research, enabling us to develop hypotheses on how BAs’ use of heuristics 
may influence the assessment of investment return and investment risk, specifically at the 
post-selection stage. 
Reducing acquisition effort. Decision-makers can most effectively reduce the 
acquisition (cognitive) effort required by examining fewer alternatives. For instance, they can 
filter out the number of opportunities considered (Payne, Laughunn & Crum, 1980) or apply 
a multistage process to reject opportunities at each stage (Svenson, 1979). In the case of BA-
investment decisions, Kelly and Hay (2003) observe that BAs reduce the number of 
opportunities they personally consider by only reviewing those that have been referred by a 
trusted third party, while van Osnabrugge (2000) observe that BAs use a multistage process 
in which opportunities are rejected for different reasons at each stage.  
Decision-makers can also reduce the acquisition effort by examining fewer cues (or 
sub-criteria). For instance, they can apply a priority rule that involves the evaluation of a 
lesser number of sub-criteria, they can use a stopping rule to decide which sub-criteria are 
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critical, and they can also apply a decision rule to decide which criteria to reject 
(Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006). In the BA-investment decision context, 
Maxwell, Jeffrey and Lévesque (2011) observed the use of an elimination-by-aspects 
approach (Tversky, 1972), where many opportunities were rejected due to the presence of a 
fatal flaw in one of the eight critical sub-criteria (V1 to V8) in Table 4.1. 
The choice of cues initially considered can also be based on the desire of the decision-
maker to reduce retrieval effort by focusing on sub-criteria that are easily available or 
recollectable (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). In the case of multi-criteria decisions, the use of 
heuristics encourages decision-makers to focus on those criteria that are the easiest to 
retrieve. For the investment decision, once opportunities with a fatal flaw are eliminated, 
criteria focusing on the venture are easier to retrieve than those focusing on how the 
entrepreneur’s characteristics influence the investment risk. This is partly because auditing 
the entrepreneur’s behaviors to predict future behaviors takes longer than the assessment of 
the more objective venture criteria, and partly because the moderating impact of the 
entrepreneur’s characteristics on the investment risk can only be undertaken once the risk 
inherent to the venture is understood (Lévesque & Maxwell, 2011). Acquiring information 
first on the venture reduces the assessment effort required and allows the BA to conserve 
cognitive efforts for later in the decision process, when only a limited number of 
opportunities are still being considered. 
Reducing assessment effort. While the aforementioned heuristics reduce the BAs’ 
acquisition effort to collect data on each sub-criterion, BAs use additional heuristics to 
reduce the assessment effort required to interpret this data and make the decision to continue 
with the interaction, or not. Decision-makers can reduce assessment effort by simplifying 
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criteria weighting. For instance, they use aspiration level or threshold decision techniques, 
based on a criterion achieving a certain level rather than the calculation of its absolute value. 
A common simplifying technique is satisficing (Simon, 1955), where the decision is based on 
the achievement of a threshold that depends on information provided to date rather than the 
assessment of all relevant information (Busemeyer & Johnson, 2004). Mason and Harrison 
(1996b) and Haines, Madill and Riding (2003) observe that BAs seem to have a certain 
investment-return aspiration level (around 30% to 40% per annum) and do not invest when 
this (predicted) level cannot be reached.  
 










Opportunities filtered by 






Lexicographic Consider limited 
number of 
criteria 
Focus on criteria thought to 
be most important 
Fishburn, 1967 
Reduce retrieval 





criteria   
Assess available criteria 





Satisficing  Use threshold 
technique 
Look at achievement      
of aspiration level  
Simon, 1955  
Integrate less 
information 









 Table 4-2 A heuristic framework for BA-investment decision-making   
Decision-makers can also reduce assessment effort by integrating less information, so 
that rather than considering all information when making a decision, only a limited amount 
influences the decision. This is particularly the case when attempting to integrate and make 
tradeoffs between dissimilar criteria (Hogarth, 1987). For instance, although it is easy to see 
how higher unit sales volumes at a lower price can produce the same revenues as do lower 
unit sales volumes at a higher price, integrating this information with the assessment of risk 
associated with competitor pricing activities is more challenging.  
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Regardless of the specific heuristic being used, BAs do appear to use them and take 
shortcuts to not only make assessments, but also to select or reject investment opportunities. 
In doing so, they may thus trade off the substantive rationality of an investment decision with 
the procedural rationality of process efficiency (Simon, 1976). Next we formulate testable 
hypotheses on the more specific use of aspiration levels (i.e., thresholds) and 
compensatory/non-compensatory (i.e., tradeoff/no tradeoff) decision techniques that result 
from the use of the above heuristics. Non-compensatory techniques (where a low score on 
one criterion cannot be compensated for by a higher score on another, i.e. no tradeoff) are 
characterized by the interactive use of cues, in contrast to the compensatory technique where 
there is an additive relationship between the criteria being assessed (Tversky, 1969). 
Combining our proposed relationships between the eight sub-criteria (V1 to V8) in Table 4.1 
and the two criteria (investment return and risk) with the BA-heuristic approach enables us to 
theorize on how BAs minimize their cognitive effort when assessing investment 
opportunities during the post-selection stage. 
4.4 Hypothesis development 
The four venture sub-criteria that contribute to a BA’s assessment of the forecasted 
venture value (V1 – market potential; V2 – product adoption; V3 – protectability; and V4 – 
entrepreneur experience) are aggregated to obtain the investment-return criterion, denoted Va 
(this aggregation will be detailed in the following section). Similarly, the four venture sub-
criteria that contribute to the BA’s assessment of the resident risk (V5 – proxy for the 
technology risk; V6 – proxy for the operational risk; V7 – proxy for the market risk; and V8 – 




A normative decision model would suggest that the decision-maker trade off between 
all of the relevant factors, including the eight venture sub-criteria that inform the investment 
return and investment risk, before making an investment decision (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 
1971). Sitkin and Weingart (1995) further note that, while in practice the forecasted return is 
somewhat objective, the assessment of risk is more subjective. These views support both a 
separation of the sub-criteria between two groups, as well as tradeoffs within these sub-
criteria in each group for the assessment of, respectively, Va and Vb. Therefore, within the 
investment-return criterion Va, the relationship between the four sub-criteria V1 to V4 will be 
compensatory, whereby a low value in one sub-criterion can be compensated for by a higher 
value in another sub-criterion. For instance, a lower market size that reduces the venture’s 
revenue potential can be compensated for by a higher level of product adoption that increases 
the revenue potential. Feeney, Haines and Riding (1999) indeed observe this compensatory 
effect in BA decision-making. This compensatory approach is also expected for the 
investment-risk criterion Vb, based on the four sub-criteria V5 to V8. For instance, limited 
customer engagement increases market risk, but can be compensated for by a forecast of 
greater gross margins that improve cash flow projections, thus reducing the financial risk.  
In addition to considering such tradeoffs (or compensation), BAs have been found to 
enter the interaction with a negative mindset (Mason & Rogers, 1997), looking for reasons to 
reject (rather than select) investment opportunities. As BAs minimize their cognitive effort 
when assessing these opportunities, they use the most easily available factors, the venture 
sub-criteria, to try to find evidence of a low assessment of investment return based on V1 to 
V4, or a high assessment of investment risk based on V5 to V8. This discussion leads to our 
first hypothesis:  
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Hypothesis 1: When rejecting an investment opportunity, BAs trade off between  
(a) market potential, product adoption, protectability, and entrepreneur 
experience (the investment-return sub-criteria);  
(b) and between product status for the technology risk, route to market for the 
operational risk, customer engagement for the market risk, and financial projections for the 
financial risk (the investment-risk sub-criteria). 
  
In traditional portfolio investment theory (Modigliani & Pogue, 1974) there is an 
assumption that the BA’s assessments of the aggregated values of the investment-return (Va) 
and investment-risk criteria (Vb) are compensatory, such that a higher level of investment 
return compensates for a higher level of investment risk. However, we have reasons to doubt 
this assumption in our context. First, in BA investing, the assessment of risk is based on the 
likelihood of venture failure and therefore a complete loss, rather than a distribution of gains 
(Benjamin & Margulis, 2000). Second, the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
brings about a nonlinear relationship between risk and return, whereby losses hurt more than 
gains feel good (i.e., loss aversion). Third, psychology and neuro-economics studies identify 
fundamental differences in the way in which the anticipation of gains are processed in the 
brain when compared to the forecast of loss (Venkatraman, Payne, Bettman, Luce & Huettel, 
2009). Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman, Peterson, and Glover (2005) and Sanfey, Lowenstein, 
McClure and Cohen (2003) note that the assessment of gain magnitude is a cognitive process 
that takes place in the subcortical nucleus accumbens, while gain probability takes place in 
the cortical mesial prefrontal cortex.  
Given the differences in how and where in the brain the assessment of value and the 
likelihood of loss or gain are assessed, integrating the two into a single decision requires the 
expenditure of considerable cognitive effort (Lowenstein, Rick & Cohen, 2008). A common 
 
106 
way to limit the need to expend this effort is through the adoption of a non-compensatory 
decision technique that avoids the need to make tradeoffs (Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1988). 
Feeney, Haines and Riding (1999) provides some evidence for the use of non-compensatory 
decision techniques, noting that BA investment opportunities were often rejected by the mere 
identification that the entrepreneur had no relevant experience. Khan (1987) further showed 
that the entrepreneur’s ingenuity was a good predictor of the BA’s decision outcome. This 
discussion thus leads to our second hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: When rejecting an investment opportunity, BAs do not trade off between 
investment return and investment risk. 
 
The non-compensatory nature of the relationship between the two investment-decision 
criteria proposed in Hypothesis 2 raises the question of whether the assessment of each 
criterion is linear (where greater investment return or lower investment risk is always better) 
or whether BAs use heuristics that influence how they assess each criterion. Simon’s (1955) 
observation of the use of satisficing heuristics to reduce assessment effort suggests that, in 
their sequential elimination process, BAs might be using a satisficing heuristic to reduce the 
decision effort and might be rejecting opportunities that do not achieve a certain aspiration 
level for investment return or exceed a certain aspiration level for investment risk. Investors 
have been found to possess an aspiration level for investment return and reject any 
opportunity that fails to reach this level (Lopes & Oden, 1999; Payne, Laughunn & Crum, 
1980). Mason and Harrison (1996b) support this view specifically for BAs. Feeney, Haines 
and Riding (1999) further contend that BA’s seemed to possess an aspiration level for 
investment risk, based on a combination of their risk tolerance and investment experience, 
rejecting any opportunity that exceeds their risk aspiration level. This discussion leads to our 
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third hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: BAs reject investment opportunities that fail to meet an aspiration level 
for  
(a) investment return  
(b) and for investment risk. 
4.5 Data and coding method  
Our data comprises a subset of the 602 BA-entrepreneur interactions that were 
videotaped for the first four seasons of the award winning CBC TV-show Dragons’ Den, 
previously investigated by Maxwell and his colleagues (Maxwell, Jeffrey & Lévesque, 2011; 
Maxwell & Lévesque, in press; Lévesque & Maxwell, 2011). The interaction begins with the 
entrepreneur explaining the investment opportunity to the five Dragons (i.e., BAs) and ends 
when either all of the Dragons provide a reason to reject the opportunity, or one (or more) 
Dragon makes an offer to invest (or co-invest). Any investment offer made on the show 
includes the amount, the BA’s equity percentage, and specific terms to be included in the 
investment agreement. The entrepreneur can accept the presented offer, negotiate a revised 
offer (including changes to the proposed terms), or reject the offer.20 The BA’s lack of prior 
knowledge of the business opportunity, the brevity of the interaction, and the need to confirm 
the entrepreneur’s claims mean that less than half of the offers accepted in the Den are 
subsequently consummated.21  
We used observational interaction techniques (Bakeman & Gottman, 1997) and two 
trained observers to code the information exchanges between BAs and entrepreneurs. The 
observers initially examined the 602 interactions, discarding the 436 that were rapidly 
                                                      
20	  Once	  the	  BA	  and	  entrepreneur	  have	  agreed	  on	  the	  terms,	  the	  BA	  will	  perform	  due	  diligence	  to	  confirm	  
claims	  made	  by	  the	  entrepreneur	  during	  the	  initial	  interaction.	  




rejected due to the presence of a fatal flaw (as characterized in Maxwell, Jeffrey & Lévesque, 
2011) in one of Table 4.1’s eight venture sub-criteria. Our observers then focused on the 
remaining 166 interactions (i.e., those that passed the initial selection stage of the investment 
process and moved on to the post-selection stage), paying special attention to the 67 rejected 
by the BAs during this stage primarily due to concerns about the potential return on 
investment or perceptions of a high likelihood of failure. The observers recorded a value for 
each sub-criterion (V1 to V8) and reason for rejection. The nature of the interaction allowed 
the BA to request sufficient information on each sub-criterion to assess its value and pay 
more attention to those sub-criteria deemed most important.  
Coding for each venture sub-criterion, as shown in Table 4.1, used an A+ to C– code 
linked to a 10-point coding scale identical to the coding schema used in Maxwell, Jeffrey and 
Lévesque (2011). Code ‘A’ was used if the observer believed the assessment of the sub-
criterion provided a compelling advantage for the venture (e.g., the venture had obtained a 
well organized patent that would discourage potential replicators that could compete with 
similar solutions). Code ‘C’ was used if the observer believed the assessment of the sub-
criterion created a strategic disadvantage (or fatal flaw) for the venture. The coding was 
consistent throughout the sub-criteria in that greater values (i.e., greater return) for V1 to V4 
were better and so were greater values (i.e., lower risk) for V5 to V8. Although many 
opportunities with fatal flaws were eliminated at the initial selection stage of the process, in 
some cases the presence of a fatal flaw only emerged after an extended interaction (e.g., an 
initially promising partner who offered a route to market was in financial trouble, thus likely 
unable to address the BA’s risk concern).  
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Our observers were encouraged to annotate scores with ‘+’ or ‘−’ to discriminate 
between opportunities. In an initial testing of the coding schema, we found 100% agreement 
between the observers’ coding when using grade categories (i.e., A, B or C), but some 
differences when annotated scores (i.e., A+, A, A−, etc.) were used. When translating the 
annotated grades to a numerical score for analytical purposes, we thus created a ‘gap’ in the 
numerical score between each grade category (i.e., A, B or C) by eliminating the numerical 
scores of 4 and 7. In other words, this scale created a difference of ±1 for scores within a 
grade category, but a gap of at least 2 when comparing grade categories (e.g., A scored 9, A− 
scored 8, but B+ scored 6). The final score used in the coding was the average of the scores 
from each observer. The aggregated values of the investment-decision criteria, Va and Vb, 
were determined by first completing a principle component analysis, and then using the 
calculated values to weigh the contribution of each sub-criterion in the aggregated value. The 
specific reason for rejection by the last BA to exit the interaction was also coded, using RE 
for ‘concern about investment return’, RI for ‘concern about investment risk’, V for ‘concern 
about a specific venture sub-criterion’ and OT for ‘other’. 
4.6 Results 
4.6.1 Validity checks 
A number of validity concerns arise from using this data, especially because we 
observe interactions that are recorded as part of a reality TV-show that might be 
fundamentally different from actual BA-entrepreneur interactions. First, the entrepreneurs are 
not representative of all fund-seeking entrepreneurs, in that they likely are unable to obtain 
funding elsewhere. They also had to be willing to expose themselves to scathing comments 
from the Dragons and to share their ideas with the public on television. Second, the ventures 
 
110 
selected for the show had to make good television (virtually all consumer products) and very 
few had sufficient potential to attract the interest of institutional investors (i.e., venture 
capitalists). Third, the context of the interaction diverges from practices in more traditional BA-
group environments, where opportunities are heard in full and the interaction takes place over 
several meetings. While these limitations affect the representativeness of our observations, our 
involvement in the show and access to unedited videotapes, as well as knowledge of BAs’ use of 
a similar investment-decision process outside the show, gave us confidence that these interactions 
did not diverge significantly from interactions that took place in more private surroundings. 
Moreover, since the nature of our research is exploratory, we do not claim that the 
population (or sample) is representative. Our observations of more traditional interactions 
(with actual investments under risky conditions) and discussions with both the fund-seeking 
entrepreneurs and the Dragons provide, nevertheless, some support for the generalizability of 
our findings. For additional details on sample representativeness, we direct the interested 
reader to recent studies (i.e., Maxwell, Jeffrey & Lévesque, 2011; Maxwell & Lévesque, in 
press; Lévesque & Maxwell, 2011) that have used the Dragons’ Den interactions, but each with a 
distinct coding approach given their distinct focus (i.e., respectively, counting the number of fatal 
flaws, counting the number of trust-based behaviors manifested by the entrepreneur, and coding 
for the extent to which an entrepreneur’s behavior manifest his/her characteristics).  
Regarding inter-rater reliability, we used two observers who were familiar with the 
interaction context. Before undertaking coding, we completed a short training program with 
them. We had them code ten opportunities that were not rejected due to the presence of a 
fatal flaw from a similar interaction (the BBC version of the show) using Table 4.1’s coding 
schema for V1 through V8. Results from this training exercise (10×8×2 ratings) were then 
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shared between the two observers and each difference between the ratings discussed. As a 
consequence of this training program, modifications were made to clarify the coding schema. 
During the training session, coding for inter-rater reliability on all eight venture sub-criteria 
had a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.76, improving following the training to 0.81. We note that inter-
rater reliability for the investment-return sub-criteria (0.84) is slightly higher than for the 
investment-risk sub-criteria (0.76), perhaps indicating that the assessment of return (and 
forecasted venture value) is more objective than the assessment of risk. Inter-rater reliability 
on the reason for rejection is, however, a perfect 1. That is, there was complete agreement 
between the observers on the last reason provided by a BA for an opportunity to be rejected.  
 
Variable  RE RI RE RI 
Constant   -37.943*** -18.702*** -73.505*** -25.393*** 
Market potential V1 2.247***  3.479*** 0.273 
Product adoption  V2 1.355***  1.715*** 0.215 
Protectability V3 1.575***  2.947*** 0.230 
Entrepreneur experience V4 1.003***  1.407*** 0.333* 
Product status V5  0.591*** -0.294 0.502** 
Route to market V6  0.756*** 0.323 0.839*** 
Customer engagement V7  0.664*** 1.253** 0.719*** 
Financial projections V8  1.024*** 0.966 0.978*** 
R2 (Cox and Snell)   0.584 0.412 0.635 0.443 
Model accuracy  94.6% 87.3% 97.0% 88.0% 
BIC (Bayesian information criteria)§  63.84 113.92 50.34 113.00 
χ2  145.59*** 88.03*** 167.09*** 97.00*** 
*** significant at 0.01; ** significant at 0.05; * significant at 0.10) 
Table 4-3 Relationship between venture sub-criteria and investment decision criteria 
While we develop our aggregated investment-decision criteria based on theoretical 
arguments linking investment return and investment risk to the venture sub-criteria, we also 
verified the validity of the proposed relationships using logistic regression, linking each 
venture sub-criteria to two types of rejection reason: RE for ‘concern about investment 
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return’ and RI for ‘concern about investment risk’. An example for RE was with a BA 
stating: “while I like the business idea, at that valuation I cannot see how I can make any 
money by investing in your business and for that reason I am out.” An example for RI was: 
“I am not convinced that you have worked out the full cost of operating your business, which 
gives me concern about running out of cash, and therefore I am out.” At times, a BA gave 
both rejection reasons: “you have not satisfied me that you have established a route to market 
or that you have allowed sufficient margin to a distributor, therefore I cannot invest in your 
business.” Table 4.3 shows the significance of the four investment-return sub-criteria (V1 to 
V4) on RE (rejection reason = 1 if RE; 0 otherwise), and of the four investment-risk sub-
criteria (V5 to V8) on RI (rejection reason = 1 if RI; 0 otherwise). We also acknowledge the 
competing view that all venture sub-criteria could be linked to either rejection reason and 
looked at the significance of V1 to V8 on RE and on RI. Table 4.3 shows that the investment-
return sub-criteria contribute significantly to concern about investment return as a reason for 
rejection, and that the investment-risk sub-criteria contribute significantly to concern about 
investment risk as a reason for rejection.    
Furthermore, Table 4.4 shows the weights derived from a principal component analysis 
using the eight sub-criteria to determine the weighting scale to be used when calculating the 
two aggregated investment-decision criteria, Va and Vb. We also offer the correlations 
between each sub-criterion and Va and Vb. Correlations are only significant (at the 0.05 level) 
between V5 and V7 and between V1 and V8. In each case, the correlation is less than 0.2, 
suggesting that this correlation should not create multicolinearity concerns in a regression 
model. Importantly, the correlation between Va and Vb is not significant, showing that the 
assessment of the investment return is not correlated to the assessment of investment risk. 
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 PCW Mean S.D. V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 Va Vb 
V1 0.835 7.10 1.65 1          
V2 0.714 6.15 1.48 -0.051 1         
V
3 
0.744 6.33 1.52 0.043 -0.119 1        
V4 0.340 6.32 1.60 0.076 -0.115 -0.12 1       
V5 0.653 6.11 1.28 0.104 0.052 -0.038 0.077 1      
V6 0.661 6.72 1.45 0.003 0.038 -0.059 0.050 0.068 1     
V7 0.730 6.43 1.40 -0.114 0.018 -0.040 0.015 -.169* -0.124 1    
V8 0.493 7.20 1.50 0.174* 0.090 -0.058 0.121 -0.010 0.044 0.143 1   
Va  17.18 2.03 0.695** 0.392** 0.491** 0.193* 0.096 0.003 -0.086 0.165* 1  
Vb  16.67 1.75 0.058 0.094 -0.099 0.124 0.412** 0.528** 0.497** 0.526** 0.0
67 
1 
** significant at 0.01 and * significant at 0.05 
Table 4-4 Principal component weights (PCW), descriptive statistics and correlations 
4.6.2 Hypothesis testing 
We use logistic regressions to test the hypotheses, where ‘proceeding to the next stage 
of the interaction’ (i.e., not rejecting the opportunity) is the dependent dichotomous variable 
(1: proceed; 0: reject). H1(a) proposes tradeoffs between the investment-return sub-criteria 
and we developed Model 1a, where V1 to V4 are independent variables. H1(b) proposes 
tradeoffs between the investment-risk sub-criteria and we developed Model 1b, where V5 to 
V8 are independent variables. The presence of a compensatory effect between sub-criteria 
within each group, as they relate to proceeding to the next stage (or, equivalently, the 
opportunity being rejected), is supported if model accuracy is high and each sub-criterion 
coefficient is positive and significant (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003). We also 
developed two additional models, Model 1a’, where V1 to V4 and their six interaction terms 
V1×V2, V1×V3, V1×V4, V2×V3, V2×V4 and V3×V4 are independent variables, and Model 1b’, 
where V5 to V8 and the corresponding six interaction terms are independent variables, to 
eliminate the potential presence of a non-compensatory effect. However, due to numerous 
interaction terms we chose to perform a stepwise logistic regression for these models and 
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only include the two interaction terms that were found significant. Table 4.5 summarizes the 
regression results for all the models we developed.   
We also found appropriate to verify whether a non-compensatory effect might have 
been present. We added the corresponding six interaction terms to Model 1a and those to 
Model 1b. Although we do not explicitly report the findings in Table 4.4 for space 
consideration, 11 out of the total 12 interactions showed insignificant coefficients, with 
virtually no change on model accuracy in both cases. The significant coefficient (–0.356, p-
value = 0.007) was for V5×V8, but since model accuracy only increased from 80.7% (in 
Model 1b) to 83.1%, we felt confident that the non-compensatory effect can be ruled out.  
Model 1a is significant (χ2 = 63.68, p-value < 0.001), with significant positive 
coefficients for every investment-return sub-criteria and a model accuracy of 84.9%. Model 
1b is also significant (χ2 = 78.01, p-value < 0.001), with significant positive coefficients for 
every investment-risk sub-criteria and a model accuracy of 80.7%. Regarding the presence of 
a non-compensatory effect (where we added the corresponding six interaction terms to both 
Model 1a and Model 1b), 10 out of the total 12 interaction terms in Model 1a’ and Model 1b’ 
are insignificant (and omitted from Table 4.5). Model 1a’ shows significance for V1×V3 and 
reduced model accuracy, but increased χ2, as compared to Model 1a. Model 1b’ shows 
significance for V5×V6 as well as increased model accuracy and χ2, as compared to Model 
1b.  Nevertheless,  the size of  these increases  and the  10 out of  12 insignificant interactions  
appear to provide enough support for the compensatory effect. Therefore H1a and H1b are 
supported. In other words, BAs make tradeoffs between market potential, product adoption, 





Variable  Model 1a Model 1a’ Model 1b Model 1b’ Model 2a Model 2b Model 3 
Constant  -14.057*** -23.323*** -15.761** -31.080*** 0.835*** 2.101*** 7.967*** 
Market potential V1 0.766*** 2.034***      
Product adoption  V2 0.559*** 0.561***      
Protectability V3 0.436*** 1.883***      
Entrepreneur experience V4 0.467*** 0.456***      
Product status V5   0.332** 2.716***    
Route to market V6   0.528*** 2.775***    
Customer engagement V7   0.514*** 0.546***    
Financial projections V8   1.015*** 1.031***    
Market potential ×  
protectability 
V1×V3  -0.197
**      
Product status ×  route to 
market 
V5×V6    -0.356
***    
Invest. return (aggregated) Va     3.142*** 4.067***  
Invest. risk (aggregated) Vb     3.076*** 4.266***  
Exponential of invest. 
return 
e-Va       -2.718*** 
Exponential of invest. risk e-Vb       -2.756*** 
Investment return ×   
investment risk 
Va×Vb      2.564
***  
R2 (Cox and Snell)  0.319 0.337 0.375 0.404 0.575 0.632 0.637 
Model accuracy  84.9% 82.5% 80.7% 83.1% 89.2% 91.0% 91.0% 
BIC (Bayesian information criteria)§ 168.24 165.79 153.91 147.93 86.05 63.75 59.71 
χ2   63.68*** 68.12*** 78.01*** 85.99*** 141.87*** 166.17*** 168.17*** 
*** significant at 0.01; ** significant at 0.05; * significant at 0.10 
 § The Bayesian information criteria is -2loglikelihood + klog(n), where k is number of parameters and n is the 
sample size  
Table 4-5 Regression analysis 
decide to reject a business opportunity due to concerns about the investment return. BAs also 
make tradeoffs between product status for the technology risk, route to market for the 
operational risk, customer engagement for the market risk, and the financial projections for 
the financial risk (the investment-risk sub-criteria) when they decide to reject a business 
opportunity due to concerns about the investment risk. 
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H2 propose instead the presence of a non-compensatory effect between the aggregated 
investment-return criteria and the aggregated investment-risk criteria as they relate to 
proceeding to the next stage of the interaction. We developed Model 2a, where Va and Vb are 
independent variables, and Model 2b, where Va, Vb and the interaction term Va×Vb are 
independent variables, to test this hypothesis. H2 is supported if the inclusion of the 
interaction term increases the χ2 and model accuracy, but reduces the Bayesian information 
criteria (BIC), with both Va and Vb, as well as their interaction Va×Vb, having positive and 
significant coefficients (Menard, 2002).  
Model 2a is significant (χ2 = 141.88, p-value < 0.001, BIC = 86.44), with significant 
positive coefficients and a model accuracy of 89.2%. Model 2b, which includes Va×Vb, is 
significant (χ2 = 166.17, p-value < 0.001, BIC = 64.41), with significant positive coefficients 
for each regressor (including the interaction term) and a model accuracy of 91.0%. This shows 
improvement over Model 2a of an amount of 24.29 for the χ2, 22.03 for the BIC, and 1.8% for 
model accuracy. The non-compensatory effect suggested by H2 is thus supported. In other 
words, when rejecting investment opportunities, BAs do not appear to make tradeoffs between 
investment return and investment risk. 
H3 proposes threshold effects for each investment-decision criterion, Va or Vb, such 
that proceeding to the next stage (or, equivalently, the opportunity being rejected) will fail 
should the opportunity not achieve an aspiration level for the investment return or exceed an 
aspiration level for the investment risk. We first developed Model 3, where the independent 
variables are the exponential transformation of Va and Vb, that is, !!!! and !!!! to test this 
hypothesis. The presence of diminishing returns (as implied by exponential transformations; 
Lin, Ko & Yu, 2007), which is an initial step in suggesting threshold effects (or aspiration 
 
117 
levels) as hypothesized in H3, is supported when an improvement is obtained in both χ2 and 
model accuracy, as well as a reduction in the BIC, when comparing Model 3 to Model 2a 
(where Va and Vb are independent variables). Model 3 shows significant coefficients, with 
greater model accuracy at 91.0%, a higher χ2 (168.17) and a significant reduction in BIC 
(60.15) compared to Model 2a. This provides support for the presence of diminishing returns 










Figure 4-1 Distribution of outcomes (showing threshold & non-compensatory effects) 
We look for more definite support for H3 by observing the scatter plot in Figure 4.1, 
which illustrates threshold effects. The opportunities that exceeded a threshold for both Va 
and Vb (i.e., 16 and 15.5, respectively) were more likely to proceed to the next stage of the 
interaction than those that exceeded only one of the thresholds. Moreover, the probability of 
an opportunity proceeding to the next stage when both Va and Vb exceeded their respective 
thresholds is 95%, while that probability is reduced to 17% and 19% when, respectively, only 
Va or Vb exceeded its threshold. That is, not only are the threshold effects (i.e., aspiration 
levels) in H3 supported, but when rejecting investment opportunities, BAs do not appear to 
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trade off between investment return and investment risk, thus further supporting the non-
compensatory effect in H2. 
a) Investment return (Va)      b) Investment risk (Vb)                   
 
Figure 4-2 Percentage of opportunities moving to the next stage of the interaction 
We provide more definite evidence of the threshold effects and further support for H3 
by transforming Va and Vb into categorical variables, based on Figure 4.1’s threshold values 
of 16 and 15.5 for Va and Vb, respectively. Specifically, [Va] = 1 if Va > 16 and 0 otherwise; 
[Vb] = 1 if Vb > 15.5 and 0 otherwise. Figure 4.2 shows that 79% of the opportunities 
proceeded to the next stage of the interaction  when Va  was  above  the  threshold, while  
only  13%   did  when  Va was  below  this threshold (a χ2 test confirms the significant 
difference between these percentages with χ2 =  62.33, p < 0.001). Similarly, the percentage 
of opportunities that proceeded to the next stage of the interaction goes from 75% when Vb 
exceeded the threshold to only 10% when Vb did not (χ2 = 53.94, p < 0.001). Moreover, this 
simple reject/do-not-reject threshold model correctly predicts the outcome in 91% of the 
cases (R2 = 0.549, χ2 = 132.30). Figure 4.3 further illustrates this effect: below the threshold 










































Vb. However, increasing Va or Vb when it is already above the threshold has a negligible 
effect on this likelihood. H3 is therefore supported and BAs appear to reject investment 













Figure 4-3 Likelihood of an opportunity moving to the next stage of the interaction 
We note that Model 2b and Model 3 included, respectively, the non-compensatory and 
threshold effects separately. We finalize our analysis by contrasting in Table 4.6 the results 
of the linear model (i.e., Model 2a) with  that of an  hypothesized  model  that simultaneously 
includes both effects (i.e., !!!!, !!!! and !!!!×!!!!). The linear model results in 7 false 
positives (i.e., the opportunities were rejected, but the model predicted that they would 
proceed to the next stage of the interaction) and 11 false negatives (i.e., the opportunities 
proceeded to the next stage, but the model predicted that they would be rejected). On the 
other hand, while the hypothesized model has no effect on the number of false positives, it 
reduces the number of false negatives to 4, a 65% reduction (with a model accuracy 
improving from 89.2% in Model 2a to 93.4% in Model 3). 
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a) Normative model (Model 2a)                                  b) Hypothesized model 
                     (with Va & Vb)                 (with !!!!, !!!! & !!!!x !!!!) 
Table 4-6 Comparison of predictive powers22 
4.7  Implications and conclusions 
This research provides a framework that can explain not only how certain (sub-) 
criteria influence an entrepreneur’s likelihood of receiving an investment offer, but also how 
BAs’ use of heuristics can yield investment decision outcomes that deviate from normative 
assumptions, where all criteria are assessed and tradeoffs between these criteria considered, 
prior to making the decision. On the theoretical side, our findings can help explain how 
specific venture (sub-) criteria inform the investment decision based on their impact on the 
BAs’ assessment of investment return and investment risk. This linkage provides a 
framework against which the impact of other criteria on the investment decision can be 
based, such as how a liability issue might influence the investment decision, how a BA’s 
access to complementary assets might improve forecasted investment return, or how a BA’s 
expertise might reduce the investment risk. Our findings also reinforce the value of observing 
experts make decisions, because it provides a shortcut to deciding what may matter as the 
                                                      
22	   A	   probability	   at	   or	   above	   0.5	   predicts	   that	   the	   opportunity	   will	   proceed	   to	   the	   next	   stage	   of	   the	  
interaction,	  while	  a	  probability	  below	  0.5	  predicts	  that	  it	  will	  be	  rejected.	  
 Predicted 
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decision process unfolds. Moreover, applying a cognitive-effort-reduction framework for the 
use of heuristics can help scholars better theorize on how decision techniques may evolve as 
the BA-entrepreneur interaction progresses.  
On the practical side, linking specific venture sub-criteria to the assessment of 
investment return and investment risk can help entrepreneurs focus attention on deficiencies 
in their venture that increase the likelihood of being rejected. Moreover, identifying which 
(sub-)criteria are compensatory and which are not can help entrepreneurs better “offset less 
readily corrected weaknesses” in their business plan and address specific “non-compensatory 
(i.e. essential) criteria” in their presentations (Sandberg, Schweiger & Hoffer, 1988, p13). 
Experienced BAs can also learn to improve their decision-making efficiency and quality by 
better understanding how they make decisions, rather than relying on how they think they 
make them. From our findings, BAs can focus attention on the sub-criteria identified as 
critical and move from a ‘gut feel’ decision approach to one where they can better assess 
investment return and investment risk. Our findings are not meant to change the heuristics 
used by BAs, but they can enable them to better appreciate how those based on threshold and 
(non-) compensatory effects might be used. Understanding rejection decisions can also guide 
governments in the development of policies and deployment of resources designed to 
increase the number of funded high-potential ventures. Government support programs, for 
instance, can be expanded to include access to market validation services or they can better 
prepare entrepreneurs to interact with potential investors.   
This research is not without limitations, which open doors for future research. First, the 
behaviors and decisions we observe were influenced by the context of the interaction. As 
both BA and entrepreneur were aware that their behaviors and decisions would be broadcast 
 
122 
on national television, they were constrained due to concerns regarding long-term reputation. 
Repeating this investigation in a more private environment, perhaps also encouraging a 
broader cross section of entrepreneurs and venture types, would be desirable. Second, our 
coding was based on observer ratings of the venture, which depended on their interpretation 
of the BAs’ reactions to the information presented. Reviewing the tapes of interactions with 
the BAs to uncover whether or not their interpretation of each criterion is similar to that 
coded by the observers would also be desirable. This might also help us better understand if 
the rejection reasons provided on the show were accurate, and not a mask for a more 
complex concern. Third, our data was gathered based on aggregated feedback from the BAs, 
rather than one individual BA. A model of how an individual BA might behave could 
provide more insights on whether experienced investors use different decision techniques 
than novices do, or how the availability of an expert within the group might influence the 
decision-making environment and outcome. 
Additional ways in which we hope to extend this research include the investigation of 
subsequent stages of the investment interaction, specifically the due-diligence stage that 
occurs after an offer has been made and accepted, but before the final shareholder agreement 
is signed. Given the high failure rate at the due-diligence stage, an investigation of whether 
failure at that stage is due to incorrect previously supplied information, or due to new 
information emerging that negatively influences the original assessment of investment return 
and investment risk, would be informative. Another opportunity to extend this research is to 
apply the same research approach to the development of the interpersonal relationship 
between BAs and funded entrepreneurs. Exploring how this dyadic relationship develops as 
the two subsequently manage the funded venture would also be informative. Finally, many 
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existing businesses have identified the importance of developing strategic partnerships, yet 
they struggle to decide with whom to partner and how to formalize such a relationship. The 
research method we use might help to also scrutinize this process and structure the 
subsequent agreement to optimize return and risk.  
Although further work is required to deepen our understanding of the use of tradeoffs 
and aspiration levels in business angel investment decisions, we have moved a step forward. 
We have shown that BAs appear to reject investment opportunities that fail to meet an 
aspiration level for both investment return and investment risk, without trading off between 
return and risk. Tradeoffs do seem to take place, however, when the BAs assess the 
investment return, as well as when they assess the investment risk, to make the decision on 
whether or not to reject the opportunity. We hope others will join us in our quest to better 
understand how BAs trade off decision accuracy for decision efficiency by considering 
criteria about the business opportunity as well as the context in which the investment 
decision is made.  
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5  Conclusions, recommendations, future research and 
impact 
5.1 Conclusions 
In our research, we attempt to advance the understanding of how various factors 
contribute to a BA's decision to invest in a risky business opportunity presented by a fund-
seeking entrepreneur.  We are interested in understanding the reasons for the high failure 
rates in the investment decision process because we believe current inefficiencies limit the 
number of high potential ventures that are able to attract funding. Previous research has 
provided little in the way of a theoretical framework to explain the multistage process, while 
reported observations that have relied on BA post-decision recollections have been subject to 
validity concerns. We overcome these issues by developing a strong theoretical framework to 
explain the sequential rejection process; and accessing a novel data set of interactions that 
allow us to address many validity concerns. 
 Developing a theoretical approach was essential in the creation of our coding schema 
that enabled us to observe how different venture criteria and entrepreneur behaviors 
influenced the rejection decision at each stage of the process. We combined insights from 
entrepreneurship and investment research to propose how various factors informed the 
investment return and investment risk, breaking down the investment risk into the 
components of resident, managerial and relationship risk. We also drew on research from 
decision-making and behavioral economics and used a heuristics framework to posit how 
experienced investors would use decision short cuts to minimize the cognitive decision 
making effort required.  This enabled us to suggest: the sequence in which criteria would be 
examined; how rejection decisions would be made; and, whether relationships between 
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criteria are compensatory or non-compensatory.  Our observations of the role of entrepreneur 
behaviors in informing the assessment of managerial and relationship risk, reinforced the 
importance experts attach to current behaviors when predicting future behaviors.  We 
observed how entrepreneur behaviors, even over a relatively short time frame, could be seen 
as manifestations of underlying characteristics, and how trust behaviors increased or reduced 
confidence in the relationship. To provide support for the hypotheses we developed, we drew 
heavily on the insights of key researchers investigating the BA investment process (i.e. 
Feeney, Harrison, Landström, Mason, Paul, Riding, Sudek, Van Osnabrugge, Wetzel & 
Wiltbank), as well as our own evidence from actual interactions.    
We observed that at the early stage of the process BAs focus on eight critical venture 
criteria that inform the assessment of the investment return and resident risk component of 
the investment risk. Understanding how specific venture criteria positively or negatively 
influence a BA’s rejection decision helps the entrepreneur focus on: how to improve key 
aspects of the business plan before an encounter with a potential investor;  when to provide 
specific information to help the BA make a favorable assessment; and how to compensate for 
weaknesses, in respect to achieving an acceptable level of return on investment, or through 
reducing the risk failure to a level acceptable to the BA. In addition, we highlight the fact that 
BAs do not appear to make trade-offs between investment return and investment risk.    
Linking the assessment of entrepreneur characteristics to specific elements of resident 
risk showed why and how the entrepreneur’s effect on the business could only be determined 
once the inherent risk in the venture was understood. We highlighted how specific 
entrepreneur behaviors could inform the assessment of managerial risk, and lead to either 
continuing with an interaction, or rejection due to concerns that the entrepreneur many not 
 
126 
successful manage the business. While behaviors that inform the assessment of managerial 
risk could only be assessed in the context of the venture, entrepreneur behaviors that 
informed the assessment of relationship risk could only be understood based on the 
relationship with the potential investor. We found that trust building behaviors (and the 
absence of trust damaging behaviors) could develop relationship confidence sufficient to 
allow the BA to invest, in part because BAs recognize the importance of trust for any 
entrepreneur who wishes to build future relationships with partners, customers, and suppliers.   
Our ability to look at a number of similar interactions from start to rejection/investment offer, 
allowed us build a comprehensive model of the investment decision process. In our model 
(Figure 5.1) we consider aspects of the venture, the entrepreneur and the potential 
relationship. This model can provide insights into the BA investment decision for both 
researchers and practioners. While they do not pretend to represent all of the venture criteria 
considered, all the behaviors seen as manifestations of characteristics, nor a comprehensive 
list of behaviors that can build, damage or violate trust, they provide a starting point, and a 
framework under which the effect of additional criteria can be considered 
The development of our model of the BA decision process allows us to answer the 
original question raised by several researchers looking at the BA decision and the relative 
importance of the “horse” (venture) or the “jockey” (entrepreneur) (Harrison & Mason, 2002; 
MacMillan, Siegel & Subba Narasimha, 1985; Sudek, Mitteness, & Baucus, 2008). We 
suggest that the venture must be evaluated before the entrepreneur because venture criteria 
are the easier to retrieve and assess. Further, the entrepreneur’s ability to optimize venture 
performance requires the entrepreneur to have venture specific capabilities, experiences, and 
traits. We do not suggest one is more important than the other, but explain the relationship 















Figure 5-1 Likelihood of an opportunity moving to the next stage of the interaction 
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between them. However, we note that a better understanding of the investment decision 
process suggests that the “race” in which the horse/jockey are to participate is equally 
important. 
We also make a number of theoretical contributions, subsequently supported by 
evidence from this research, which we now highlight. We utilize a heuristics framework to 
posit four stages of the BA investment decision process, and break down this complex 
decision based on minimizing the BA’s required retrieval and assessment effort. Wee 
identify how BAs use satisficing and priority heuristics to limit the decision effort required at 
the venture assessment stage. We highlight how auditing behaviors seen as manifestations of 
underlying characteristics can be used to assess managerial risk, and identify the presence of 
an inverted U shape relationship between certain traits and increasing levels of managerial 
risk. We link the development of confidence in a relationship to the display of trust building 
behaviors and the absence of trust damaging behaviors and propose how controls can allow 
the effect of damaged trust to be reduced. Finally, we reinforce the insights that can be 
learned from observing how entrepreneurs behave and make decisions (especially to form 
partnerships) and provide two coding schemas and a research approach that can be used in 
future behavioral research. 
5.2 Recommendations 
 A key motivation behind this research was the provision of specific advice to fund-
seeking entrepreneurs, BAs and government policy makers frustrated with the small 
percentage of high potential ventures able to attract equity investment from BAs. In part this 
frustration is heightened by existing textbooks and research papers that tend to overstate the 
number of criteria considered by BAs without explaining which are compensatory and which 
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non-compensatory. In addition, a lack of understanding of how BAs assess presenting 
entrepreneurs and their ventures, even among the BAs themselves, makes it challenging to 
identify specific actions that fund-seeking entrepreneurs can take to improve success rates. 
Based on the conclusions from each of the previous three chapters, we identify specific 
actions that can be taken by entrepreneurs, BAs and government policy makers to increase 
the percentage of BA-entrepreneur interactions that result in investment. 
We first provide advice to entrepreneurs who are often confused as to exactly what 
investors are looking for in a business plan, often because they fail to appreciate that VCs, 
BAs and banks are all looking for different factors when considering an investment 
opportunity (Mason & Stark, 2004). In Appendix B we provide a copy of the original 
“Pitcher’s Bible” that we developed for CBC to provide to fund-seeking entrepreneurs 
participating in Season Two of Dragons’ Den. This provides our initial recommendations to 
entrepreneurs and more importantly illustrates the specific assistance given to entrepreneurs 
to prepare for their interactions with the Dragons. 
 In Table 5.1 we provide specific recommendations to entrepreneurs that highlight how 
and why specific criteria are assessed at each stage of the process. We provide 
recommendations that identify specific aspects of the venture that can cause a BA concern, 
and explain how certain information might be best displayed during the interaction, as well 
as how behaviors might be modified. In addition we provide guidance as to how to develop 
and negotiate successful long-term relationships with a BA. While providing guidance to 
entrepreneurs may enable them to hide aspects of the business or mask their natural 
behaviors causes concern that the BA might be taken in; in our experience fundamental 
venture or behavioral problems inevitably emerged during the interaction or at the due 
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diligence stage, limiting the likelihood of the BA making an inappropriate investment. 
However, our main concern was to provide assistance that would enable more promising 
opportunities to increase their likelihood of receiving an investment offer based on a better 
understanding of the investment decision process. We hope that fund seeking entrepreneurs 
who either through misinformation or inexperience are prematurely rejected can take 
guidance from these recommendations and increase their likelihood of attracting funding.  
Table 5-1 Recommendations to fund-seeking entrepreneurs 
I. Review your business plan against the eight critical factors  
a. Develop a business plan/presentation to addresses the 8 critical factors: specifically:  
i. identify how high market potential, strong product adoption, good 
protectability & relevant experience - provide an adequate financial return 
ii. identify how completed product development, established route to market/ supply 
chain, strong customer engagement, & robust financial projections - limit risk 
b.  Develop conservative cash flow - explain how much you need & what it is for  
c. Identify a realistic exit strategy and valuation to help justify investment 
d. Compensate for weaknesses in one criteria with strengths in a compensatory one  
e. Look for additional ways to reduce risk or increase returns 
II. Recognize your strengths and weaknesses 
a. Demonstrate capability and experiences. If necessary find an appropriate partner  
b. Self-assess traits and modify negative behaviors or find a coach 
III. Understand how behaviors influence relationship development  
a. Be conscious of the importance of trust building on relationship development 
b. Avoid behaviors that damage or violate trust. If you damage trust, be willing to 
accept controls   
c. Be conscious of BA’s need to meet aspiration levels for investment return and risk 
d. Remember relationship development is two – way  
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BAs often say that they rely on ‘gut feel’ when making an investment decision 
primarily because they do not really understand their own decision making processes. As a 
result, they find it difficult to explain to others how they make decisions, or to identify 
opportunities to improve decision efficiency or accuracy. In Table 5.2, we review specific 
ways in which BAs can improve decision quality or decision efficiency by better 
understanding their own decision criteria and processes.   
Awareness of how heuristics influence their decision-making approach and how 
specific venture criteria and entrepreneur behaviors influence their rejections can help them 
improve how they make decisions. Further, insights from this improved understanding of the 
decision process can be shared with fund-seeking entrepreneurs and individuals who refer 
opportunities improving overall process efficiency. Heightened awareness of the effect of 
certain entrepreneurial behaviors on the BA’s assessment of managerial or relationship risk 
can also help the BA look for early signals of potential problems. Knowledge of how specific 
factors influence their assessment of risk can encourage BAs to identify solutions to 
overcome specific deficiencies or identify how the identified risk can be mitigated through 
their own direct involvement. Direct feedback from the BA can also help the entrepreneur 
provide more pertinent information, and be more conscious of how their behaviors during the 
investment interaction influence the decision outcome. This can improve the quality of the 
interaction, and lead to both a higher percentage of entrepreneurs able to attract funding, and 
enhanced relationship between BA and entrepreneur both for those who receive an 
investment, and even with those who do not. In the context of Dragons’ Den the reputation of 
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BAs is enhanced by their behaviors23 and decisions. Creating a reputation as a strong partner, 
with expert knowledge and access to broad social networks, can beneficially influence the 
BA’s ability to undertake subsequent transactions. 
Table 5-2 Recommendations for Business Angels 
Better understanding of the investment decision process provides an opportunity for 
government policy to identify specific actions they might take to increase the success rates of 
interactions between fund-seeking entrepreneurs and BAs. Appropriate policies will increase 
the number of investable ventures, facilitate additional BA/entrepreneur interactions and 
                                                      
23	  One	  reason	  the	  show	  is	  not	  embraced	  by	  the	  BA	  community	  is	  because	  the	  Dragons	  make	  cruel	  comments	  
on	  the	  show,	  yet	  BAs	  have	  a	  natural	  desire	  to	  encourage	  entrepreneurs.	  Rather	  than	  being	  a	  normal	  behavior	  
negative	  comments	  were	  encouraged	  by	  the	  producer	  as	  making	  good	  tv	  (O’Leary,	  2011)	  	  
I. Understand your own investment requirements   
a. Identify the importance of fit and type of venture where you can make a difference 
b. Examine the relationship between specific venture and investment decision criteria  
c. Examine your previous venture experience to decide the types of business where 
you can be most helpful 
d. Review how you can deploy your assets/expertise to help a promising opportunity  
e. Provide specific feedback to the entrepreneur about the venture’s shortcomings  
f. Ask for third party validation of performance (market or technology) 
II. Focus on how entrepreneur behaviors influence your risk assessment  
a. Examine entrepreneur behaviors for manifestations of capabilities and experiences   
b. Highlight how excessive behaviors influence your assessment of performance risk 
c. Audit displays of trust building, damaging, or violating behaviors 
d. Identify appropriate controls to handle damaged trust (but walk away from violators) 
III. Highlight your aspiration levels and other motivations 
a. Explain investment motivations so that the entrepreneur can seek out the 
appropriate investor 
b. Grow reputation by introducing potential investees to previously funded entrepreneurs 
c. Take the role of the coach in the relationship so that you can be on the same side 




provide mechanisms to reduce the investment risk, which will increase the number of funded 
ventures. In Table 5.3 we provide some specific recommendations for governments and 
policy makers based on removing the causes of inefficiencies in the current investment 
decision process, especially through the deployment of mechanisms that can reduce the 
likelihood of rejection.  
	  
Table 5-3 Recommendations for Governments and Policy Makers 
5.3 Future research 
There are a number of ways in which we plan to extend this research. We can re-
examine existing data from the first four seasons of CBC Dragons’ Den to investigate how 
I. Better prepare entrepreneurs to become investment ready  
a. Provide third party market and technology validation services 
b. Provide financial and technical support to encourage first customer adoption 
c. Create new opportunities for governments to be first customer 
d. Help entrepreneurs understand how investors make their decisions 
e. Help fund-seeking entrepreneurs understand how their behaviors influence outcomes. 
f. Provide training on negotiation to fund-seeking entrepreneurs 
g. Develop standard approaches to deal structuring and shareholder agreements 
h. Provide access to advisors and their supporting resources 
II. Enhance the opportunities for BA/entrepreneur interactions 
a. Create and support BA inter and intra networking activities among BA groups 
b. Provide training / support for BAs and entrepreneurs to reduce information asymmetry   
c. Provide matching funding or tax incentives to encourage BA investment & reduce risk 
d. Link BA activities to other sources of finance 
III. Provide resources to help BAs with their nascent ventures after funding 
a. Provide access to high quality professional services to provide timely advice 
b. Facilitate access to existing government support programs 
c. Facilitate opportunities for funded SMEs to collaborate with academia & industry  
d. Establish governments as first customers 
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additional factors affect decision outcomes such as BA expertise or access to complementary 
assets. We can also explore the decision processes of individual BAs rather than the 
aggregate decisions of all the BAs, as we do in the current research. This will allow us to 
investigate how decision outcomes are influenced by: participation in the show; individual 
characteristics; previous experiences; and, the investment objectives of each BA.  
We can also extend our research to explore the impact of culture and context on the 
investment decision outcome and relationship development by comparing our coded 
interactions from the Canadian version of Dragons’ Den with interactions from the 21 other 
countries where Dragons’ Den is now recorded, which includes developed and developing 
countries in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Asia and Africa.  Our research method and 
coding schema can also be adapted to investigate more traditional BA/entrepreneur 
interactions (for example entrepreneur presentations to BA groups, or more “private” 
interactions with participation by a broader cross-section of fund-seeking entrepreneurs).  
Given the critical nature of the development of the relationship between a funded 
entrepreneur and the funding BA we can also adapt our research method to investigate how 
this relationship develops over time. This could include the immediate follow up to the 
Dragons’ Den interaction when due diligence is carried out and final terms are agreed, and 
subsequently as the relationship continues to develop. In fact we can deploy approaches from 
relationship management developed using Observational Interaction in social relationships to 
the development of the ongoing relationship between BA and entrepreneur, where we can 




We started this thesis by explaining the importance of high growth potential ventures to 
regional economies and observing that less than 5% of those seeking funding were able to 
attract it. Our hope is that by explaining the investment decision process in detail, 
participants in the process will learn how to reduce this high failure rate.  A better 
understanding of how and why investment decisions are made (facilitated by the fact that the 
interactions can be viewed on national television) should encourage both more potential 
entrepreneurs to seek third party finance and more high net worth individuals to invest in 
early stage ventures.  Further, a better understanding of BA’s and entrepreneur’s motivations 
and decision techniques will lead to improved outcomes from the investment interaction. 
Appreciating the decision process and the other party’s motivation is even more important when 
a successful interaction outcome leads to sharing venture ownership and the development of a 
long-term partnerships. I our efforts f are only able to reduce the current rejection rate from 95% 
to 90% we will double the number of high potential ventures able to attract funding.  
Our research was also motivated by the desire to contribute to entrepreneurship theory 
by: developing improved models of the venture creation process; highlighting the importance 
of entrepreneur behaviors; and, emphasizing the importance of entrepreneur trustworthiness. To 
improve the efficiency of the venture creation process we broke it down into stages so that we 
could identify the causes of failure at each. This allowed us to combine theory and observation to 
uncover the relationship between each criteria or behavior and the rejection decision. Our focus 
on understanding how entrepreneurs behave and make decisions required us to adopt and 
enhance research methods from several disciplines that can guide future research. . We hope that 
our research will have an impact on both entrepreneurship theory and practice.   
 
136 
Appendix A  Dragons’ Den interactions – the context 
i. Show background 
Dragons’ Den is a globally syndicated reality TV show currently being recorded and 
shown in 22 countries. The show started in Japan, and the current format for the show was 
developed by the BBC in the UK in 2004. In the show, entrepreneurs pitch their business 
opportunities to five BAs (the Dragons) in the hopes of obtaining direct equity investment of 
between $10,000 and $500,000. In the Canadian version of the show, entrepreneurs looking 
for investment for their nascent ventures apply to take part in the show through an audition 
process at regional centers across Canada or through an online screening process. The 
screening process was designed by the show’s producers in conjunction with industry experts 
to match as closely as possible the actual screening process used by third-party individuals 
who refer entrepreneurs to BAs. Between 10 and 12 interactions between entrepreneurs and 
the BAs were recorded each day in a continuous format and the results used for the 
production of the show footage. Analysis for this research used unedited line-tapes rather 
than the edited-for-TV version (with some never shown on air), which gave us the 
opportunity to observe and reexamine these interactions. 
ii. The interaction 
During the interaction, the entrepreneur starts by stating his/her name, the nature of the 
proposed business, and the amount of capital requested. The BAs have no knowledge of the 
opportunity or the entrepreneur prior to their meeting in the “Den,” where the entrepreneur 
must request (and be offered) a specific investment amount (after describing his/her business 
opportunity) or go home with nothing. The Dragons then quiz the entrepreneur on, among 
other things, his/her experience and the details of the business, in order to decide whether or 
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not to make an investment offer. During the show, the investor must make a risky investment 
decision in 15 to 75 minutes, with the interaction continuing until either all five Dragons 
withdraw, or one or more proposes an investment offer. This offer can then be accepted or 
rejected by the entrepreneur. When a Dragon withdraws from an opportunity, he/she is 
required to provide a reason for the lack of interest in moving forward. If an offer is made 
and accepted, then there is a subsequent due diligence process, which if successful leads to 
an investment and the start of a long-term relationship between the BA and the entrepreneur. 
iii. Validity concerns 
a. Interaction behaviors and decisions not indicative of traditional interactions: 
The entire interaction was videotaped in the CBC studio in front of TV cameras for 
subsequent broadcast on national television. The artificial reality TV environment and the 
subsequent public disclosure of the decision outcome cause validity concerns as they might 
influence participant behavior to the point where entrepreneur behaviors and BA reactions 
deviate from similar interactions in a more traditional and private environment. While we 
acknowledge such concerns, we find evidence that using reality TV show for research into 
decision-making under risk is not novel.  A number of researchers have used the natural 
experiments of game shows to investigate people’s attitude to: risk aversion; expected utility 
theory; endowment; heterogeneity; and, discrimination. Shows studied include the game-
show Card Sharks, Jeopardy, Who Wants to Be a Millionaire, Weakest Link, and Deal or No 
Deal (Gertner, 1993; Metrick, 1995; Hartley et al., 2005, Levitt, 2004; and de Roos and 
Sarafidis, 2006, respectively). These studies have confirmed the general applicability of TV 
shows to “real-world” decision-making. All of these examples are deemed reliable as they 
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study people under situations of real consequence, as does Dragons’ Den, since investors 
offer their own money to fund real business opportunities.  
Behavioral economic studies have found that the behaviors of TV participants in an 
intense decision-making environment reflect similar behaviors in real-life. In investigating 
prospect theory using Deal or No Deal, researchers confirmed that contestants’ decisions on 
the show were similar to those in a subsequent experiment that replicated the risky decision 
making processes. They also noted “prior to the show, contestants have had considerable 
time to think about what they might do in various situations” (Post et al. 2008: 67). This was 
the case in Dragons’ Den, where both BAs and entrepreneurs had time to reflect on how they 
would make a decision prior to actually making it. In addition, the Dragons’ Den set was 
built to foster an intimate environment, and participating entrepreneurs confirmed that within 
a few minutes of the start of the interaction they tended to forget that the interaction was 
being recorded for subsequent broadcast. Rather, the nature of the interaction and the need to 
respond to questions from five expert Dragons caused them to focus on the interaction itself. 
The stressful interaction context encouraged entrepreneurs to respond and display behaviors 
that exaggerated their underlying characteristics (Mishra, 1996). 
The interaction context also differed from more traditional entrepreneur/BA 
interactions. In traditional interactions entrepreneurs are referred by trusted third parties, the 
interaction takes place over several meetings with the BA performing due diligence both in 
between and subsequent to these meetings. In the observed interactions in Dragons’ Den, the 
BA could not rely on the referral source, nor look to validate the opportunity from external 
sources. As a result, the BA was forced to make rejection decisions based primarily on the 
entrepreneurs’ displayed behaviors and disclosed information. This highlights rather than 
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diminishes the insights we gain from observations of the causes of rejection and failure 
manifest on the show.  
The time spent to reject an opportunity is directly linked to the stage in the process 
when the opportunity is rejected, given our assertion that BAs reject opportunities as soon as 
they find a reason. As each season progressed, and as the two new BAs became more 
familiar with the interaction, their decision-making expertise seemed to increase, and they 
became more sophisticated at focusing on the critical elements that might cause rejection. 
Over time they seemed to reject certain opportunities more rapidly, and had extended 
interactions with those to whom they made an investment offer.  
There were two further constraints on the observed Dragons’ Den interaction that 
differed from traditional entrepreneur/BA interactions. The first was the requirement that 
each BA provide a reason for rejection. The second was that the entrepreneur had to receive 
the initial amount requested or leave with nothing. The requirement that BAs had to provide 
a rejection reason forced them to internalize their decision-making process and explain their 
rejection decision to the entrepreneur (and the TV audience). This explanation of the 
rejection reason in real time facilitated improved understanding of the rejection decision and 
helped us identify the stages of the process. The shows requirement that the entrepreneur 
receive an investment offer of the amount requested or leave with nothing did cause certain 
potential fundable opportunities to be rejected. Most of these rejections occurred at the 
venture assessment stage, where some opportunities were rejected because they offered 
insufficient return. This slightly increased the number rejected at this stage, whereas, in a 
more traditional setting, some of those opportunities may have been offered a lower 
investment amount by the BA. While this artificially did change the outcome, it also made 
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decision outcomes easier to code. It should be noted that in each subsequent season, asking 
for too much money became less common, indicating that entrepreneurs were learning from 
observing previous season’s interactions.  
 
b. Selection bias in both entrepreneurs and BAs participating in the show 
We are conscious that there was an inherent selection bias in both the fund-seeking 
entrepreneur chosen for the show and in the BAs who chose to participate. Entrepreneurs 
who wished to participate in the show and appear on national television were usually unable 
to obtain funding elsewhere. This created a number of adverse selection problems in that 
very few ‘high potential’ entrepreneurs participated, as they were likely able to attract 
funding from traditional local BA investors. In addition the context of the show precluded 
BAs from verifying information about the opportunity or the entrepreneur’s 
capabilities/experiences before they had to make an investment decision. This created 
adverse selection issues as initial decisions had to be made without full disclosure. In 
addition, the selection of entrepreneurs could not be seen as representative of the total 
population. Some participating entrepreneurs chose to pitch their business on national 
television because this might generate interest from customers, strategic investors or 
acquirers. Conversely, other entrepreneurs decided not to participate in the show, concerned 
that presenting nascent ideas on national television could lead to them being prematurely 
exposed to the market and/or replicated.  
Further, the audition process created a second selection bias as CBC chose several 
entrepreneurs based on their “entertainment” value rather than based on their likelihood of 
receiving investment. The audition process tended to favour ventures with consumer 
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products, as they were both easy to explain on the show and made good TV content. 
However, while these limitations reduce our ability to extrapolate the percentage of potential 
opportunities that might get funded, or to infer insights about the entrepreneurial population, 
they do not diminish our ability to identify the causes of rejection at each stage of the 
process. 
The selection of the seven BAs (one was replaced at the end of season one, and one at 
the end of season three) also influenced the interaction. Each of the BAs had a high net 
worth, was committed to investing in companies each season, had a track record of angel 
investing, was willing to invest in companies from across Canada, and had different industry 
experience and background. Further, the producers chose BAs who had entertaining 
personalities that would make the interactions more interesting. However, the ability to 
compete and cooperate, together with the number of interactions in which the BAs 
participated together, enriched the insights that could be gathered from their complex 
decision processes. We can also confirm that none of the BAs participated solely as a means 
to directly generate deals on the show, based both on their comments and the fact that the 
number of deals done by each would not normally justify their investment in the time 
required (about 15 days for each season). It seems that the two primary motivations for BAs 
to participate in the show were a desire to enhance their personal brand and a desire to give 
something back to the community. It should also be noted that we observed the BAs to be 
thoughtful and helpful to participating entrepreneurs, in many ways similar to BAs operating 
in a more traditional environment. Some of the extreme comments made by BAs made were 
at the behest of the show’s producer because they created good TV. Such comments 
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inevitably made it to the broadcast version of the show, although they were not indicative of 
the tone of most interactions.  
As the interaction involved the simultaneous decisions of the five BAs, the effect on 
the outcomes of the individual biases of each BA tended to be minimized. Individual BA 
personality or experience that might affect outcomes such as “chemistry with the 
entrepreneur” or specific industry knowledge were reduced by using a coding schema that 
assessed the aggregate value of each factor (for example capability assessment was informed 
based on the combined assessment of the entrepreneur by all the BAs). Similarly, rejection 
reasons were coded based on the last BA to reject an opportunity. In combination, these 
factors limited the impact of individual BA characteristics on the decision outcome and 
allowed us to generalize the investment decision process. However, we are conscious that 
research into individual investment decisions could further improve understanding of the 
investment decision process. For example, it would be interesting to explore BA behaviors 
and decisions based on their experiences, capabilities and traits.    
 
c. Development of coding schema 
The development of the two behavioral coding schema was achieved through an 
iterative process where videotapes were shared with subject matter experts. Original coding 
consisted of the time to decision and outcomes. Outcomes could include an investment offer 
being made (who made the offer, how much the offer was for, the percentage equity required 
and any control mechanisms introduced), or being rejected (rejection reason given by each 
BA). An example of the coding sheet (Sheet A) that was used to break down the multistage 
process into four stages is included in Appendix C.  Figure 6 highlights the number of 
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opportunities rejected at each stage based on rejection reason: a) due to insufficient return, b) 
due to excess resident risk, c) due to excess managerial risk; and, d) due to excess 
relationship risk.  
 
Figure 5-2 Number of opportunities rejected at each stage of the decision process  
 
We took each group of opportunities based on common rejection reason and reviewed 
each interaction to establish patterns linked to theory. We then developed specific hypotheses 
and created an initial coding schema for each chapter that would enable us to find support for 
our theory. For each group of opportunities with common rejection reasons, our initial 
hypotheses, coding schema and sample coding were shared with subject matter experts24 who 
helped refine the coding schema, which we then used to code a small sample of interactions 
to confirm that coding was both feasible and reliable.  Once we had been able to get high 
levels of inter-rater reliability and refined out hypotheses about the anticipated relationships 
between the observations and the outcomes, we finalized the schema shown and used them to 
                                                      
24	  For	  example	  an	  initial	  coding	  schema	  of	  seven	  trust	  behaviors	  was	  presented	  at	  the	  EIASM	  workshop	  
on	  Trust	  in	  2010.	  Based	  on	  feedback	  at	  the	  conference,	  this	  initial	  schema	  was	  modified	  refined	  to	  include	  
the	  four	  types	  of	  trust	  behaviors	  with	  three	  behavior	  manifestations	  of	  each	  type	  used	  in	  chapter	  2.	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code the relevant data set. Examples of the coding sheet for each chapter are included in 
Appendix C: rejected due to insufficient return or excess resident risk (Sheet B), rejected due 
to excess managerial risk (Sheet C), rejected due to excess relationship risk (Sheet D). (The 
names of the entrepreneurs are whited out to maintain confidentiality). 
iv. Direct involvement in the show 
The data set for this research was made available through the Canadian Innovation 
Centre volunteering to help the CBC with the development of the Reality TV Show – 
Dragons’ Den. I, along with a colleague from the Canadian Innovation Centre, worked with 
the CBC to recruit entrepreneurs, facilitate the audition process, and prepare the 
entrepreneurs for their meeting with the Dragons. This involvement allowed us to influence 
the audition process, which allowed us to understand how entrepreneurs were selected. In 
addition, during the first two seasons of the show we interviewed each of the entrepreneurs 
after the interaction, and in some cases the BAs after a particularly complex interaction. 
Responses to our questions helped us in the development of our coding schema.  
The show’s format impacted the interaction in four ways that simplified our research: 
the entire interaction from first meeting to the decision to make an offer was recorded in a 
single continuous session; the BAs had no prior knowledge of the entrepreneur or the 
opportunity; the outcome was an equity investment offer or a rejection; and,  if the 
opportunity was rejected each Dragon had to specify a specific reason. These factors 
facilitated our coding and reduced the externalities that often influence the decision in a more 
traditional investment situation. The taping of the show, our access to the line tapes, and 
CBC’s permission to share some of the recordings allowed us to undertake a “field 




Pitcher’s Bible prepared for CBC Dragons’ Den participants 
Guide to entrepreneurs: 
As a participant in the Dragon’s Den you have a “once in a lifetime” opportunity to 
pitch your business to potential investors – the Dragons. Good preparation and understanding 
what the show’s producers are looking for will get you on to the show, while understanding 
how the Dragons make their investment decisions will increase your chances of success. In 
this pitching guide we explain both what the Producers and the Dragons are looking for, how 
to pitch, and potential pitfalls. The purpose of these notes is to provide assistance in 
preparing for participation in the Dragon’s Den interaction at the CBC studios. They are not 
mandatory, so please feel free to use any or all of them as you feel appropriate, you may also 
want to discuss them with your advisors.  
To get funded entrepreneurs must persuade the Dragons: 
§ That you are a person whom Dragons can have the confidence in to trust with their 
money. 
§ That the product or service innovation is one that a sufficient number of people will 
wish to purchase. 
§ That the business itself will be able to be sold in the future and allow both you and the 
Dragon to make a return on the investment. 
What CBC producers want to see: 
First you must recognize that the show is designed for television, and the format of the 
show is such that you must be able to explain your business to the Dragons in your opening 
pitch. This means that consumer products or services are easiest to present, while new 
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software algorithms might be more challenging. The show context is set up so that both the 
Dragons and the TV audience are learning about your business simultaneously. 
You need to persuade the CBC that you will be able to communicate your idea well, 
and that you pitching this on television will be of interest to viewers because of one of three 
things: viewers will be interested in the product/service themselves, there will be an interest 
from the Dragons in investing, or the interaction will create entertainment value.  We suggest 
that you develop a script that can achieve one or more of these three objectives, and then 
practice it many times, before the show. You will not be able to read from the script during 
the show, nor do you have to address every point. The pitch must be personalized and the 
order in which you present the information should suit you and your business idea. Whilst it 
will be beneficial to understand your Dragon’s to succeed, please also bare in mind that the 
TV audience will contain many potential customers or alternate potential investors. 
What you should include in your pitch: 
A pitch is actually the ultimate sales opportunity. You have to sell the investor on the 
fact that you are the right person to run the business, that lots of people will want to buy the 
product or service, and that they can obtain the required exit from their investment. These 
three issues are fundamentally different. You will be given the chance to make an opening 
statement that must attract the interest of the investor. Most pitches lose the interest of the 
investor within the first two minutes. After some initial opening the investor is likely to 
cross-examine you. This serves three purposes: 
§ To help them quickly understand the critical features of the invention and the business 
model. 




§ To create a dynamic that will put them in a good position when negotiating. 
You can use each of these to your advantage but requires significant preparation. You 
need to have two versions of your presentation ready, the two-minute elevator pitch and the 
ten-minute full presentation. Whilst it is unlikely that you will get the chance to make the full 
presentation, having it prepared will help you. You should rehearse each of the pitches 
several times and then work with a coach who will role-play the investor and ask you the 
really tough questions. If you don’t know them when you practice, you need to make time to 
perfect them. It is surprising the number of times entrepreneurs say they wish they could 
answer a question again. Often this occurs when an entrepreneur has not practiced enough. 
Many times the investor decides not to invest because of the lack of information provided in 
the answer, or, because the answer takes the discussions in the wrong direction. Practicing 
pitches helps to reduce the chances of this happening. 
Critical factors to cover: 
1. Does the product have a unique value proposition and will people in your target market 
buy it: 
i. What is the product and what does it do? 
ii. Can you explain why people will buy it and provide any evidence? 
iii. Is it a new product or just better than an existing product? 
iv. How will you get people to switch 
2. How big is the market: 
i. Who are the main customers in your target market? 
ii. Is the market growing or declining? 
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iii. Who are the competition, and how will they react? 
3. What led to the idea? 
i. Do you have some expert knowledge that helped you identify the need? 
ii. Do you have some unique expertise that led you to develop the idea? 
4. What experience or qualifications do you (or your team) have to show you can manage 
the business? 
i. Have you started a business? 
ii. Have you worked in a similar business? 
iii. Do you have direct experience of the market? 
5. How will you make money for the business with this product? 
i. How much does it cost and how much will you sell it for? 
ii. How much will you have to spend on other items? 
iii. Can you show that you will not run out of cash? 
6. How will you make sure it is difficult for people to copy you once they have seen it on 
television? 
i. Can you patent it? Or obtain some alternative first mover advantage? 
ii. Can you rapidly gain market share to create economies of scale or recognizable 
branding? 
iii. Can you tie-up major customers to make them unavailable to potential 
competitors? 
7. Can you demonstrate you have a good understanding of the market and similar 
products available? 




ii. Can you demonstrate the advantages your product has over these competitors? 
iii. How do you know that competitors will not simply add your unique features 
to their product? 
8. Where are you in the development stage? 
i. Have you finished the development and design phase? Is it ready for 
manufacturing? 
ii. How close are you to being able to sell the product to customers? 
iii. Have you already sold some or do you have commitments from future 
customers? 
9. Do you have a well thought out distribution and scale up strategy? 
i. How will you get your product to customers (direct, distribution, through 
licenses)? 
ii. Are there logistical issues that limit your ability to sell? Do you have channel 
partners in place?  
iii. Are there any supplier constraints? 
10. How much money are you looking for? 
i. Exactly what will you do with it? 
ii. Can you take it in phases? 
iii. Are there ways to reduce this amount? 
 
The interaction: 
The interaction itself is vey important, it shows your credibility and gives the BA 
confidence in both you and the business. In addition, the BA’s interest in working with you 
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develops during this short interaction, remember you may be establishing a long-term 
relationship, and the interaction establishes the initial pattern for what happens if the venture 
is funded. Most people focus too much on the idea, and not enough on showing the investor 
they can make money, and that working with you will be fun:    
§ Persuade the BA of the value of the idea, business model and market opportunity. 
§ Get the BA to believe that you have the capability to implement the business plan. 
§ Show how the value of the company will grow by a significant factor (usually more 
than 10 times). 
§ Demonstrate how you will leverage invested dollars.  
§ Convince the BA that they can work with you in the long term and that you will listen 
to their advice. 
Negotiating the deal: 
Raising capital at the early stage of a venture is extremely costly, both in terms of the 
equity you will have to give up and the time taken to attract the money.  Going into the 
negotiation you must be very clear on what you need, how you will spend and what you 
might be willing to give up for it. You should also consider, what is the cost of not taking an 
investment offer (however costly in terms of equity) and can you do better elsewhere?   
§ You must start by understanding the money you need, and the basic methods of 
company valuation. Many entrepreneurs limit their upside by being unrealistic at the 
early stage; this reduces the likelihood of doing a deal and your credibility. Although 
some would say that you simply have to negotiate the best deal, in some cases, starting 
too aggressively can have a negative effect.  
§ The negotiation process is a power struggle, between an entrepreneur with one idea, 
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and an investor with many investment options. You need to consider the interaction 
from the BAs perspective, if you are going to get the deal that is right for you.   
§ The final terms of any investment offer will cause the entrepreneur to lose some control 
of the venture. Most entrepreneurs are passionate about the ventures, and giving up 
control can be an emotional challenge. Investors recognize this, but will see too much 
desire to keep control by an entrepreneur as negative, and something that will limit the 
future likelihood of success. 
Finally, this is not a simple negotiation, with a winner and a loser, the negotiation must 
conclude with an agreement that both parties can live with and become the basis for a long 
term fair partnership. Acting during the negotiation to protect your interest, but without 
appearing uncooperative is not an easy challenge. 
There is also an element of the show context designed to increase the tension during the 
interaction. You should be aware of these dynamics during the interaction, expect them, and 
recognize the best way to respond to specific questions or comments from the Dragons: 
§ Dragons are themselves successful entrepreneurs, with strong personalities. In a group 
this will give them a dominant position with regard to an individual, less experienced 
innovator. 
§ Dragons have a strong sense of what will make money and what will not. It is 
important to ensure that entrepreneurs transfer their belief in the opportunity to the 
naturally skeptical Dragons. 
§ Dragons are looking for a good “Return on Investment” and will seek to value the 
company based on realistic comparable opportunities. Innovators may be over-
optimistic on their company valuation. 
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Remember Dragons are likely not experts in your product or service and may not be 
typical customers. You have to paint a picture for them so that they can understand the 
market need, see the potential business opportunity and become engaged. Testimonials and 
existing sales go a long way to address this.   
How much money should you ask for: 
Asking for the right level of investment is very important as it shows to potential 
investors that you have a good understanding of what the business needs to do to be 
successful and precisely how their investment will be spent. Specifically, they will determine 
from this: 
§ Where you are in the development/production/launch phase of the product. 
§ A good understanding of the business model and the crucial financial investment 
decisions which the company will need to make over the next months 
§ An appreciation of your knowledge, experience and approach to determine your 
technique to commercializing your innovation 
§ Clear reasons for each expenditure so that once underway, performance milestones can 
be introduced and measured to track performance. 
§ A clear understanding that you will not run out of money when you are half way along 
the path, with an inability, at the point to raise any further funds. 
§ Whether you are asking for sufficient funds to take the company to the point where 
there is a demonstrable and significant increase in company value, such as: 
§ The point where the technology development is either complete or overcomes the 
single most important technological challenge.  
§ The point where a first strategic customer offers to purchase and use the product. 
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§ The point where the growth of the business is enhanced through the signing of some 
long term contract with an OEM, distributor or other strategic channel partner. 
How much equity should you give up: 
Money raised at this time is the most expensive money you will ever raise. This is 
because it carries the highest level of risk. As time progresses, you achieve more milestones 
and get closer to commercial success and the risk is reduced. The higher the risk, the more 
you will have to provide back to the investor. Early-stage high-risk translates to high returns 
for early stage investors. However, the return to the investor usually comes a the point when 
the venture is sold, so you need to focus on developing a business plan that identifies an exit 
strategy, and a likely acquirer.      
The most common valuation method is based on making assumptions about revenue 
levels at the time the company is sold, and looking at industry multipliers to use this to 
calculate the value. However there are very few hard and fast rules on this and it is very 
difficult to do. Be cautious, company valuations based on unsubstantiated projected future 
revenues are equally flawed, as is accumulated expenditure or investments already made in 
the company.  The road to high growth in a venture eventually means surrendering most of 
the equity and control of the venture to others.  The decision to seek external investment for 
the first time is the first step on this path. In general you must balance two things, do you 
have to attract external finance in order to grow the business, and is the offer on the table the 
best you can get (delaying the decision can also be expensive). In addition, if you recognize 
that you may need additional funds at a later date, you need to be clear that what you give up 
now may affect your ability to raise further money in the future. However, this is less of a 
concern than you might think, once a Dragon has invested, they will work with you to find 
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the next round of funding, at that point they are as interested in the company success as you.  
Top twenty reasons Dragons’ don’t invest:  
1. It is a bad idea, with no market opportunity. 
2. The innovator failed to communicate the value proposition to the potential investor. 
3. The innovator fails to convince the investor that they can make a sufficient return on their 
investment. 
4. The market is one that the investor is unfamiliar or uncomfortable with. 
5. The entrepreneur does not have the knowledge, aptitude or experience to run the 
business. 
6. The entrepreneur is not willing to seek external advice. 
7. The entrepreneur has the necessary knowledge and experience but does not communicate 
it well.   
8. Lack of chemistry between entrepreneur and the investor, or even a potential conflict. 
9. Great product or service, but not a fundable business. 
10. It will take too long to bring the product or service to market. 
11. The investor does not see how they can add value to the business. 
12. The investor has had a bad experience with a similar product or service. 
13. The entrepreneur has unrealistic expectations on current valuation. 
14. There is no real barrier to entry 
15. There are no natural acquirers who could allow an exit to be made. 
16. There are no ways to erect a barrier to entry to stop stronger competitors taking over the 
market. 
17. The business plan requires a level of resources that are too high to justify before 
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revenue is achieved. 
18. There is no evidence of how the entrepreneur will attract first customers, or perhaps 
channel partners.  
19. There is too much focus on technology, and not enough on meeting market need. 
20. The investor does not envisage a good working relationship with the entrepreneur over 
the longer term. 
What can you learn from participating in Dragons’ Den: 
Most pitches fail, because they fail to communicate effectively. This can occur when 
the entrepreneur becomes too interested in their invention and not enough in the business or 
investment opportunity. It can be because they have not rehearsed enough or because the 
Dragons put them off. Whatever the reason, they need to leave the experience wiser. They 
need to learn from this experience, their investment of time and emotion and be better 
prepared when the next opportunity arises. Most entrepreneurs fail on their first attempts to 
raise money. What separates the ones who are ultimately successful is their ability to learn 
from each experience and incorporate these lessons into the next pitch. 
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Appendix C  Coding Manual for Dragons Den Interactions (and sample data sheets) 
Coding instructions for coding sheet SS – identifying rejection reason (interaction stage) 
Form information;   Code date of interaction:  Your initials    (Reference will be added by ALM) 
Coding mandate – Code reason that each Dragon exits from interaction - due to a fatal flaw (Column 5), Insufficient return (Column 6), 
Excess Venture Risk (Column 7), Excess Managerial Risk (Column 8) or Excess Relationship Risk (Column 9)  
If there is an investment offer, code amount and equity percentage, if more one than one Dragon code split. 
Code Entrepreneur:    Name of principle entrepreneur (Use CBC designation)  
Code Start and Finish time:  Time entrepreneur enters/leaves Den based on screen clock 
Code investment offer with amount. $___, Accepted Y/N, Investing Dragons by first name (Robert, Laurence, Arlene, Jim, Kevin) 
FF: Code Rejection Reason due to Fatal Flaw in venture criteria (Code: a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) 
Venture criteria  Key question  Fatal flaw if Examples of BA comment 
a. Market potential   Is there a large market for 
this product? 
No evidence of market 
potential market 
presented 
I cannot see any demand for this product…. 
The market is already well served….. 
b.  Product 
adoption   
Will customers in target 
market easily adopt this 
product?  
No clear benefits, or 
major adoption 
issues 
You have not convinced me that anyone will buy this product… 
There are only a few major customers for your product, and it 
will take you too long to sell to any of them…. 
c. Protectability  How easy will it be for 
other people to copy the 
product or service? 
Anyone could copy 
product or service 
easily. 
No barrier to entry, as soon as you are successful, others will 
enter the market and you will find it hard to compete…. 
Without a clear advantage you will just have to compete on 
price, which will reduce your profits to zero…. 
d.  Entrepreneur 
experience  
Does management have 
direct and relevant 
experience? 
No evidence of 
required experience 
I am concerned that without any direct experience of the retail 
market you will be able to achieve success… 
While the product is great, this is a business, and you haven’t 




Venture criteria Key question Fatal flaw if Examples of BA comment 
 
   
e.  Product status  
 
 
Product ready for market, or 
major work required before 
it ships? 
Needs more research 
and development 
The product is still in its research and development phase when 
you actually have something that works… 
Currently each product is handmade, not clear that you have put 
any thought into how you could scale up manufacturing…. 
f. Route to market 
 
Is there a realistic 
marketing plan and route to 
market? 
Limited thought given 
to distribution issues 
Why would an existing distributor switch to you as a supplier… 




Is a first customer 
identified? Does product 
meet need? 
No first customers 
identified. 
You have not identified a first customer who would likely be 
interested in the product… 
You have not considered the switching cost for potential 




Profitable and sustainable 
cash flow?   
No evidence of profit 
or cash management 
You will run out of money before you are able to raise more 
money from investors… 
There is simply not a path to profitability…. 
 
RE: Code Rejection Reason due insufficient return (Code: 0 for rejection, 1 for no rejection) 
RI: Code Reason for excess resident risk (Code: 0 for rejection, 1 for no rejection) 




Can not identify a viable 
exit, or valuation at exit 
insufficient 
While the company looks like it can grow – it will never be sufficiently large to attract an 
acquirer, therefore there is no path to exit. 
Sales projections in three years result in a valuation that makes it impossible to make a 
reasonable return on investment at the time of exit 




physical, financial or 
people risk  
There is too much uncertainty about your ability to deliver a working product within a 
reasonable timescale  
Your business is predicated on raising additional rounds of finance, but I can not see how 




MR: Code Rejection Reason for excess managerial risk (Code: 0 for rejection, 1 for no rejection) 






concerns that they do 
not have the capabilities 
to manage the venture 
People that work in companies in which I invest know their numbers (lack of competence)  
You need to find a new approach to the problem – not just repeat it (lack of innovativeness) 
 You can not approach this problem as if you were working in a big company experience (lack 




Does not have 
appropriate experiences 
to achieve success  
You have failed to show you have what it takes to manage my money (lack of experience)  
Your answers to market questions show a poor competitor understanding (lack of expertise)  
You do not seem to have required knowledge to address technology issues (lack of training) 
T. Inappropriate 
traits 
Creates concern about 
leadership & decision 
making ability    
You appear to be unwilling to listen to my advice (lack of coachability) 
You seem to be willing to hang on to poor performers (over-agreeableness) 
Running this business will take much more than a good idea (lack of persistence) 
 
RR: Code Rejection Reason for excess relationship risk (Code: 0 for rejection, 1 for no rejection) 
 Reason Details Examples of BA comment (explanation in brackets) 
B Lack of 
display of 
trust building 
Fails to demonstrate 
they are trusting or 
trustworthy  
You don’t seem to be willing to let go of day-to-day management (lack of vulnerability) 
You need to show that you care about the people you work with (lack of benevolence)   








I thought you would better understand this issue (damage anticipated capability)  
You should not have taken advantage of the situation (damage benevolence) 
You should not have disclosed that information (damage disclosure)  
T. Display of 
trust violating  
Entrepreneur tries to 
deceive the potential 
investor 
You are in complete denial that you did anything wrong (lack of receptiveness)   
Don’t you see that you need to separate your money and company money (lack of integrity) 
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Code start and finish time, and fatal flaw by reason (Circle final rejection reason)  
Fatal flaws code: a (market potential) b (product adoption) c (profitability) d (entrepreneur experience)  








Coding instructions for coding sheet VC – identifying rejection due to venture criteria  
Form information;   Coding  date:    Your initials  (Reference will be added by ALM) 
Coding mandate – Assess alphanumeric code (A+, A, A-, B+, B , B-, C+, C, C-) for each venture criteria (V1 – V8), and assess 
whether rejection reason linked to insufficient investment return or excess investment risk   
Code Entrepreneur:   Name of principle entrepreneur (Use CBC designation)  
Code Rejection Reason:  RE – insufficient return (0 for rejection, 1 for no rejection) 
    RI – excess risk (0 for rejection, 1 for no rejection) 
VC: Code Evaluation of each of the venture criteria (A+  to  C-) 
Venture	  Criteria	   Evidence	  of	   	   Examples	  
V1	  	   Market	  
potential	  	  	  
Market	  size	   A	   Large	  market	  potential	  (i.e.	  over	  $20	  m.)	  
B	   Medium	  market	  potential	  (i.e.	  over	  $5	  m.)	  
C	   Unable	  to	  predict	  —	  likely	  less	  than	  $5	  m.	  
V2	  	   Product	  
adoption	  	  	  
Market	  share	   A	   Customers	  will	  easily	  adopt	  product	  /	  service	  
B	   Benefits	  harder	  to	  identify,	  adoption	  issues	  
C	   No	  clear	  benefits,	  or	  major	  adoption	  issues	  
V3	  	   Protectability	  	   Profitability	   A	   Product	  patented	  or	  significant	  other	  barrier	  
B	   It	  will	  not	  be	  easy	  to	  replicate.	  
C	   Anyone	  could	  copy	  it	  easily.	  
V4	  	  	   Entrepreneur	  
experience	  	  	  
Reputation	   A	   Significant	  relevant	  experience	  
B	   Limited	  experience,	  appropriate	  knowledge	  
C	   No	  evidence	  of	  required	  experience	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Venture	  Criteria	   Evidence	  of	   	   Examples	  





A	   Finished	  product	  
B	   Design	  complete	  -­‐	  technical	  issues	  addressed	  








A	   Realistic	  marketing	  plan/	  distribution	  partner	  
B	   Options	  identified	  —	  no	  agreements	  in	  place	  






Market	  risk	   A	   Customers	  in	  place,	  committed	  to	  purchase	  
B	   Customers	  engaged	  in	  development	  project	  







A	   Sound	  business	  model	  and	  cash	  management	  
B	   Unclear	  profitability,	  limited	  cash	  manage	  
C	   No	  evidence	  of	  profit	  or	  cash	  management	  
 
Code Rejection Reason:  RE – insufficient return (0 for rejection, 1 for no rejection) 
    RI – excess risk (0 for rejection, 1 for no rejection) 




Future venture value 
insufficient to generate return  
Percentage equity insufficient 
to generate return 
I never see this company being large enough to attract an acquirer (no valuation)     
Slow sales growth means I’d be better off putting money in bank (insufficient return) 
The ownership percentage you are proposing for me makes it impossible to 





Excess technological risk 
Excess physical risk 
Excess financial risk 
Excess people risk  
Come back when the product is finished (excess technological risk) 
I am worried that you don’t have a secure supply chain (excess physical risk) 
With those overheads, you will never be profitable (excess financial risk) 

















































































































V1	  	   A	   Large	  market	  potential	  (i.e.	  over	  $20	  m.)	  
B	   Medium	  market	  potential	  (i.e.	  over	  $5	  m.)	  
C	   Unable	  to	  predict	  —	  likely	  less	  than	  $5	  m.	  
V2	  	   A	   Customers	  will	  easily	  adopt	  product	  /	  service	  
B	   Benefits	  harder	  to	  identify,	  adoption	  issues	  
C	   No	  clear	  benefits,	  or	  major	  adoption	  issues	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   V3	  	   A	   Product	  patented	  or	  significant	  other	  barrier	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   B	   It	  will	  not	  be	  easy	  to	  replicate.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   C	   Anyone	  could	  copy	  it	  easily.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   V4	  	  	   A	   Significant	  relevant	  experience	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   B	   Limited	  experience,	  appropriate	  knowledge	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   C	   No	  evidence	  of	  required	  experience	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   V5	  	   A	   Finished	  product	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   B	   Design	  complete	  -­‐	  technical	  issues	  addressed	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   C	   Needs	  more	  research	  and	  development	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   V6	  	  
	  
A	   Realistic	   marketing	   plan/	   distribution	  
partner	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   B	   Options	  identified	  —	  no	  agreements	  in	  place	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   C	   Limited	  thought	  given	  to	  distribution	  issues	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   V7	  	  
	  
A	   Customers	  in	  place,	  committed	  to	  purchase	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   B	   Customers	  engaged	  in	  development	  project	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   C	   No	  first	  customers	  identified.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   V8	  	  
	  
A	   Sound	  business	  model	  and	  cash	  management	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   B	   Unclear	  profitability,	  limited	  cash	  manage	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   C	   No	  evidence	  of	  profit	  or	  cash	  management	  




Table B: Sample coded data for elimination due to insufficient return or excess risk 
 
165 
Coding instructions for coding sheet B – identifying behaviors as manifestations of characteristics 
Form information;   Coding  date:    Your initials:    (Reference will be added by ALM) 
Code Entrepreneur:   Name of principle entrepreneur (Use CBC designation)  
Coding mandate – Observe behaviors of entrepreneur and reaction of BAs so that at the end of the interaction you can the 11 
aspects of the characteristics described below on a scale of 1 – 5. Coding should be based on the relative score in relation to the other 
entrepreneurs and strongly consider the reactions of the BA (look for follow up questions from BA to inform coding schema). Try not to 
code everyone 3 for every characteristic.   Note high levels of traits should be coded 5 – even if they seem to have a negative effect on BA. 
Code: offer: (1 is offer made, 0 is no offer made) 
CD, ED, TD: Code overall impression of each of the 11 characteristics listed (at end of interaction 




Management	  ability	  	  
Social	  skills	  
Limited	  evidence	  of	  technical	  
issues	  involved	  in	  product	  dev.	  
Poor	  presentation	  skills	  
Demonstrates	  ability	  to	  solve	  
complex	  technical	  issues	  






Develop	  innovative	  solutions	  
Solve	  problems	  /	  good	  
decisions	  
Provides	  little	  evidence	  of	  ability	  
to	  “think	  outside	  the	  box”	  
Recounts	  previous	  poor	  decisions	  
without	  realizing	  errors	  
Responds	  to	  questions	  with	  novel	  
solutions	  that	  address	  problem	  	  
Shows	  ability	  to	  make	  good	  







Gather	  resources	  /	  build	  
networks	  
Little	  evidence	  that	  knows	  how	  to	  
build	  an	  organization	  
No	  external	  connections	  or	  social	  
networks	  
Addresses	  specific	  challenges	  of	  
establishing	  new	  organization	  
Wide	  network	  of	  relevant	  







No	  evidence	  of	  prior	  
management	  or	  leadership	  
experience	  	  
No	  record	  of	  establishing	  
anything	  new	  (or	  of	  success)	  
Proven	  track	  record	  of	  leadership	  
(not	  necessarily	  business)	  
Strong	  track	  record	  of	  creating	  









Industry	  or	  domain	  
familiarity	  
No	  evidence	  of	  technical	  skills	  
required	  	  
Limited	  understanding	  of	  market	  
Strong	  evidence	  of	  technical	  skills	  
required	  
Profound	  understanding	  of	  
marketplace	  and	  competitors	  
ED3	  
Education	   Formal	  programs	  Informal	  training	  
No	  evidence	  presented	  of	  
participation	  in	  any	  form	  of	  
training	  or	  post-­‐secondary	  
education	  
Often	  a	  degree	  (does	  not	  have	  to	  
be	  directly	  relevant)	  






Confident	  /	  high	  conviction	  
Optimistic	  /	  ext.	  control	  
orientation	  	  
Autonomy	  /	  self-­‐efficacy	  
Low	  level	  of	  confidence	  –	  difficult	  
to	  see	  leadership	  	  
Unclear	  has	  the	  vision	  to	  
overcome	  adversity	  
Extreme	  confidence	  –	  not	  always	  
willing	  to	  take	  feedback	  




Enthusiasm	  /	  passion	  
Energetic	  /	  outgoing	  
Action	  orientation	  /	  
proactive	  
Introverted	  and	  uninspiring	  
Gathers	  excessive	  data	  before	  
making	  decision	  
Views	  business	  as	  his	  or	  her	  
“baby”	  and	  can	  be	  over-­‐protective	  
Leaps	  into	  things	  without	  full	  
information	  
TD3	   Openness	  to	  
experience	  
Explore	  novel	  ideas	  	  	  	  	  
Innovative/Easily	  adaptable	  
Willing	  to	  take	  risk	  
Not	  clear	  has	  ability	  to	  overcome	  
problems	  or	  pivot	  business	  
High	  risk	  aversions	  
Identifies	  many	  opportunities,	  
keeps	  refocusing	  business	  plan	  




Honest	  /	  trustworthy	  /	  
integrity	  
Listens	  to	  feedback	  /	  
sympathetic	  
Develops	  networks	  	  
Doesn’t	  provide	  straightforward	  
answers	  to	  questions	  	  	  
Provides	  limited	  evidence	  of	  
successful	  partnerships	  
Open	  and	  frank,	  discloses	  
information	  freely	  
Willing	  to	  rely	  on	  anyone	  who	  




Motivated	  /	  need	  for	  
achievement	  	  
Dependable	  /	  organized	  /	  	  
Committed	  /	  persistent	  	  
Limited	  evidence	  of	  inner	  drive	  
or	  planning	  and	  organizing	  ability	  
Gives	  us	  easily	  
Strong	  work	  effort	  /	  continues	  
despite	  setbacks	  
Organized	  	  
Wants	  to	  make	  a	  difference	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Date of coding: __________________  Coder: _______________  Coding sheet ref: B________________ 















































































































































	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Entrepreneur behaviors coded as evidence of high levels of characteristic (5), average level  (3) or low level (1) 




Table C: Sample coded data for elimination due to excess managerial risk 
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Coding instructions for coding sheet T – identifying trust behaviors  
Form information;   Coding  date:    Your initials  (Reference will be added by ALM) 
Code Entrepreneur:   Name of principle entrepreneur (Use CBC designation)  
Coding mandate – Observe interaction and code for each example of trust behavior (by type) that builds, damages of violates 
trust. For trust violation explain why trust is violated not damaged.  Code offer, acceptance & controls: similarities & presentation  
Code: offer: (1 is offer made, 0 is no offer made), acceptance (1 is offer accepted, 0 is not accepted) 
Code similarities: (1 is there an identified similarity between one of the BAs and the entrepreneur, 0 there is no similarity noted) 
Code presentation quality scale of 1 – 5 (where 1 is poor & 5 is excellent)   Code controls (1 control introduced, 0 no control) 
T1 – T12: Code instances of trust building (X), trust damaging (D), or trust violating (V) behaviors 






y	   Consistency	   Displays of behavior that confirm previous promises 
Shows inconsistencies between 
words & actions 
Fails to keep promises and 
agreements 
Benevolence	   Exhibits concern about well-being of others 
Shows self-interest ahead of 
others’ well being 
Takes advantage of others when 
they are vulnerable 
Alignment	   Actions confirms shared values and/or objectives 
Exhibits behaviors sometimes 
inconsistent with declared values 
Demonstrates lack of shared values 






Competence	   Displays relevant technical and/or business ability 
Shows lack of context specific 
ability 
Misrepresents ability by claiming to 
have non-existent competence 
Experience	    Demonstrates relevant work 
and/or training experience 
Relies on inappropriate 
experience to make decision Misrepresents experience 
Judgment	   Confirms ability to make accurate and objective decisions 
Relies inappropriately on third 
parties 
Judges others without giving them 







Disclosure	   Shows vulnerability by sharing confidential information 
Shares confidential information 
without thinking of consequences  
Shares confidential information 
likely to cause damage 
Reliance	   Shows willingness to be vulnerable through task delegation  
Reluctant to delegate, or 
introduces controls on 
subordinates’ performances 
Is unwilling to rely on 




Demonstrates ‘coachability’ and 
willingness to change 
Postpones implementation of ideas 
/ makes excuses for failures Refutes feedback or blames others 
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e	   Accuracy	   Provides truthful and timely information 
Unintentionally misrepresents or 
delays information transmission 
Deliberately misrepresents or 
conceals critical information 
Explanation	   Explains details / consequence of information provided Ignores request for explanations Dismisses request for explanations 
Openness	   Open to new ideas or new ways of doing things 
Does not listen or refutes 
feedback 
Shuts down or undermines new 
ideas 
 
S: Code Entrepreneur/BA similarities (Code: 1 for similarity observed, 0 for no similarity observed) 







Common culture or geographic heritage noted (i.e. both are immigrants/single mothers) 
Common University or Company experience (i.e. both graduated from same university) 
Common sport or pastime (i.e. both like horse riding) 
 
P: Code Presentation Quality (Code: 1 for poor quality, 5 for high quality) 







Limited evidence of critical factors, lack of confidence, incomplete information, looks amateurish 
Presents critical factors, not polished, knows information but does not volunteer, unimpressive 
Highlights important critical factors, professional, responds to questions, engaging, polished   
 
C: Code Introduction of Controls in relationship (Code: 1 for controls introduced, 0 for no controls) 
 Examples BA owns more than 50% of the company or issued special share 
BA introduces own employee to operate at senior management role 





Examples of trust building, damaging and violating behaviors 





















K.     
Entrepreneur refuses new and improved investment offer because she 
has already committed to first investor 
Entrepreneur offers to stay late to keep office open so that employee can 
go home to take care of personal issue 
Entrepreneur provides information about challenging technology issues 
that another person may have failed to disclose 
Entrepreneur allows friend to represent company at important customer 
meeting because unable to travel for health reasons 
Entrepreneur listens to feedback from BA and incorporates changes 
based on advice into business plan 
Entrepreneur espouses the idea of a multicultural working environment 
but 90% of employees are white 
Entrepreneur has been trained in computer programming but shows lack 
of basic skills required to design software programs 
Entrepreneur requires employee travelling on work to file daily reports 
on work plan and daily accomplishments 
Despite promises to pay, entrepreneur fails to pay supplier when 
payment due because of unforeseen cash flow issue  
Entrepreneur promises to pay supplier on time despite the fact that he 
knows that no money is available  
Fires employee for poor performance without being willing to listen to 
an explanation about extenuating circumstances. 
 Builds trust through consistency  
 
Builds trust through benevolence 
 
Builds trust through benevolence 
 
Builds trust through reliance 
 
Builds trust through receptiveness 
 
Damages trust through lack of alignment 
 
Damages trust through lack of competence 
 
Damages trust through lack of reliance 
 
Damages trust through lack of consistency 
 
Violates trust through deliberate 
inconsistency between words and actions 
Violates trust through making poor judgment 




Date of coding: __________________ Coder: _______________  Coding sheet ref: T________________ 
 
Entrepreneur behaviors coded as X – trust building, D – trust damaging, V – trust violating 
Controls indicated based on linking control to trust damage (1 - 12) (no indication if no control) 
Similarities coded as 1 if obvious similarity recognized by Dragon, 0 if none obvious, Presentation coded on scale 1 (poor) – 3 (average) – 5 
(high) 
Outcomes coded as 1 offer made, 0 no-offer and 1 offer accepted, 0 not accepted 
 
 

























































































































	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  




Table D: Sample coded data for elimination due to excess relationship risk 
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